What if POTUS wanted an OBBD? Let us say, purely hypothetically, that there is a point at which some combination of the spending excesses of the One Big Beautiful Bill, the government shutdown, a rejection by the Supreme Court of tariff mania, and more, result in a shortfall of revenues for the current administration. And let us also say that POTUS goes to his brains trust to ask how best to do an OBBD/R (One Big Beautiful Default/Restructuring). What path might the brains trust take? And what about the option of taxing the treasury holdings of foreign governments, which the administration has already signaled its interest in? Producer: Leanna Doty

The Invasion Tax The lawsuit over Ukraine's $3 billion bond debt to Russia seems to be on hold (maybe forever) in the English courts. And maybe there is no way for the Russian government to force repayment. Still, the debt is a minor cloud hanging (along with many bigger ones) over Ukraine. It would be nice if there was a way to make it go away permanently. Might there be? We talk about a common provision in a sovereign bond's Taxation section — we aren't sure how common, but it certainly isn't unique to Ukraine — that lets the issuer tax investors who have a connection to it other than simply holding its bonds. As written, this provision would allow Ukraine to impose a 100% tax on bond payments to Russia. This may not be what the drafters had in mind, and it opens the door to some unsavory tax shenanigans, but an Invasion Tax doesn't seem too objectionable. Also: "Whatever it takes" means "whatever it takes!" Except when it means something else. Producer: Leanna Doty

Argentina Again The Trump administration says it will do “whatever it takes” to rescue the Argentine peso and bond yields, saving buddy Javier Milei from electoral disaster. We do not think the U.S. Treasury can simply dole out money to Milei. If the administration does not want to go to Congress for permission (it generally does not), and if the Mexican bailouts of 1982 and 1995 are indicators, the U.S. Treasury will ask the Argentines to provide collateral of some sort. (The Falklands, maybe?) If so, holders of Argentine sovereign bonds might wonder whether they are entitled to some collateral too. Sovereign bonds have negative pledge clauses, which generally prevent the borrower from creating new secured debt without securing bondholders on equivalent terms. So, we looked at some of the negative pledge clauses in Argentine bonds. They are weird, but don't seem very protective. These are beautiful clauses, folks, BEAUTIFUL. Looks like the U.S. gets collateral, bondholders don't. Total disaster for them! Producer: Leanna Doty

Ukraine's Expansive "Fiscal Laws" Clause International sovereign bonds, and particularly those issued under English law, often include a clause providing that payments are subject to the applicable "fiscal and other laws." Usually, the clause makes clear this refers to fiscal laws in the “place of payment” (e.g., Luxembourg). Separately, international bonds also provide that, if the issuer imposes any taxes on bond payments, it must "gross up" payments to foreign investors, so the tax does not reduce their payments. Together, the two clauses usually immunize foreign investors from taxes imposed by the issuer but leave room for taxes imposed by the place of payment. Ukraine's bonds are different. They seem to leave room for Ukraine to impose its own "fiscal" law on payments. Arguably, they leave investors subject even to local laws that aren't fiscal in nature. Might this be a source of leverage for the country in its negotiations with GDP warrant holders, who have so far refused to make concessions in restructuring talks? Producer: Leanna Doty

The Greek GDP Warrant Drama Greece’s debt situation has improved remarkably, from default status in 2012 to investment grade in 2025. A few weeks ago though, Bloomberg reported on a brewing drama with the GDP warrants that were offered to investors in the brutal 2012 restructuring. Apparently, Greece has elected to exercise its right to call the warrants, and holders are yelling bloody murder at the low price at which Greece says it is entitled to buy. Every side has lawyered up and claims the other side is acting unreasonably. We speculate wildly on what might actually be going on and what is likely to happen. Producer: Leanna Doty

Some Questions, Now That it's About 3 Years Since Russia’s Default It has now been around 3 years since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which prompted EU and US sanctions and a default on Russia’s external bonds. The prescription clause in these bonds says that Russia’s obligations become void unless investors make claims within three years of the date payment is due. What does it mean to “make” a “claim”? Filing a lawsuit would do the trick. What about an email requesting payment? An automated message, which the depository sends out every payment date? Should bondholders have sought an agreement tolling the prescription period? Since they didn't, does Russia now have what amounts to an option to pay past due amounts? And what about interest on unpaid amounts? Does Russia owe interest on payments that were impossible to make due to sanctions? Producer: Leanna Doty

Sovereign Debt Odd & Ends An odds and ends podcast about unrelated sovereign debt topics. First up, Venezuela. Most investors have been sitting around waiting for an eventual restructuring and lifting of US sanctions. But a handful of funds sued early, got judgments, and have spent years trying unsuccessfully to collect. If they had succeeded, they would have recovered much more than similarly-situated creditors who waited around for a restructuring deal. But they failed and, in a bizarre twist, have asked the court to vacate their judgments, effectively returning them to the creditor queue. We cry foul. Next up, another fiscally-irresponsible and increasingly author ... well, it's the United States. We discuss the crazy (and terrifying) idea that the US might unilaterally extend the maturities of government debt. Producer: Leanna Doty

Is There Any Law of State Succession? Syria, Ukraine and Greenland The law of state succession to obligations comes mostly from a different era, when war and conquest were legal and borders changed with some frequency. Today, we are faced with multiple situations where borders might change due to war. Does the law tell us what happens to the debts attributable to the acquired territory? And how do we translate legal rules that evolved in the 18th and 19th centuries into the modern era? Paul Stephan (Virginia), one of the foremost international law experts, joins us to discuss. Producer: Leanna Doty

What if Trump Discovers that Unpaid UK (and French) Debt From WWI? The current administration has tossed concepts such as “special relationships” with allies out the window. The administration seems willing to apply just about any leverage it has to obtain concessions from allies, including concessions that might reduce the US debt. Seen in that light, what will happen when Trump and the Musketeers discover that the UK and France have hundred-year old unpaid debts? With interest, that unpaid debt would now amount to a few trillion dollars. Enforcing these debts would be near impossible, except that the UK and France own a whole bunch of US Treasuries. Could the administration try to force a swap of those Treasuries into longer term obligations? Or try to use the US government's claims against the UK and France as a setoff, reducing payments on US debt held by those governments? Seems loony. But loony is normal these days. Producer: Leanna Doty

What Might a Syrian Debt Restructuring (Eventually) Look Like? There is little doubt that Syria needs to restructure its debt, among other reasons to pave the way for rebuilding after a long and brutal civil war. It strikes us as too early to envision what that process will look like, but we can identify some of the key issues. The country owes a lot to official creditors, especially Iran and Russia. Much of this was off-books and was used for the military or otherwise to support former President Bashar al-Assad's repressive regime. Not surprisingly, we are already hearing the term "odious debt" raised to suggest these debts need not be repaid; there may be a separate doctrine allowing repudiation of certain war-related debts. We talk about whether these (arguable) doctrines of international law have any relevance here and about the potential role of the U.S. in a debt restructuring. Producer: Leanna Doty

User Fees on the US Treasury Strategic Gold Crypto Reserve Trump plans to reduce the US debt. We are missing some of the steps, but here are the ones we have identified so far: 1. Golden passports 2. Tariffs 3. Maybe not tariffs 4. Okay, tariffs 5. Something about gold 6. User fee on treasuries 7. Crypto 8. ??? We speculate about what we are missing. Maybe it’s a red Tesla? Producer: Leanna Doty

Why Do We Care Who is Behind HRB’s Sri Lankan Lawsuit? The Hamilton Bank litigation against Sri Lanka appears to be reaching the end. Or is it? The stays that were granted during restructuring talks have implications for future sovereign debt restructurings, we think. Especially Venezuela’s restructuring, which is going to be a huge undertaking. And then, there may be more drama to come in the HRB lawsuit itself. Sri Lanka says it needs more discovery, apparently to dig into whoever might be behind the lawsuit. Why? Producer: Leanna Doty

Greece’s (Ratings) Rise From the Ashes – Wow, but also How? We study sovereign restructurings, which means we primarily study countries going into and struggling to get out of crisis. Serial defaulters such as Argentina and Ecuador are frequent topics on our podcasts. And given how bad things were a decade ago, and its history of frequent defaults before that, we might have expected that Greece would join Argentina and Ecuador as among our more frequent podcast topics. And, indeed, Greece is back. But not because it is back in crisis. Instead, it is because it has had a remarkable rise from the ashes to almost investment grade. To discuss this rise, our two good friends from Moodys Ratings, Sarah Carlson and Elena Duggar, join us. Check out an overview of Moodys Sovereign Methodology here: https://ratings.moodys.io/sovereign-methodology Producer: Leanna Doty

Getting "J. Screwed" Sounds Better than Getting "Argentina'd" In the world of corporate debt, everyone seems to be talking about "Liability Management Exercises," where a borrower, with a subset of creditors, exploits loose loan covenants in ways that leave other creditors screaming mad. Even better, these LME techniques have clever names: "trap doors," getting "J. Screwed," etc. And while the worlds of sovereign and corporate debt don't overlap all that much, we wonder if litigation over LMEs can tell us anything about sovereign debt restructurings. Alas, we don't know much about corporate debt. Thankfully, Andrew Kissner (Morrison Foerster) joins us to dispel our confusion. Producer: Leanna Doty

Is Sri Lanka’s Loss Reinstatement Provision a Penalty? Two of our favorite things to talk about are innovative contract clauses and ancient illogical contract doctrines that unexpectedly bite in the ass. A few weeks ago, we walked through the Loss Reinstatement provisions for Ghana and Zambia. We asked the question of whether those provisions might run afoul of the antiquated and bizarre (to us) anti-penalty doctrines under English and New York law. English law having recently become more permissive with regards to permitting penalty type clauses – if they have a legitimate business purpose -- we speculated about whether the Zambia/Ghana clauses might pass muster. Maybe. But Sri Lanka’s version of the clauses is under New York law. And New York law on this matter is still stuck in the dark ages, best we can tell. So, does the Loss Reinstatement provision for Sri Lanka run afoul of the penalty doctrine? Producer: Leanna Doty

Sri Lanka's New MFC Clause — Have "Contorts" Arrived in Sovereign Debt? The doctrine of tortious interference with contracts is one of several that sits at the intersection of tort and contract law. These "contorts" confuse law students — lawyers and law professors too! — but can be important in practice. If not anticipated, they can create problems for unsuspecting parties and lawyers. Has Sri Lanka’s novel Most Favored Creditor clause created problems for creditors who participated in the country's restructuring? The MFC clause is confusing in places. It simultaneously seems to contemplate Sri Lanka striking a deal with holdouts (after litigation ends) and to quite aggressively try to prevent such a deal from happening. We discuss whether this creates risks for restructuring creditors and wonder why such an aggressive clause was viewed as necessary. Producer: Leanna Doty "Shades of Spring" Kevin MacLeod (incompetech.com) Licensed under Creative Commons: By Attribution 4.0 License creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

YPF and Argentina’s Contributions to International Law Argentina owes over $16 billion in connection with its nationalization of state oil company YPF. A federal judge in the Southern District of New York is considering whether to order Argentina to hand over its shares in YPF — technically located outside the United States — to pay part of the judgment. Can it do that? Paul Stephan (Virginia) joins to talk about how foreign state property located outside the United States is (and is not) protected by the law of foreign sovereign immunity, residual common law protections, and doctrines like comity. Producer: Leanna Doty "Shades of Spring" Kevin MacLeod (incompetech.com) Licensed under Creative Commons: By Attribution 4.0 License http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

The Penalty Doctrine in Contract Law We've never been fans of the contract law rule against penalties. Why can't parties (sophisticated ones at least) agree to suffer a penalty in the event of breach? We’d ordinarily avoid this topic, because the doctrine makes little sense and the issue doesn’t come up much in the sovereign debt world. But recently, a couple of sovereign restructurings (Ghana and Zambia) have used “Loss Reinstatement Provisions.” At least on their face, these provisions seem vulnerable to challenge under the penalty doctrine, since, if the sovereign defaults on the restructured deal, they impose a loss that seems untethered to the injury creditors have suffered. Would these new clauses be enforced if challenged? The contracts in question are both under English law, which we don't know much about. But that does not stop us from speculating and arguing. Producer: Leanna Doty

A New Competition For Law (and Jurisdiction)? Jurisdictions famously compete for businesses to use their corporate law. Less discussed is the competition for having one’s law chosen to govern contracts. But it happens. Sovereign debt lawyers in England and New York can, if they have a few drinks in them, can be quite entertaining in their sniping at each other about whether English or New York law is better for sovereign issuers. And the sovereigns for their part, seem to only care about what they have done in the past, regardless of what the lawyers say or what court decisions come down (remember pari passu and Judge Griesa in New York – nothing changed). But recently, as a result of the attempts of a few members of the New York legislature to try and mess with sovereign restructuring framework (“improve”, some would say – but not us), a couple of issuers have put in place provisions that allow them to choose to switch governing law (but not jurisdiction?) mid stream, in the event that New York actually passes some daft legislation. We think this is all great fun to talk about. Angry emails about how we should take these matters more seriously should all be sent to the address of Hamilton Bank in Nevis. Producer: Leanna Doty

An Execution Sale is Not a Receivership. (Right?) Creditors of Venezuela and PDVSA, its state oil company, have forced an execution sale of PDVSA's only US asset – which happens to be the ultimate parent company of CITGO. The federal judge overseeing the process has tried to keep things orderly, but the inter-creditor fighting is getting juicy. Some lower priority creditors have filed new lawsuits in an apparent attempt to jump the queue. Now the special master overseeing the execution sale process wants the court to enjoin these lawsuits. Which strikes as us a reach – almost as if the execution sale process is some kind of receivership. So we asked Nate Oman, who has written about the potential use of receiverships to solve sovereign debt problems, to help us figure out what is going on. Producer: Leanna Doty