What if POTUS wanted an OBBD?
Let us say, purely hypothetically, that there is a point at which some combination of the spending excesses of the One Big Beautiful Bill, the government shutdown, a rejection by the Supreme Court of tariff mania, and more, result in a shortfall of revenues for the current administration. And let us also say that POTUS goes to his brains trust to ask how best to do an OBBD/R (One Big Beautiful Default/Restructuring). What path might the brains trust take? And what about the option of taxing the treasury holdings of foreign governments, which the administration has already signaled its interest in?
Producer: Leanna Doty
All content for Clauses & Controversies is the property of Mitu Gulati & Mark Weidemaier and is served directly from their servers
with no modification, redirects, or rehosting. The podcast is not affiliated with or endorsed by Podjoint in any way.
What if POTUS wanted an OBBD?
Let us say, purely hypothetically, that there is a point at which some combination of the spending excesses of the One Big Beautiful Bill, the government shutdown, a rejection by the Supreme Court of tariff mania, and more, result in a shortfall of revenues for the current administration. And let us also say that POTUS goes to his brains trust to ask how best to do an OBBD/R (One Big Beautiful Default/Restructuring). What path might the brains trust take? And what about the option of taxing the treasury holdings of foreign governments, which the administration has already signaled its interest in?
Producer: Leanna Doty
The Penalty Doctrine in Contract Law
We've never been fans of the contract law rule against penalties. Why can't parties (sophisticated ones at least) agree to suffer a penalty in the event of breach? We’d ordinarily avoid this topic, because the doctrine makes little sense and the issue doesn’t come up much in the sovereign debt world. But recently, a couple of sovereign restructurings (Ghana and Zambia) have used “Loss Reinstatement Provisions.” At least on their face, these provisions seem vulnerable to challenge under the penalty doctrine, since, if the sovereign defaults on the restructured deal, they impose a loss that seems untethered to the injury creditors have suffered. Would these new clauses be enforced if challenged? The contracts in question are both under English law, which we don't know much about. But that does not stop us from speculating and arguing.
Producer: Leanna Doty
Clauses & Controversies
What if POTUS wanted an OBBD?
Let us say, purely hypothetically, that there is a point at which some combination of the spending excesses of the One Big Beautiful Bill, the government shutdown, a rejection by the Supreme Court of tariff mania, and more, result in a shortfall of revenues for the current administration. And let us also say that POTUS goes to his brains trust to ask how best to do an OBBD/R (One Big Beautiful Default/Restructuring). What path might the brains trust take? And what about the option of taxing the treasury holdings of foreign governments, which the administration has already signaled its interest in?
Producer: Leanna Doty
