We continue our speculation about constitutionalism after Trump (after some mundane observations about the 2025 elections), by broadening our lens to include some thoughts about what progressives might do to present appealing visions of an egalitarian and multicultural society that’s part of our heritage. We disagree a bit about the level at which the conversation should be pitched and then turn to some suggestions about “principled compromises” that progressives could offer to appeal to some people who at present find MAGA-ism the best thing available to them. The compromises deal with public support for education in religiously affiliated schools and some aspects of trans rights. We disagree about what the proposed compromises, with Tushnet arguing that they either don’t give MAGA supporters anything they can’t get from the Supreme Court or mistakenly treat issues as serious policy proposals when they are, in the jargon, performative. We don’t resolve our disagreements but promise to come back to them later!

Our conversation with Richard Re focuses on his Foreword to the Harvard Law Review’s annual Supreme Court Review. The Foreword argues that the Roberts Court today is a conservative version of the Warren Court whose decisions are as supported today or perhaps even better supported today by a political majority as were the Warren Court’s decisions. We suggest that his argument is a domesticated version of the more politically engaged analysis of Supreme Court decisions offered by people associated with Critical Legal Studies—and that the domestication can’t conceal the fundamentally political nature of the Court’s decisions (today or during the Warren Court era). Re in turn disagrees!

If we manage to extricate ourselves from our current constitutional plight, what might things look like? Or, alternatively, what sorts of constitutionally inflected policies should Democrats offer as part of their political effort to defeat Trumpism? We argue pretty forcefully against what we call “restorationism,” a program that would simply reinstitute the constitutional agenda that MAGA constitutionalism rejects. This episode focuses on the role that skepticism about expertise plays in MAGA constitutionalism. After describing how that skepticism is tied to the extremely strong theory of the unitary executive that the Trump administration advances, we offer some thoughts about how progressive policies—particularly with respect to the design of the institutions of the administrative state—could combine some degree of justified skepticism with greater popular participation in lawmakng in ways that some MAGA voters as well as many progressives might find appealing.

We talk about the Jimmy Kimmel episode, a small victory in the fight against Trumpism. We range more widely, though, in identifying no fewer than five groups who have competing First Amendment interests in having Kimmel on or off the airwaves, which makes figuring out what the First Amendment “means” in this setting. We emphasize the interests of broadcasters in choosing what to air and the interests of potential listeners in hearing—and preventing others from hearing—what they want. Any government intervention supports the free-speech interests of one or another group and undermines the free-speech interests of other groups. After discussing the way in which New Deal constitutional doctrine tried to separate economic regulation from regulation of fundamental rights, we discuss the relation between property rights and the ability to exercise your right to free expression, we end with a discussion of the possibility of antitrust regulation of large media corporations, which was implicated in the Kimmel episode. Reconciling antitrust regulation of the sort progressives want with existing constitutional doctrine takes some serious analytic work, which progressives ought to be doing now.

Why are the birthright citizenship cases both not such a big deal and a big deal? After going through the arguments for the Trump administration’s position in some detail (the arguments against it are so obvious that we don’t spend much time on them), we situate the cases in the administration’s larger policy and ideological agendas: from a policy point of view they aren’t that big a deal, but from an ideological one they might be.

Our conversation with Will Baude covers his ideas about originalism as "our law" and the implications of his position for a constitution--ours, perhaps--that isn't normatively attractive overall.

We pick up after our summer break with a recap of our arguments about constitutional theory. Then we discuss the pending Supreme Court decision about President Trump’s power to impose tariffs, getting into some weeds that most popular commentary avoids, including a lot of detail about the major questions doctrine.

Today we apply our way of thinking about the Constitution—what we’ve been calling constitutional theory—to a topic that isn’t usually discussed in those terms even though it gets a lot of attention: constitutional criminal procedure, focusing on police practices like stop-and-frisk and on the Miranda warnings. As usual our questions are about the connection between judicial (and political and bureaucratic) regulation of police practices and the people’s ability to govern itself. And as usual we divide (a bit) over whether courts have made things better, whether they’ve actively made things worse by exacerbating the race-based inequalities produced by the politics of crime, and whether the courts might come up with better ways of regulating police conduct that would enhance self-government.

This current events episode uses ICE arrests of public officials and protestors as the vehicle for a discussion of jury nullification as a constitutional or political practice. We begin with the story of abolitionist interference with the renditions—a word in the news again—of fugitives from enslavement as authorized by the 1850 Fugitive Slave Act. We use jury nullification to explore the opposition between “law” and “non-law” in political practice. We also discuss more briefly some aspects of the First Amendment defenses Harvard University is mounting against the Trump administration’s attacks—and reflect even more briefly on the importance of preserving civil society’s institutions as proto-authoritarians seek to move their agenda forward.

Joseph Fishkin and William Forbath join us to discuss their book The Anti-Oligarchy Constitution. We talk about what their book's title describes, why they think it matters to describe it as a "constitutional" position rather than a "mere" set of policy prescriptions, the importance of historical traditions in thinking about the political use of the word "constitutional," the advantages and disadvantages of using that word as an intensifier, and more (including a digression of the possibility of "secession" or a division of the United States into "blue" and "red" nations)."

Mike gets a chance to lay out his approach. We begin with a longish discussion of the Emancipation Proclamation: Was it merely a “bill of lading”/military measure (Mark) or an extraconstitutional action justified because it was right (Mike)—or both? Mike then develops his approach by distinguishing between simple justice and legal justice and argues that legal justice interferes with the accomplishment of simple justice by trying to shut down disagreements about simple justice requires with an authoritarian “Get over it!” His alternative is the development of norms of reciprocity, mutual respect, compromise, and more to guide the temporary resolution of such disagreements through ordinary politics. Mark snipes along the way, wondering whether those norms can be retrieved from today’s swamps of ordinary politics.

The final (!) episode laying out Tushnet’s “craft” account of what judicial review done well looks like. We discuss Tushnet’s argument that good judges use legal reasoning, not direct appeals to justice, to explain and justify what they do. His shorthand is that, just as a well-designed legislative process gives everyone a fair shot at getting their policies adopted and so produces outcomes that those who lose out should and typically do accept, so a well-performed judicial function gives everyone a fair shot at making reasoned arguments that judges evaluate on the merits. And that means, for him, that good judges engage in legal reasoning, working with the plumbing of our constitutional system. Seidman argues that legal reasoning is so far removed from the way ordinary people think about the issues raised in constitutional cases that the judges Tushnet admires or hopes to see on the Court can’t resolve constitutional controversies in a way that those whose positions are rejected should or are likely to accept. Along the way we talk about the mindset judges should bring to their task, criticizing Justice O’Connor’s slogan, “Sometimes Wrong but Never in Doubt.”

We have our first guest! We engage in a wide-ranging conversation with Aziz Rana, jumping off from his important book The Constitutional Bind: How Americans Came to Idolize a Document That Fails Them (which we urge you to buy and read). Rana’s book ends before the turn of this century, and our conversation both extends the ideas he develops there (particularly about the connection between the role of the US on the international scene and the US constitutional creed), and takes up his and our thinking about contemporary issues.

Another discussion of current events and constitutional theory. We distinguish between “small bore” and “large bore” challenges to Trump’s agenda—the former dealing with individual injustices and the latter with more comprehensive programs like tariffs—and suggest that courts might do something about the former but are less likely to do anything about the latter. We disagree as usual about the potential political impact of interventions in small bore cases. And we wrap the episode up with a discussion of whether Trump could serve a third term through creative constitutional interpretation or a workaround—and end up with arguing over the connection between some embedded norms like a “no third term” norm and the Constitution itself. More about that to come.

This current events episode uses the Alien Enemies Act case before Judge Boasberg as our vehicle for examining what constitutional theory can contribute to understanding fast-moving current events. We argue about how nervous we should be about Seidman’s arguments for constitutional disobedience in our current context and about the contributions, if any, constitutional litigation can make to alleviating—or exacerbating—what’s going on. We conclude with a description of what commentators might mean when they describe Trump’s actions as “illegal,” and discuss why such descriptions might not be as helpful as you might initially think.

With the idea of constitutional "workarounds” as a focal point, we describe the quite large areas of agreement between us about democratic constitutions in general and about the US Constitution specifically and try to clarify where our disagreements lie. The disagreements are mostly about how the US constitutional system functions today and partly about what a good democratic constitution building upon actual US experience would look like.

This episode lays out a different way of thinking about the US Constitution as of 2025. (How different it is from Tushnet’s is something we discuss in the episode and will continue to worry over.) Seidman begins by describing what the Constitution as written in 1789 was designed to do then—set up a government, set out some compromises between then-important political forces in a sort of peace treaty, and state some general aspirations the new government might hope to advance. He then asks whether adhering to the Constitution of 1789, particularly by treating it as in general enforceable by the courts, is necessary—or even useful—as a way of keeping the government running, maintaining social order in the face of disagreement, and guiding the nation toward implementing attractive values. His answer is, “Decidedly not.” Along the way Tushnet offers some support and some criticisms, and the discussion opens the way to exploring our differences in more detail in a subsequent episode.

After our discussion of the first month of the Trump administration and constitutional law, we return to our exploration of constitutional theory—this time turning away from theories of interpretation to theories about constitutional foundations: What’s the best story about why people adopt constitutions? This episode begins to examine stories that say that constitutions are good ways—maybe the only way—to work out how to peacefully resolve their disagreements about what ought to be done through what we call ordinary politics. We look at some reasons for (and against) entrenching the “rules about ruling”—and expose some disagreements about constitutional foundations that we’ll get into in later episodes.

This is a “current events” episode. We discuss whether, one month in, we should think about the Trump administration as initiating a constitution crisis or a constitutional revolution--regime change at home. Should we think of courts as the opposition’s Obi-Wan Kenobi—its only hope—or as doing nothing more than putting speed bumps in Trump’s way (and doing that might be good enough). Moving outside our wheelhouse we also offer some amateur political analysis of the conditions for Trump’s political success or failure with a project of political transformation.

This episode discusses living constitutionalism and what we call eclectic approaches to constitutional interpretation such as Phillip Bobbitt’s “modalities” approach. We argue that such approaches have some virtues—including greater descriptive accuracy than originalism and democracy-focused approaches—but significant weaknesses. We also begin to introduce Tushnet’s “craft” account of constitutional interpretation, to be developed in more detail in later episodes.