Docket Number: 24-1287
Date Argued: 11/05/25

24-1287 LEARNING RESOURCES, INC. V. TRUMP

DECISION BELOW:

LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 25-5202

QUESTION PRESENTED:

The International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1701 et seq. ("IEEPA") permits the President, upon a valid emergency declaration, to "investigate, block during the pendency of an investigation, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit, any acquisition, holding, withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal, transportation, importation or exportation of, or dealing in, or exercising any right, power, or privilege with respect to, or transactions involving, any property in which any foreign country or a national thereof has any interest[.]" Id. § l 702(a)(1)(B). Until now, no President in IEEPA's nearly 50-year history has ever invoked it to impose tariffs-let alone the sweeping worldwide tariffs imposed pursuant to the executive orders challenged here.

The question presented is:

Whether IEEPA authorizes the President to impose tariffs.

THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT IS GRANTED. CONSOLIDATED WITH 25-250 FOR ONE HOUR ORAL ARGUMENT. EXPEDITED BRIEFING. THE CASES WILL BE SET FOR ARGUMENT IN THE FIRST WEEK OF THE NOVEMBER 2025 ARGUMENT SESSION.

CERT. GRANTED 9/9/2025

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25-250 TRUMP V. V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC.

DECISION BELOW: 2025 WL 2490634

LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 2025-1812, 2025-1813

QUESTION PRESENTED:

1. Whether the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), Pub. L. No. 95-223, Tit. II, 91 Stat. 1626, authorizes the tariffs imposed by President Trump pursuant to the national emergencies declared or continued in Proclamation 10,886 and Executive Orders 14,157, 14,193, 14,194, 14,195, and 14,257, as amended.

2. If IEEPA authorizes the tariffs, whether the statute unconstitutionally delegates legislative authority to the President.

THE MOTION TO EXPEDITE AND THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI ARE GRANTED. CONSOLIDATED WITH 24-1287 FOR ONE HOUR ORAL ARGUMENT. EXPEDITED BRIEFING. THE CASES WILL BE SET FOR ARGUMENT IN THE FIRST WEEK OF THE NOVEMBER 2025 ARGUMENT SESSION.

CERT. GRANTED 9/9/2025

https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2025/24-1287_097c.pdf

Docket Number: 24-724
Date Argued: 11/04/25

24-724 HAIN CELESTIAL GROUP V. PALMQUIST

DECISION BELOW: 103 F.4th 294

LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 23-40197

QUESTION PRESENTED:

Respondents, citizens of Texas, filed this products-liability suit in state court against Petitioners Hain Celestial Group, Inc., then a citizen of Delaware and New York, and Whole Foods, Inc., a citizen of Texas. Hain removed based on diversity jurisdiction, arguing that Whole Foods should be dismissed as fraudulently joined. The district court agreed, dismissing Whole Foods with prejudice. After two additional years of federal-court litigation and a two-week jury trial, the district court granted judgment as a matter of law to Hain. On appeal, without ruling on the merits, the Fifth Circuit held that the district court erred in dismissing Whole Foods, vacated the final judgment, and ordered the matter remanded to state court to start from scratch. Relying on Respondents' post-removal amended complaint, the panel held, in conflict with several other courts of appeals, that the district court lacked jurisdiction to enter judgment as to the completely diverse parties before it.

The questions presented are:

1. Whether a district court's final judgment as to completely diverse parties must be vacated when an appellate court later determines that it erred by dismissing a non-diverse party at the time of removal.

2. Whether a plaintiff may defeat diversity jurisdiction after removal by amending the complaint to add factual allegations that state a colorable claim against a nondiverse party when the complaint at the time of removal did not state such a claim

CERT. GRANTED 4/28/2025

https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2025/24-724_ebgj.pdf

Docket Number: 24-808
Date Argued: 11/04/25

24-808 CONEY ISLAND AUTO PARTS, INC. V. BURTON

DECISION BELOW: 109 F.4th 438

LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 23-5881

QUESTION PRESENTED:

Well-settled legal principles dictate that a judgment entered in the absence of personal jurisdiction is void. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(4) authorizes federal courts to vacate a judgment when it is void. A motion seeking vacatur, however, "must be made within a reasonable time." Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1).

Each of the United States Courts of Appeals other than the Sixth Circuit holds that there is effectively no time limit for moving to vacate a judgment, notwithstanding Rule 60(c)(1)'s "reasonable time" requirement, when the judgment is obtained in the absence of personal jurisdiction. The common thinking among these circuits is that a judgment entered without personal jurisdiction is void ab initio. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit is the sole outlier. In this case, it held that Rule 60(c)(1) governs the timing of a motion seeking vacatur of a void judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b)(4).

The question presented is:

Whether Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(c)(1) imposes any time limit to set aside a void default judgment for lack of personal jurisdiction.

CERT. GRANTED 6/6/2025

https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2025/24-808_k53l.pdf

24-924 HENCELY V. FLUOR CORP.

DECISION BELOW: 120 F.4th 412

LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 21-1994

QUESTION PRESENTED:

Former U.S. Army Specialist Winston T. Hencely was critically and permanently injured by a suicide bomber inside Bagram Airfield in Afghanistan. The bomber, Ahmad Nayeb, worked on base for a government contractor. An Army investigation found that the attack's primary contributing factor was the contractor's actions in breach of its Army contract and in violation of the military's instructions to supervise Nayeb. Hencely sued the government contractor for negligence under South Carolina law. He did not sue the military under the Federal Tort Claims Act.

Even so, the Fourth Circuit held that Hencely's state claims are preempted by unspoken "federal interests" emanating from an FTCA exception. Invoking Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988), the court of appeals held that the FTCA's exception immunizing the government for "[a]ny claim arising out of the combatant activities of the military or naval forces ... during time of war," 28 U.S.C. §2680(j), barred Hencely's South Carolina claims against the contractor. The decision below reaffirmed a 3-1-1 split among the Second, Third, Fourth, Ninth and D.C. Circuits over Boyle's reach when contractors defend against state tort claims by invoking §2680(j).

The question presented is:

Should Boyle be extended to allow federal interests emanating from the FTCA's combatant-activities exception to preempt state tort claims against a government contractor for conduct that breached its contract and violated military orders?

CERT. GRANTED 6/2/2025

https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2025/24-924_c18e.pdf

24-1056 RICO V. UNITED STATES

DECISION BELOW: 2025 WL 720900

LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 24-2662

QUESTION PRESENTED:

Whether the fugitive-tolling doctrine applies in the context of supervised release.

CERT. GRANTED 6/30/2025

https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2025/24-1056_4gd5.pdf

24-624 CASE V. MONTANA

DECISION BELOW: 553 P.3d 985

LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: DA 23-0136

QUESTION PRESENTED:

Whether law enforcement may enter a home without a search warrant based on less than probable cause that an emergency is occurring, or whether the emergency-aid exception requires probable cause.

CERT. GRANTED 6/2/2025

See transcript https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2025/24-624_3eah.pdf

Docket Number: 24-109

Decision Below: 732 F.Supp.3d 574

Question Presented

Over the State's strenuous objections, the Middle District of Louisiana held, Robinson v. Ardoin , 605 F. Supp. 3d 759 (M.D. La. 2022)-and the Fifth Circuit affirmed, Robinson v. Ardoin , 86 F.4th 574 (5th Cir. 2023)-that Louisiana likely violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA) by failing to create a second majority-Black congressional district. The Fifth Circuit gave the Legislature a small window of time to adopt its own remedial plan, or else the State would have to go to trial, which would almost certainly end in the Middle District imposing its own preferred map. Rather than acquiesce in the Middle District's preferences, the Legislature reclaimed its sovereign redistricting pen and passed S.B. 8, which created a second majority-Black district as the courts demanded, protected the Legislature's sovereign prerogatives, and achieved its political goals.

In this case, a majority of a three-judge court sitting in the Western District of Louisiana enjoined S.B. 8 as an unconstitutional racial gerrymander. The questions presented are:

1. Did the majority err in finding that race predominated in the Legislature's enactment of S.B. 8?

2. Did the majority err in finding that S.B. 8 fails strict scrutiny?

3. Did the majority err in subjecting S.B. 8 to the Gingles preconditions?

4. Is this action non-justiciable?

CONSOLIDATED FOR ONE HOUR ORAL ARGUMENT WITH 24-110. THESE CASES ARE RESTORED TO THE CALENDAR FOR REARGUMENT. IN DUE COURSE, THE COURT WILL ISSUE AN ORDER SCHEDULING ARGUMENT AND SPECIFYING ANY ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS TO BE ADDRESSED IN SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEFING.

Order of August 1, 2025:

THE PARTIES ARE DIRECTED TO FILE SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEFS ADDRESSING THE FOLLOWING QUESTION RAISED ON PAGES 36—38 OF THE BRIEF FOR APPELLEES: WHETHER THE STATE’S INTENTIONAL CREATION OF A SECOND MAJORITY-MINORITY CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT VIOLATES THE FOURTEENTH OR FIFTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE U. S. CONSTITUTION.

JURISDICTION NOTED 11/4/2024

---------------------------------------

24-110 ROBINSON V. CALLAIS

DECISION BELOW: 732 F.Supp.3d 574

LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 3:24-cv-00122-DCJ-CES-RRS

The questions presented are:

1. Did the District Court err in concluding that race predominated in the design of CD6 based on the Legislature's stated intent to comply with the rulings of the Robinson courts without presuming the good faith of the legislature, attempting to disentangle the Legislature's racial and political considerations, or requiring an alternative map that satisfied both §2 and the Legislature's political objectives, as required by Alexander v. S. C. State Conf. of NAACP , 144 S. Ct. 1221, 1233-1234 (2024)?

2. Did the District Court err when it disregarded the rulings of the courts in Robinson that the Gingles preconditions could be (and had been) satisfied and instead required that the State's enacted map satisfy the first Gingles precondition to survive strict scrutiny?

3. Did the District Court err in failing to accord the Louisiana Legislature sufficient breathing room to account for political considerations that resulted in a less compact district than necessary to satisfy §2?

4. Did the District Court err in relying on extra-record evidence and ignoring the evidence in the record on SB8's respect for communities of interest in concluding that SB8 failed to satisfy strict scrutiny?

5. Did the District Court abuse its discretion by unnecessarily expediting the proceedings and limiting the evidence presented in this complex, fact-intensive case?

See Transcript https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2025/24-109_feah.pdf

Docket Number: 24-482

Decision Bellow: 113 F.4th 839 (8th Cir. 2024)

Question Presented

Whether criminal restitution under the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act (MVRA) is penal for purposes of the Ex Post Facto Clause.

John F. Bash, Esquire, of Austin, Texas, is invited to brief and argue this case, as amicus curiae, in support of the judgement below.

Cert. Granted April 7, 2025

See Transcript https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2025/24-482_6j37.pdf

Docket Number: 24-5438

Decision Below: CA 11 Order 6/27/2024

Lower Court Case Number: 24-11704

Question Presented

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1), "[a] claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus application under section 2254 that was presented in a prior application shall be dismissed." (emphasis added).

The first question presented is:

Whether 28 U.S.C. 2244(b)(1) applies to a claim presented in a second or successive motion to vacate under 22 U.S.C. § 2255.

* * *

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(E), "[t]he grant or denial of an authorization by a court of appeals to file a second or successive application shall not be appealable and shall not be the subject of a petition . . . for a writ of certiorari." (emphasis added).

The second question presented is:

Whether 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(E) deprives this Court of certiorari jurisdiction over the grant or denial of an authorization by a court of appeals to file a second or successive motion to vacate under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.

Kasdin M. Mitchell, Esquire, of Dallas, Texas, is invited to brief and argue this case, as amicus curiae, in support of the judgment below as to question 1 presented by the petition for a writ of certiorari.

Cert. Granted January 17, 2025

See Transcript

https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2025/24-5438_2dp3.pdf

Docket Number: 24-351

Date Argued: October 8, 2025

Decision Below: 96 F.4th 799 (5th Cir. 2024)

Lower Court Case Number: 23-10179

Question Presented

Docket Number: 24-568

Date Argued: October 8, 2025

Decision Below: 114 F.4th 634 (7th Cir. 2024)

Lower Court Case Number: 23-2644

Question Presented

Federal law sets the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November as the federal Election Day. 2 U.S.C. §§ 1, 7; and 3 U.S.C. § 1. Several states, including Illinois, have enacted state laws that allow ballots to be received and counted after Election Day. Petitioners contend these state laws are preempted under the Elections and Electors Clauses. Petitioners sued to enjoin Illinois' law allowing ballots to be received up to fourteen days after Election Day.

The sole question presented is whether Petitioners, as federal Candidates, have pleaded sufficient factual allegations to show Article III standing to challenge state time, place, and manner regulations concerning their federal elections.

Cert. Granted June 2, 2025.

See Transcript https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2025/24-568_7l48.pdf

Docket Number: 24-5774

Decision Below: 102 F.4th 60 (2d Cir. 2024)

Lower Court Case Number: 21-1379

Question Presented

1. Whether the Double Jeopardy Clause permits two sentences for an act that violates 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) and§ 924(j), a question that divides seven circuits but about which the Solicitor General and Petitioner agree.

2. Whether "Hobbs Act robbery qualifies as a crime of violence under §924(c)(3)(A), a question left open after" United States v. Taylor, 596 U.S. 845 (2022). United States v. Stoney , 62 F.4th 108, 113 (3d Cir. 2023).

Petition for a writ of certiorari is granted limited to question 1 presented by the petition. Charles L. McCloud, Esquire, of Washington, D.C., is invited to brief and argue this case, as amicus curiae, in support of the judgment below.

Cert. Granted March 3, 2025.

See transcript

https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2025/24-5774_7648.pdf

Docket Number: 24-539

Date Argued: October 07, 2025

Decision Below: 116 F.4th 1178

Question Presented

Kaley Chiles is a licensed counselor who helps people by talking with them. A practicing Christian, Chiles believes that people flourish when they live consistently with God's design, including their biological sex. Many of her clients seek her counsel precisely because they believe that their faith and their relationship with God establishes the foundation upon which to understand their identity and desires. But Colorado bans these consensual conversations based on the viewpoints they express. Its content- and viewpoint-based Counseling Restriction prohibits counseling conversations with minors that might encourage them to change their "sexual orientation or gender, identity, including efforts to change behaviors or gender expressions," while allowing conversations that provide "[a]ccpetance, support, and understanding for ... identity exploration and development, including ... [a]ssistance to a person undergoing gender transition." Colo. Rev. Stat. § 12-245-202(3.5).

The Tenth Circuit upheld this ban as a regulation of Chiles's conduct, not speech. In doing so, the court deepened a circuit split between the Eleventh and Third Circuits, which do not treat counseling conversations as conduct, and the Ninth Circuit, which does.

The question presented is:

Whether a law that censors certain conversations between counselors and their clients based on the viewpoints expressed regulates conduct or violates the Free Speech Clause.

Cert. Granted March 10, 2025.

See Transcript

https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2025/24-539_7l48.pdf

Docket Number: 24-440

Decision Below: 2024 WL 5354482

Lower Court Case Number: 23-1620

Question Presented

This case presents a clear, recognized, entrenched conflict over an important question about the application of state procedural rules in federal court.

Delaware, like numerous states, requires that in certain actions the plaintiff must also file an affidavit of merit ("AOM") with the complaint. See 18 Del. C. § 6853. An AOM is an affidavit signed by an expert stating that there are reasonable grounds to believe that each defendant has committed the alleged misconduct. See id.§ 6853(a)(l).

The Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth circuits hold that AOM provisions and comparable statutes do not govern actions in federal court because they answer the same question as-and therefore conflict with-several different Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Third and Tenth circuits, in contrast, hold that they present "no conflict" with any Federal Rules.

In the decision below, the Third Circuit, in an unpublished opinion, for at least the fifth time, refused to hold that an AOM statute conflicts with any Federal Rules. Judge Phipps "concur[red] in only the judgment." Third Circuit precedent required him to vote to affirm, he explained, but ''writing on a clean slate ... he may not [have] arrive[d] at that same conclusion."

The question presented is:

Whether a state law providing that a complaint must be dismissed unless it is accompanied by an expert affidavit may be applied in federal court.

Cert. Granted March 10, 2025

See Transcript (https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2025/24-440_q86b.pdf)

Docket Number: 24-557

Date Argued: October 6, 2025

Decision Below: 707 S.W.3d 138

Lower Court Case Number: Pd-0048-20

Question Presented

Whether a trial court abridges the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel by prohibiting the defendant and his counsel from discussing the defendant's testimony during an overnight recess.

Cert. Granted April 7, 2025

See transcript (https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2025/24-557_6j7a.pdf)

24A884 TRUMP V. CASA, INC.

DECISION BELOW: 2025 WL 654902

LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER:

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24A885 TRUMP V. WASHINGTON

DECISION BELOW: 2025 WL 553485

LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER:

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24A886 TRUMP V. NEW JERSEY

DECISION BELOW: 131 F.4th 27

LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER:

--

QUESTION PRESENTED:

THE APPLICATIONS (24A884, 24A885, AND 24A886) FOR PARTIAL STAYS ARE CONSOLIDATED AND DEFERRED PENDING ORAL ARGUMENT. THE APPLICATIONS ARE SET FOR A TOTAL OF ONE HOUR ORAL ARGUMENT AT 10 A.M. ON THURSDAY, MAY 15, 2025.

SET FOR ORAL ARGUMENT 4/17/2025

You can read the oral argument transcript here: https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2024/24a884_2c83.pdf

24-394 OK CHARTER SCHOOL BOARD V. DRUMMOND

DECISION BELOW: 558 P.3d 1

LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 121,694

QUESTION PRESENTED:

This Court has "repeatedly held that a State violates the Free Exercise Clause when it excludes religious observers from otherwise available public benefits." Carson as next friend of O. C. v. Makin, 596 U.S. 767, 778 (2022). Three times, the Court hasapplied that principle to strike down "state efforts to withhold otherwise available public benefits from religious organizations." Id. at 778-79 (citing Trinity Lutheran Church ofColumbia, Inc. v. Comer, 582 U.S. 449 (2017); Espinoza v. Mont. Dep't of Revenue, 591 U.S. 464 (2020)).

Contrary to those precedents, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that a state can exclude privately owned and operated religious charter schools from its charter-school program by enforcing state-law bans on "sectarian" and religiously affiliated charter schools. The court also held that a charter school engages in state action for constitutional purposes when it contracts with the state to provide publicly fundededucation. These rulings implicate an entrenched circuit split and present two questions for review:

o Whether the academic and pedagogical choices of a privately owned and run school constitute state action simply because it contracts with the state to offer a free educational option for interested students.

o Whether a state violates the Free Exercise Clause by excluding privately run religious schools from the state's charter-school program solely because the schools are religious, or whether a state can justify such an exclusion by invoking anti-establishment interests that go further than the Establishment Clause requires.

CONSOLIDATED WITH 24-396 FOR ONE HOUR ORAL ARGUMENT. JUSTICE BARRETT TOOK NO PART.EXPEDITED BRIEFING.

CERT. GRANTED 1/24/2025

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24-396 ST. ISIDORE OF SEVILLE SCHOOL V. DRUMMOND

DECISION BELOW: 558 P.3d 1

LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 121,694

QUESTION PRESENTED:

This Court has repeatedly held that the Free Exercise Clause prohibits a state from denying generally available benefits to a school solely because it is religious. That principle should have resolved this case. Petitioner is a private religious institution. Itseeks to partake in the benefits of Oklahoma's charter school program. But the court below invalidated Petitioner's contract with the charter school board. The court disregarded this Court's Free Exercise precedents because, in its view, Petitioner had become an arm of the government by virtue of that contract. It thus held that the Establishment Clause and Oklahoma laws aimed at creating "a complete separation ofchurch and state" compelled the court to deny Petitioner-on religious grounds-the benefits created by Oklahoma's Charter Schools Act.

The questions presented are:

o Whether the academic and pedagogical choices of a privately owned and run school constitute state action simply because it contracts with the state to offer a free educational option for interested students.

o Whether a state violates the Free Exercise Clause by excluding privately run religious schools from the state's charter school program solely because the schools arereligious, or whether a state can justify such an exclusion by invoking anti-establishment interests that go further than the Establishment Clause requires.

CONSOLIDATED WITH 24-394 FOR ONE HOUR ORAL ARGUMENT. JUSTICE BARRETT TOOK NO PART.EXPEDITED BRIEFING.

CERT. GRANTED 1/24/2025

You can read the oral argument transcript here:

https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2024/24-394_1b72.pdf

24-304 LABORATORY CORP. OF AMERICA V. DAVIS

DECISION BELOW: 2024 WL 489288

LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 22-55873

QUESTION PRESENTED:

o Whether a federal court may certify a class action when some of its members lack any Article III injury.

THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI IS GRANTED LIMITED TO THE FOLLOWING QUESTION: WHETHER A FEDERAL COURT MAY CERTIFY A CLASS ACTION PURSUANT TO FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 23(B)(3) WHENSOME MEMBERS OF THE PROPOSED CLASS LACK ANY ARTICLE III INJURY. EXPEDITED BRIEFING.

CERT. GRANTED 1/24/2025

You can read the oral argument transcript here:

https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2024/24-304_3e04.pdf

24-362 MARTIN V. UNITED STATES

DECISION BELOW: 2024 WL 1716235

LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 23-10062

QUESTION PRESENTED:

Petitioners are the innocent victims of a wrong-house raid conducted by an FBI SWAT team in Atlanta, Georgia. Seeking a remedy for torts committed against them, Petitioners brought a cause of action against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act. In its opinion below, the Eleventh Circuit held that all of Petitioners' FTCA claims are barred by sovereign immunity supplied either through the Constitution's Supremacy Clause or the FTCA's discretionary-function exception.

In one or more ways, the opinion below conflicts with decisions from every other circuit.

The questions presented are:

o Whether the Constitution's Supremacy Clause bars claims under the FTCA-a federal statute enacted by Congress-when the negligent or wrongful acts of federal employees "have some nexus with furthering federal policy and can reasonably be characterized as complying with the full range of federal law." Pet. App. 17a (quotation omitted).

o Whether the FTCA's discretionary-function exception bars claims for torts arising from wrong-house raids and similar negligent or wrongful acts by federal employees.

GRANTED LIMITED TO THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS: 1) WHETHER THE CONSTITUTION’S SUPREMACY CLAUSE BARS CLAIMS UNDER THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT WHEN THE NEGLIGENT OR WRONGFUL ACTS OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES HAVE SOME NEXUS WITH FURTHERING FEDERAL POLICY ANDCAN REASONABLY BE CHARACTERIZED AS COMPLYING WITH THE FULL RANGE OF FEDERAL LAW. 2) WHETHER THE DISCRETIONARY-FUNCTION EXCEPTION IS CATEGORICALLY INAPPLICABLE TO CLAIMS ARISING UNDER THE LAW ENFORCEMENT PROVISO TO THE INTENTIONAL TORTS EXCEPTION. EXPEDITED BRIEFING.CHRISTOPHER MILLS, ESQUIRE, OF CHARLESTON, SOUTH CAROLINA, IS INVITED TO BRIEF AND ARGUE THIS CASE, AS AMICUS CURIAE, IN SUPPORT OF THE JUDGMENT BELOW AS TO THE FIRST QUESTION IDENTIFIED IN THE ORDER GRANTING THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI.

CERT. GRANTED 1/27/2025

You can read the oral argument transcript here:

https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2024/24-362_8njq.pdf

24-320 SOTO V. UNITED STATES

DECISION BELOW: 92 F.4th 1094

LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 2022-2011

QUESTION PRESENTED:

This case determines whether thousands of medically retired combat veterans should receive all the combat related special compensation (CRSC) that Congress specifically authorized for combat veterans. The government has elected to calculatethe period of retroactive compensation due using the procedure in the Barring Act (31 U.S.C. § 3702) instead of the one in the CRSC statute (10 U.S.C. § 1413a)-a maneuver that allows the government to apply the Barring Act's six- year limitations period in order to pay the veterans less. But the Barring Act is a default provision and does not apply where "another law" provides a procedure for calculating the amount due-that is, for "settling" a demand for payment.

Although this Court's precedent defines "settlement" of demands for payment from the federal government as "the administrative determination of the amount due," it has not decided the test for whether a statute provides a settlement procedure that should apply in place of the Barring Act. And agency practice more broadly-which aligns with the test the District Court articulated and is consistent with this Court's definition of "settlement"-is irreconcilable with the novel test that the Federal Circuit applied, although both tests claim reliance on this Court's definition of "settlement."

The question presented is:

o When a person makes a demand for money from the federal government pursuant to federal statute, what test should courts and agencies use to determine whether that statute includes a settlement procedure that displaces the default procedures and limitations set forth in the Barring Act (31 U.S.C. § 3702)?

GRANTED LIMITED TO THE FOLLOWING QUESTION: GIVEN THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S HOLDING THAT A CLAIM FOR COMPENSATION UNDER 10 U. S. C. §1413a IS A CLAIM "INVOLVING ... RETIRED PAY" UNDER 31 U. S. C. §3702(a)(1)(A), DOES 10 U. S. C. §1413a PROVIDE A SETTLEMENT MECHANISM THAT DISPLACES THE DEFAULT PROCEDURES AND LIMITATIONS SET FORTH IN THE BARRING ACT?

CERT. GRANTED 1/17/2025

You can read the oral argument here:

https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2024/24-320_5436.pdf