Pride goeth before the fall
War starts with a bluster. Whether it is with sacrifices in the temples, parades or press conferences, young men are sent to battle with pomp and ceremony. Then, they storm the forts or the beaches or the hilltops. They die, usually horribly, foolishly, from mistakes historians will later describe as avoidable. Lessons are learned - often, they resemble lessoned already learned in previous conflicts. Force generation and employment adapts. War ends. Another one begins, the cycle repeats itself. Academics write about military incompetence; others wax poetically about zoology.
One could argue that this pattern was to be expected in the past. For the majority of human history, fighting was barely a profession and militaries were lean establishment. Modern staffs, the "brain of the army" were a very late invention. Beforehand, learning was personal, military scholarship (often surviving centuries, receiving a stature akin to holy scripture) was anecdotal and amateurish.
We have surely advanced since. Everywhere military "back office" has ballooned, the fighting force has been professionalized. Military academies were established and some places, education programs were even enshrined by law. The military profession has moved from mainly art to science and art.
Militaries started trying to design themselves for the next war, establishing bureaucracies and process that move vast resources for that purpose. Yet militaries seem to keep getting it wrong. For a recent example, one should look east, the Russia-Ukraine war. Prior to that conflict, the Russian military, on its face, did everything right - it had a robust and professional back office, with many educational facilities, granting advanced degrees in military art and science to officers serving many years in their positions. It undergone and extensive reform converting it from a heavy conscripted force to a lean semi-volunteer army. It modernized, introducing new kit in every service and branch. It had many experienced officers from recent conflicts from Chechnya to Georgia and Syria to Ukraine itself. It was, on the paper at least, a serious threat, a force to be reckoned with.
Yet, it too collapsed on the shores of reality and had to adapt and relearn lessons that were supposed to have already been known. This story is not unique. It repeats in many forms and languages. To the military professional observing from the ringside, this should raise serious questions about how militaries generate forces. Could it be that we are indeed incompetent? Are the tales of lions and donkeys true?
It is, of course, complicated

It is, indeed, complicated. Modern militaries like to engineer their forces. Force generation entails lengthy planning processes, involving many stakeholders and moving parts, over multiple years, meant to create the right force to win the first battle. To facilitate this design process, the military tries to holistically look at the various elements creating military power. These elements, referred to by the acronym DOTMLPF, describe everything that should go into the giant cocktail that is a military force - Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership (and education), Personnel and Facilities. In recent years, a new ingredient was added to the recipe - Policy. With these powers combined, the right and lethel force is supposed to be created. This alphabet soup, however, only describes part of the very complicated picture and neglects the relationship between the various elements comprising military power. Depiction closer to reality would look something like this:
A military force is an organ (ideally) larger than the sum of its parts. These parts include "hard" elements (everything we can describe and measure), "soft" elements (other things we can't comfortably describe, but rather talk with more hand waving about), non-military elements and unknown variables. Analysts and pundits tend to focus on the "shiny objects" that a...

The United Kingdom's national resilience is a critical pillar of its security in an increasingly volatile global environment. As geopolitical tensions rise, particularly with adversaries such as Russia, the UK faces multifaceted threats that target its centres of gravity: key societal, economic, and infrastructural elements that underpin national stability. These centres include critical national infrastructure (CNI) such as telecommunications, water, energy, and social cohesion, which are vital to the functioning of modern society. In response to these threats, defence primes have advocated for investments in ground-based air defence (GBAD) systems, often citing Israel's Iron Dome as a model for protecting against missile and drone attacks. However, the UK's geopolitical and geographical context differs significantly from Israel, rendering direct comparisons problematic.
While GBAD systems have a role, they are not the primary solution to the UK's immediate threats, which are more likely to involve hybrid warfare, cyberattacks, and disruptions to CNI rather than conventional missile barrages. This essay examines the challenges to UK national resilience, the limitations of GBAD as a solution, recent events targeting UK vulnerabilities, and the broader strategies needed to bolster resilience within the NATO framework.
Understanding Centres of Gravity and UK Vulnerabilities
In military and strategic theory, centres of gravity are the critical capabilities or assets that, if disrupted, significantly weaken a nation's ability to function. For the UK, these include CNI (telecommunications, energy, water, and transport), economic stability, public trust, and social cohesion. Unlike traditional military targets such as bases or airfields, these centres are civilian in nature but essential to national security. Adversaries seeking to undermine the UK are increasingly likely to employ hybrid tactics - combining cyberattacks, disinformation, sabotage, and economic disruption - to destabilise these assets without resorting to direct military confrontation.
Recent events underscore the vulnerability of these centres. In 2024, reports indicated that the UK faces approximately 90,000 cyberattacks daily, many attributed to Russia and its allies, targeting government systems, financial institutions (FSI), and critical national infrastructure (CNI). These attacks aim to disrupt digital infrastructure, steal sensitive data, or sow distrust in institutions. Additionally, suspected sabotage of undersea cables in the Baltic Sea in 2024 highlighted the fragility of the UK's international communications networks, which are critical for economic and security functions. Such incidents demonstrate that adversaries prioritise non-kinetic means to degrade the UK's resilience, exploiting its reliance on interconnected systems.

The UK's population centres are also vulnerable to disruptions that do not involve missiles. Power cuts, for instance, could paralyse urban areas, disrupting healthcare, transport, and food supply chains. The 2019 UK power outages, though not attributed to hostile action, exposed how a single failure in the National Grid could affect millions, with hospitals and transport systems struggling to cope. Similarly, social media-inspired unrest, as seen in the 2011 London riots and more recently in Southport, illustrates how disinformation or orchestrated campaigns could amplify social tensions, undermining public order. These examples highlight that adversaries can achieve strategic goals by targeting civilian infrastructure and societal cohesion rather than military assets.
Defence Primes and the Push for GBAD Systems
Defence primes, such as MBDA and Northrop Grumman, have seized on the growing threat perception to advocate for enhanced air and missile defence systems, particularly GBAD. They point to Israel's Iron Dome, which has successfully intercepted short-range rockets and drones, as a case study for why the UK should invest i...

Why Short Histories Matter
War has long been the domain of soldiers and scholars: studied by the few, practised by the fewer, but suffered by the many. In the absence of lived memory, the risk is that societies forget what war really means.
This fading memory matters. The 20th century saw war reach its historical zenith through extreme industrialised conflict. It was a time of mass mobilisation, unprecedented global integration, and civilian populations on the front and rear lines like never before. But today, nearly a century later, no full generation left alive can truly compute the scale of destruction the first half of the 1900s wrought outside of study, media, or memory.
Total war is often abstract. It is reduced to historical footage, elevated by academic study, rendered across film and games, or reflected through anecdotes by those who have experienced conflict in our lifetime. That makes public understanding not just desirable, but necessary. As Great Power Competition returns, we risk confronting future war without a logical and emotional foundation needed to respect its costs.
That is the challenge Gwynne Dyer takes up in The Shortest History of War. If war must be made intelligible to the many and not just the few, then its complexity simplified is key. His message is clear: violence certainly exists in nature, and fighting is too common across the animal kingdom; but war is something distinctly human. It is an institutional practice born of hierarchy, sustained by coercion, and shaped by political purpose.
What the Book Gets Right: The Impressive Scope
Dyer's narrative unfolds in broad chronological arcs, but its power lies in rejecting determinism. War, he argues, has never been inevitable and has always been enabled. Elites choose it, institutions entrench it, and ideologies justify it.
Going as far back as historically plausible for a self-respecting scholar, Dyer systematically dismantles romantic myths of honourable violence and the noble savage. Instead, he traces how conflict has been shaped by degrees of industrialisation across millennia, various forms of nationalism before and after Westphalia was even a thing, evolving methods of bureaucracy long before Mandarins, and even game theory as a thought experiment.
These are forces, Dyer outlines, which rhyme across history, reinforcing the institutional logic of violence and escalating its lethality. War is not some immutable condition of humanity - it is a social technology. A political invention, forged in the surplus of early agriculture and sustained by organised power ever since.
One of the book's most striking passages illustrates the intense changes in just the last few centuries. Outlining the use of phalanx-style tactics, Dyer observes that a well-trained army from 1500 BCE (if rearmed with iron instead of bronze) could plausibly hold its own against one from 1500 CE. Yet within just a century of that, the military revolutions of the 17th century made such continuity impossible. The accelerating pace of change, particularly in our lifetime, has transformed war's destructiveness beyond recognition. Where war once meant hours of bloody attrition with swords or muskets, today it can mean a nuclear-armed intercontinental ballistic missile capable of erasing cities in minutes. The gap between what war was and what it could become has never been wider.
Nowhere is this institutional absurdity clearer than in Dyer's analysis of Cold War nuclear doctrines. Mutually assured destruction (MAD), he writes, was not strategic brilliance but a global suicide pact rationalised into orthodoxy. What began as deterrence hardened into doctrine - a logic so widely accepted that he says its contradictions became invisible. But The Shortest History of War is not a book about tactics, doctrines, or battlefield dynamics. It is not concerned with how wars are fought, but why war became possible at all.
Dyer is philosophical as any other scholar of war, but he nonetheless br...

The views expressed in this Paper are the authors', and do not represent those of MOD, the Royal Navy, RNSSC, or any other institution.
The transformation of the UK's Commando Forces (CF), anchored in the Littoral Response Groups (LRGs) and the CF concept, represents an ambitious shift in British expeditionary warfare. However, its viability is undermined by structural and doctrinal disjoints that question its ability to operate effectively in contested littoral environments. Chief among these issues are: the persistent disconnect between the British Army and Royal Navy (RN); inconsistencies between UK Joint Theatre Entry Doctrine and emergent CF operational concepts; and the historical realities of military operations in littorals - especially the Baltic - which highlight the need for mass and endurance over rapid raiding.
The Army-Navy Disconnect: An Enduring Structural Weakness
CF transformation seeks to create an agile, distributed force capable of operating in complex littoral zones. However, its success is constrained by the systemic disconnect between the RN and Army. Despite their transformation into a high-readiness raiding force, the CF remains reliant on 17 Port and Maritime Regiment RLC (17P&M) for strategic lift and sustainment. Recent analysis underscores 17P&M's indispensable role in enabling amphibious operations, yet it is a relatively misunderstood, under-resourced, and neglected capability within the broader amphibious force structure, and one that remains firmly under an Army Op Order.1
The Army's focus on land-centric deterrence in Europe - particularly through the NATO Allied Rapid Reaction Corps and recently deployed Allied Reaction Force - suggests limited institutional buy-in for amphibious operations beyond logistical support. Ironically, it is the Army's reliance on 'red carpet' port-to-port transfer of forces that underpins its continental strategy, as evidenced in the seaborne deployment of 1UK Div to Romania via Greece2 and the recent signing of a 'strategic agreement' with Associated British Ports to expand staging options beyond Marchwood military port.3 This absence of a unified Army-Navy vision for expeditionary warfare leaves the UK in a precarious position: a CF designed for high-intensity littoral raiding, but dependent on an Army-enabled logistics structure that remains geared towards continental land warfare.
Similarly, the CF's raiding focus risks confusing the amphibious shipping requirement by ignoring the Army's need for logistical mass, as well as other doctrinally recognised amphibious operations such as Humanitarian Aid and Disaster Relief.[not
Doctrinal Incoherence: Joint Theatre Entry vs. Commando Force Operations
The UK's Joint Theatre Entry Doctrine emphasizes securing lodgements to facilitate force build-up and follow-on operations. Historically, this has required large-scale amphibious capabilities, pre-positioned logistics, and joint enablers. Yet, the emergent CF concept of operations prioritizes distributed, small-unit raiding without a clear pathway to sustained presence or operational endurance. This is accentuated by naval-centric command and control; the CF is a maritime force element composed of naval platforms and personnel optimised to support a maritime - rather than land - campaign plan.
Critiques of raiding highlights its fundamental limitations: it is resource-intensive, difficult to sustain, and often a tactic of operational necessity rather than strategic advantage.4 While raiding can disrupt adversary activity, it cannot replace force projection or control of key maritime terrain, both of which require relative mass and sustainment. By orienting the CF around raiding without a credible joint force integration plan, the UK risks investing in a force that is tactically innovative but strategically irrelevant.
Moreover, this raises a crucial question: if the UK's future amphibious posture is designed for raiding rather than securing and holding terrain, how d...

Incremental adaptation in modern warfare has astonished military observers globally. Ukraine's meticulously planned Operation Spider Web stands as a stark reminder of how bottom-up innovation combined with hi-tech solutions can prove their mettle on the battlefield. It has also exposed the recurring flaw in the strategic mindsets of the great powers: undermining small powers, their propensity for defence, and their will to resist. Having large-scale conventional militaries and legacy battle systems, great powers are generally guided by a hubris of technological preeminence and expectations of fighting large-scale industrial wars. In contrast, small powers don't fight in the same paradigm; they innovate from the bottom up, leveraging terrain advantage by repurposing dual-use tech, turning the asymmetries to their favour.
History offers notable instances of great power failures in asymmetric conflicts. From the French Peninsular War to the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, these conflicts demonstrate the great powers' failure to adapt to the opponent's asymmetric strategies. This is partly due to their infatuation with the homogeneity of military thought, overwhelming firepower and opponents' strategic circumspection to avoid symmetric confrontation with the great powers.
On the contrary, small powers possess limited means and objectives when confronting a great power. They simply avoid fighting in the opponent's favoured paradigm. Instead, they employ an indirect strategy of attrition, foster bottom-up high-tech innovation and leverage terrain knowledge to increase attritional cost and exhaust opponents' political will to fight. Similarly, small powers are often more resilient, which is manifested by their higher threshold of pain to incur losses, an aspect notably absent in great powers' war calculus.
In the Operation Spider Web, Ukraine employed a fusion of drone technology with human intelligence (HUMINT) to attack Russia's strategic aviation mainstays. Eighteen months before the attack, Ukraine's Security Services (SBU) covertly smuggled small drones and modular launch systems compartmentalised inside cargo trucks. These drones were later transported close to Russian airbases. Utilising an open-source software called ArduPilot, these drones struck a handful of Russia's rear defences, including Olenya, Ivanovo, Dyagilevo and Belaya airbases. Among these bases, Olenya is home to the 40th Composite Aviation Regiment - a guardian of Russia's strategic bomber fleet capable of conducting long-range strikes.
The operation not only damaged Russia's second-strike capability but also caught the Russian military off guard in anticipating such a coordinated strike in its strategic depth. Russia's rugged terrain, vast geography and harsh climate realities shielded its rear defences from foreign incursions. Nonetheless, Ukraine's bottom-up innovation in hi-tech solutions, coupled with a robust HUMINT network, enabled it to hit the strategic nerve centres, which remained geographically insulated for centuries.
Since the offset of hostilities, Ukraine has adopted a whole-of-society approach to enhance its defence and technological ecosystem. By leveraging creativity, Ukraine meticulously developed, tested and repurposed the dual-use technologies to maximise its warfighting potential. From sinking Russia's flagship Moskva to hitting its aviation backbones, Ukraine abridged the loop between prototyping, testing, and fielding drones in its force structures.
Another underrated aspect of Ukraine's success is the innovate or perish mindset. Russia's preponderant technology and overwhelming firepower prompted Ukrainians to find a rapid solution to defence production. Most of Ukraine's defence industrial base is located in Eastern Ukraine, which sustained millions of dollars' worth of damage from Russia's relentless assaults. Therefore, the Ukrainian government made incremental changes in Military Equipment and Weaponry (MEW) requirements by outs...

The United States Defence Secretary, Pete Hegseth, recently commented that the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, which existed between 2001-2014, colloquially stood for 'I saw Americans fighting' at a recent Capitol hearing.1 Hegseth was giving evidence in front of the Senate Appropriations Committee when he made the comment, which complements the current Trump Administration's of America-First foreign policy,2 in that European countries should not rely on American military support and that Europe should be pulling its weight more in support of collective defence.
Hegseth further added that, 'what ultimately was a lot of flags, was not a lot of ground capability, you're not a real coalition unless you have real defense capabilities and real armies can bring those to bear and that's a reality Europe is waking up to quickly'.3 Senator Chris Coon, a Democrat who sat on the Committee, was quick to clarify that other military partners served and died within Afghanistan.4 In an unpredictable world this exchange provoked a key thought, what makes a good military coalition partner, seen from a Western perspective?
Brief History of Military Coalitions
Forming military coalitions based on shared strategic goals is not a new concept. Pragmatically, it makes sense to form military coalitions to share capabilities/equipment, to act as a deterrence, and to form international legitimacy against any action against a common adversary. Even the mighty Spartan Army fought alongside a military alliance with other Greek soldiers when threatened by the Persian Empire in the 5th Century BCE. According to Herodotus, there were only 300 Spartan Royal bodyguards in comparison to thousands of other Greeks who fought against the Persians.5 However, these Spartans were portrayed as warriors who were disciplined and highly trained in comparison to other Greek soldiers.6 Facing a force of a hundred thousand Persian soldiers, the odds were against the Greeks.
Were the Spartans a better coalition partner than the other Greeks as they had alleged quality over quantity, or was mass required? The eventual defeat of the Greeks at the Battle of Thermopylae and sacking of Athens, perhaps for this specific battle, meant that simply more Greeks were needed to match the Persians.
Moving forward to the 21st Century, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) was created in 1949. ISAF was formed after the events of 9/11, when Article 5 was triggered, but it was in 2003 when NATO took the lead of the UN mission in Afghanistan. At the height of the mission, 51 NATO and partner nations provided troops.7 With six different ISAF objectives and the whole of Afghanistan divided into five (later six in 2010) Regional Commands, ISAF members held various roles and responsibilities. For example, Regional Command North was commanded by Germany with troops from Sweden, Hungary, and Norway supporting the various missions.8 Troop numbers and equipment supplied varied across ISAF, with the United States contributing the most significant number of troops by some margin.
This tragically resulted in greater deaths, with the United States losing nearly 2500 military personnel in comparison to a country like Georgia, in which 29 military personnel were killed.9 When compared against the population size of Georgia (a non-NATO country), the deaths experienced in Afghanistan resulted in a death per million rating of 8.42, higher than the United States at 7.96. However, it is ethically challenging to compare the number of casualties experienced by each partner. As such, measuring casualty figures by each coalition partner is not an efficient way to determine if each country is 'pulling its weight'.
Another significant military coalition was formed in 2014. The Global Coalition against Daesh originally had 13 members, but today has 87 partners and is designed to degrade and ensure Daesh's enduring defeat.10 In September 2014, President Obama commented in a majo...

Europe's NATO members can gain an operational advantage by reframing close-combat training. However, with the current Combatives models, this change would add burden to both time-in-training and financial resources. Seizing this opportunity would require replacing the current technique/MMA-based models with a leaner model. To this end, alternative options offer increased functional expertise and substantial reductions in time and cost allocations.
To demonstrate this, we can use "time-in-training" to compare costs-and-time allotments against the achieved level of functional expertise.
The technique-based models:
For this comparison, the U.S. Army's current MMA-based Combatives training-model is a well-documented program. Here, 40-hours of training produces a "questionable" level-1 proficiency. An additional 80-hours produces a Level 2 proficiency. A combined total of 440-hours achieves the top level-4 proficiency. However, the average U.S. soldier only holds a level-1 or level-2 rating.
The statement of "questionable" proficiency is founded in the comparison of four scientific points;
1. Developing functional expertise: Functional expertise in MMA techniques require extensive repetition.
2500 to 3000 repetitions of technique are required to create the most basic mental-map (muscle-memory). This requirement increases with complexity. MMA techniques are complex. For example - Level 1 has a minimum of 8 phases, each with multiple individual techniques. Achieving basic functionality in any one phase equals 2500 times the number of techniques it contains.
1. Situational Awareness and Avoidance
2. Stress Management and Decision Making
3. Dominant Body Positions, range & range transitions, and body control, (a key principle)
4. Basic striking and defensive techniques
5. Grappling, throws, takedowns, clinch, chokes, and knee defense
6. Introductory rifle/knife based Combatives
7. Techniques for creating distance and disengaging from an opponent
8. Realistic Training and Application
2. Retention of functional expertise: Retention of functional expertise in complex techniques is low.
Retention of a complex movements (effective expertise) depends on repetitions and the time since last practiced. The factors listed below negatively affect retention.
1. How natural the movement is - Generally MMA techniques are not natural movements.
2. The complexity of the movement - Generally MMA techniques are complex.
3. The frequency between initial-training and recurrent training - MMA requires high frequencies.
3. The deterioration of fine movement under stress: MMA methods include fine-motor techniques.
High psychological/physiological stresses cause fine-motor deterioration. Deterioration begins at 145 heart-rate (BPM). The more complex a movement is, the more it deteriorates.
4. Somatic-markers: Somatic-markers determine access to mental-maps (techniques).
"Somatic-markers" store, sort, and select physical movement. Somatic-markers use rapid-sorting to determine selection. The most practised mental-maps are the quickest; lesser used maps are slower.
As counter-point, I am well versed in W.E. Fairbairn's "Gutter Fighting", so I will speak from that as an alternate option. In comparison with the MMA model, Gutter Fighting's battle-proven model achieves a higher-than-average functionality in less than 40- hours.
Completing the U.S.'s level-1 and 2 models will require 120-hours; completing the Gutter Fighting model will require 40-hours. 80-hours is a massive time/cost reduction. These savings will repeat every time the program is run. These are time/cost saving that can be reallocated to greater advantage elsewhere. Conversely, the MMA model repeats their double-rate-loss every time its program is run.
The Gutter Fighting Variant:
1. Developing functional expertise: Principle-based, Gutter Fighting is very natural.
Training installs a small toolbox of techniques that personally fit the user. This natural ease-of-execution accelerates efficiency,...

The recently published Strategic Defence Review (SDR)1 and National Security Strategy (NSS)2 both place accelerating development and adoption of automation and Artificial Intelligence (AI) at the heart of their bold new vision for Defence.
I've written elsewhere3 about the broader ethical implications,4 but want here to turn attention to the 'so what?', and particularly the 'now what?' Specifically, I'd like to explore a question SDR itself raises, of "Artificial Intelligence and autonomy reach[ing] the necessary levels of capability and trust" (emphasis added). What do we actually mean by this, what is the risk, and how might we go about addressing it?
The proliferation of AI, particularly Large Language Models (LLMs), promises a revolution in efficiency and analytical capability.5 For Defence, the allure of leveraging AI to accelerate the 'OODA loop' (Observe, Orient, Decide, Act) and maintain decision advantage is undeniable.
Yet, as the use of these tools becomes more widespread, a peculiar and potentially hazardous flaw is becoming increasingly and undeniably apparent: their propensity to 'hallucinate' - to generate plausible, confident, yet entirely fabricated and, importantly, false information.6 The resulting 'botshit'7 presents a novel technical, and ethical, challenge.
It also finds a powerful and troubling analogue in a problem that has long plagued hierarchical organisations, and which UK Defence has particularly wrestled with: the human tendency for subordinates to tell their superiors what they believe those superiors want to hear.8 Of particular concern in this context, this latter does not necessarily trouble itself with whether that report is true or not, merely that it is what is felt to be required; such 'bullshit'9 10 is thus subtly but importantly
different from 'lying', and seemingly more akin therefore to its digital cousin.
I argue however that while 'botshit' and 'bullshit' produce deceptively similar outputs - confidently delivered, seemingly authoritative falsehoods, that arise not from aversion to the truth, but (relative) indifference to it, and that may corrupt judgement - their underlying causes, and therefore their respective treatments, are fundamentally different. Indeed, this distinction was demonstrated with startling clarity during the research for this very paper.
Mistaking one for the other, and thereby applying the wrong corrective measures, poses a significant threat to strategic thinking and direction, and Operational Effectiveness. By understanding the distinct origins of machine-generated 'botshit' and human-generated 'bullshit', we can develop more robust and effective approaches to the envisioned future of hybrid human-machine decision-making.
A familiar flaw: human deference and organisational culture
The Chilcot Inquiry11 served as a stark reminder of how easily institutional culture can undermine sound policy.
In his introductory statement to the report,12 Sir Chilcot noted that "policy […] was made on the basis of flawed intelligence and assessments", but more to the point that "judgements […] were presented with a certainty that was not justified" and that "they were not challenged, and they should have been." He further emphasised "the importance of […] discussion which encourages frank and informed debate and challenge" and that "above all, the lesson is that all aspects […] need to be calculated,
debated and challenged with the utmost rigour." He was saying, very clearly and repeatedly, that this was not simply a failure of intelligence collection or strategic calculation; it was a failure of culture.
The decision-making process exposed an environment where prevailing assumptions went untested and the conviction of senior leaders created a gravitational pull, warping the information presented to them to fit a desired narrative.
Chilcot highlights how an environment in which decisions are based on eminence (also eloquence and vehemence) rather than evidence13 encourages t...

The Russian invasion of Ukraine, in its full-scale war for the third year with level overall years of conflict, is reaching a critical moment where both Kyiv's and Moscow's will to fight comes down to attrition. Under the second Trump Administration, peace talks and proposals of frozen lines have taken place with NATO members, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenksy, and Russian President and longtime autocrat Vladimir Putin.
The United Kingdom and other continental heavyweights such as France and Germany have discussed a major European peacekeeping contingent if the Russian invasion of Ukraine mirrors the Korean War conclusion with frozen lines. Nevertheless, challenges will remain regarding the deployment of a British-led contingent.
Substantial safeguards will be necessary for deployed European forces in Ukraine, who will have different rules of engagement compared to those in prior combat deployments in Mali, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Furthermore, questions will remain regarding the adequate allocation of rotational force among each contributing country, the stability of Ukraine, and the support from the United States for the peacekeeping proposals.
Potential Peacekeeping Operations in Ukraine
On March 15, 2025, during a high-level virtual meeting in London, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer proposed plans to potentially send 10,000 peacekeeping troops to Ukraine, which would be led by British forces. The 10,000 is the official estimate of the overall number of European soldiers proposed to be sent, with the majority being British and French, as Prime Minister Keir Starmer stated to The Sunday Times.
Several days later, France also committed to the proposal as French President Emmanuel Macron had previously proposed sending troops to Ukraine as Russia's wartime capabilities continue to grow. Other countries that could potentially join the 'coalition of the willing' include Finland, Sweden, Turkey, Estonia, Lithuania, and others.
Deployments in Ukraine would have to be based in and around the contact lines, which are currently unknown. Despite the substantial casualties, the Russian military has advanced - albeit through increments - particularly in the Donetsk oblast.
In case of further Russian aggression after a ceasefire, putting Western troops on potential contact points could not only deter Russian military action but free up Ukrainian forces tied down in former combat zones such as Northern Ukraine.
If the lines were to be frozen under diplomatic pressure with both exhausted Ukrainian and Russian forces, the British-led contingent could be deployed in key sectors. Sumy, Kharkiv, Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, the left bank of Kherson, and the border with Belarus would need to be manned to deter further Russian aggression with command-and-control centers in Kyiv and Odesa.
Hurdles Over the Deployment and Rotational Abilities of European Forces
The implementation of a peacekeeping contingent will need to be considered several factors, including the rotational capabilities of each participating nation, the number of troops allocated by each country, and the potential political ramifications at home.
The United Kingdom and France can provide sizable contingents of troops that would not affect mission readiness for other areas of operations. However, other European countries may struggle to rotate their own. Furthermore, questions remain over the length of the mission, such as how long the commitment of British and allied forces will be and whether it will fall under NATO command or a task force solely allocated for Ukraine.
Each deployment would be about 3-6 months, and other countries would need to step up. Finland, despite having the continent's largest reserve army, has a small full-time defense force.
Other countries that are staunch supporters of Ukraine, such as Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, also have small militaries and would need to balance out the small contingents each country would...

The recently reported move by the RAF to manage supply of vegan alternative uniforms on request, whilst not necessarily quite as new as it may seem, may initially appear to challenge military identity, organisational culture, and the nature and Operational Effectiveness of a modern fighting force.
But whilst I'm not vegan myself and therefore won't be taking advantage of this policy, I believe that it's a sensible and entirely appropriate step forward, that strengthens the RAF by demonstrating its commitment to its people, broadening its appeal to potential recruits, and reinforcing its ethical foundations without compromising Operational Effectiveness.
There's been a lot of hate and derision over this, on social media, in various media outlets, and sadly even in the Service itself - unfortunate but unsurprising in the current climate. But I've also received and seen some genuine and reasonable comments - some from people I greatly respect - that I think do deserve and warrant a considered response.
I'm entirely uninterested in feeding trolls, but I do believe in giving and receiving reasonable challenge and engaging in respectful debate - this is my attempt to contribute to that conversation.
Individualism vs Uniformity
The core purpose of a uniform is to foster a collective identity and spirit, subordinating the individual to the team. The criticism is that allowing ethical variations undermines this principle.
However, I'd suggest this is a misinterpretation of the meaning, intent, and value of uniformity. Uniformity is not conformity, and Unit cohesion is not threatened by diversity; indeed, combined with psychological safety and strong, effective leadership (as one would expect in a military environment), diversity enhances military organisational effectiveness. Uniformity in the military is therefore about common standards and unity of purpose, not the literal, molecular composition of every item.
A Service person's identity and function are defined by their rank slide, trade badge, and the uniform's cut, feel, and colour, none of which are altered by using appropriate non-animal materials.
The military has a long history of accommodating deeply held beliefs without sacrificing cohesion. We accommodate religious dietary needs in rations, allow turbans and hijabs that conform to regulations, and respect religious holidays. Providing a vegan uniform option is simply a modern extension of this principle to include deeply held ethical convictions. True cohesion comes from shared values like courage, respect, and integrity, not from enforcing conformity down to the last stitch.
A force that respects and values the conscience and cognitive diversity of its people strengthens the moral component, and is thus more unified and resilient.
I'd also note that as long as I've been serving, personnel have always been able to source different boots and other items, to optimise their comfort. Go to any military Unit, and you'll see personnel in Altberg, Aku, Kestrel, Lowa, Meindl, and many other brands of boot - all procured through the stores issue system, and all intended to ensure individual comfort and suitability. There's very simply nothing new or controversial about accommodating individual needs to enhance performance.
Cost and Resources
It's argued that this is an unnecessary expense, diverting funds from more critical areas, like frontline equipment or improving pay.
But the Strategic Defence Review 2025 recognises that representation, empowerment, and flexibility for our people is an investment. The cost of recruiting and training a Service person is significant - tens of thousands for a recruit and millions for a pilot.
Losing even a small number of highly skilled personnel, or indeed deterring potential recruits, because of an easily solvable conflict with their (non-Operational) beliefs, costs far more to Defence than the marginal expense of sourcing alternative boots or gloves.
The policy is "on request", and with MoD ...

This brief presents a strategic imperative. The development of the IMF is consistently bound by a very complex set of messaging - not just within the MoD but also across its supplier base - whereby interlinking technology, organisational and institutional change is hindering scalability across 'The Stack'.
Increasingly, the three components of technology, people, and change need to be brought together using simple themes of design, build, secure and deliver to create the required capability positioning both within the MoD and its acquisition processes.
This will demand a unifying plan/approach by the MoD to manage and exploit fully the IMF approach - consolidating a range of individual components such as cloud, security, et, under a cohesive plan/framework to support operational outcomes.[/note] to embed an Identification/Mission First (IMF) framework at the core of UK Defence.
In the face of rising digital threats and rapid technological evolution, the UK must shift from legacy force structures to an agile, information-led defence model where identification, not just firepower, drives operational advantage. IMF is defined as the ability to collect, process, and exploit information faster and more effectively than adversaries, seamlessly connecting Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR), Logistics (including Medical), Command and Control (C2), and FIRES.
This is both a technological and behavioural shift, aligning with modern warfare doctrines such as UK Fusion Doctrine, NATO's Comprehensive Approach and the Observe, Orientate, Decide, Act (OODA) loop.1
In an increasingly congested, contested, and connected battlespace, information superiority - not platform superiority - is the decisive edge, with speed of identification and mission alignment emerging as critical differentiators. As such, data must be treated as a strategic asset, akin to oil in the 20th century, requiring ethical prioritisation, protection, and operationalisation.
Furthermore, civilian digital infrastructure, including social media and undersea cables, forms a crucial part of the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) ecosystem, and must be lawfully integrated into defence strategies.2
To operationalise these imperatives, several core recommendations are identified and proposed. Under Leadership and Governance, Defence should appoint a Senior Responsible Owner (SRO) for Identification/Mission First (IMF) and establish a Digital Identification Task Force under Military Strategic Headquarters (MSHQ) to oversee strategy, ethics, and innovation.
In terms of Workforce and Skills, it is essential to build a pipeline of data-literate, ethics-conscious strategists, and to incentivise digital fluency across all services through tailored career pathways. Regarding Investment and Architecture, Defence must prioritise sovereign, interoperable digital systems with low latency and secure data exchange, while embedding real-time, multi-domain identification layers into command, control (C2), and ISR platforms.
For Operational Integration, IMF capabilities should be embedded into Joint Action doctrine and field exercises, and open-source intelligence should be harnessed through structured, policy-governed approaches. Finally, under Strategic Communication and Ethics, a Defence-wide Digital Ethics and Law Compliance Framework must be established, alongside clearly defined red lines for the use of private and civilian digital systems in targeting and surveillance.
These measures collectively aim to ensure that Defence maintains its competitive edge through agile, ethical, and integrated information dominance
Introduction
Digital connectivity and rapid technological change have redefined modern warfare, where information superiority increasingly determines success. While kinetic force retains importance, digital tempo - the speed and effectiveness of information-action cycles - has become decisive.3
The MoD remains constrained by legacy structures ...

"I like the word lethal. It is reminiscent [. . .] of pretty women and muscular men in classy hotels. Of secret negotiations and ice cubes in 25-year-old scotch glasses. [. . .]."
Commentator in a study by Ofra Ben Ishai
In this brief article, I will propose that the concept of lethality, aside from being poorly defined, has become a bleak commodity for Western military leaders. To be used as a tool for political consumption, devoid of real worth beyond permitting those who wish so to sweep aside any falsely perceived 'ethical' barriers to the conduct of war.
Notably military forces that have not paid much heed to such ethics, for example, the Russians, conduct themselves on the battlefield and in occupation, already at the ultimate end-state of this dark consumerism. Lethality is becoming a military fiction as far removed from reality as any James Bond movie.
That numerous Western militaries are now placing this at the centre of their national defence is, to me, both an act of desperation and a neglect of senior leaders' duties. It is a myth that shields itself from scrutiny. I will outline three points that you may wish to consider to gain a better understanding of my perspective. The first will be a rather heavy, but mercifully brief, interpretation of lethality as consumerism, using the work of post-modern sociologist Zygmunt Bauman.
Second, outline the simple fact that lethality is so poorly defined as to be conceptually meaningless, and finally, to dissect through first principles some of the recent leadership statements about lethality and how they raise more questions than provide answers.
Post-Modern Sociologists
Like many post-modern sociologists, Zygmunt Bauman saw the termination of the 'rational' modern society in the concentration camps of the Holocaust. Rational man, bringing industrial-scale slaughter to humanity. In its place now stands a world devoid of rational values; the only cause for existence is to consume. How much you possess being the only mark of merit.
Whilst this appears to be a potentially dark future, Bauman does see this as an opportunity, where the individual is now unconstrained by the guardrails of modernism. It is also important to note that societies don't just step over the border from modernism to postmodernism; these are theories, and of course, reality is far more complex. But Bauman's ideas are powerful ones.
But it is in the darker aspects of Bauman's postmodernism that I see the relationship between the military and lethality. To suggest that the political process surrounding military strategy is not immersed in post-modernism is a form of profound cognitive dissonance. Politics at present is a prime case study in Bauman's thesis; military strategy like it or not is inseparable from that. To use the words of General Miley, 'militaries don't fight war, nations do,' post-modern nations.
Lethality is becoming a commodity, an end in itself; sacks of shiny lethality become the worth of a military organisation. Detached from the necessity of military prudence. An anchorless idea that the Vietnam War and the outcomes of Western militaries in recent attempts at 'nation building' with massively overmatched firepower show is void.
The problem with any form of consumerism is that it is always form over substance; the unique and well-advertised commodity is immediately desirable and not subject to critique of its worth. The recent strike on Iran's nuclear facilities being a prime example, any questioning of the strategy (or lack thereof) and effectiveness was immediately viewed as unpatriotic.
Additionally, noting that the engines of this lethality consumerism, the defence industry, will do nothing to check this voraciousness. The entrance of numerous venture capital companies into the sector is a telling indicator.
Things are entirely subjective
My second point is that, like commodities themselves, what is desirable is entirely subjective. Additionally, as Stephen Wren had demonstrated with...

Modern military debate often gets lost in technology, jargon, and expensive promises about the "next war." In Euclid's Army: Preparing Land Forces for Warfare Today, William F. Owen cuts through the fog with a sharp and uncompromising thesis: armies must be simpler, cheaper, and better at the basics. This is not a comfortable read for those invested in the current way of doing things, but it is a necessary one.
At a time of constrained budgets and increasing threats, Owen forces us to reconsider how we train, equip, and organise land forces.
Owen's central argument is that land forces have drifted into over-complexity. He contends that armies are seduced by shiny technology, vast acquisition programmes, and speculative concepts of future war. Instead, they should prioritise what can be proven to work: robust doctrine, adaptable organisation, and relentless training in fundamentals.
In clear language, he argues that preparing for the "unknowable future" requires paring back excess and focusing on what soldiers can do with the tools available, rather than chasing the next big procurement dream.
Throughout the book Euclid's Army examines cost, weight, complexity, and effectiveness. Owen insists that simpler equipment is cheaper and more resilient in war. The current war in Ukraine seems to demonstrate this. Logistics, mobility, and the ability to sustain fighting power matter more than whether a system boasts the latest sensors or software.
This view will resonate with readers who have watched acquisition programmes spiral out of control or units trained more for parades and PowerPoint than for combat.
Owen writes like he speaks: direct. He does not mince his words. Euclid's Army, aim is to provide a framework1 that enables armies to think clearly about force design in uncertain times.
The book's greatest strength lies in its provocation. It demands that military professionals and defence planners ask hard questions. Are our training systems preparing troops for combat, or for box-ticking exercises? By stripping away complexity, Owen forces us to confront uncomfortable realities: much of what is currently fashionable in defence policy may have little utility when bullets start flying.
That said, Euclid's Army is not without weaknesses. Critics will argue that emerging domains - cyber, space, and multi-domain integration - cannot simply be ignored, yet Owen gives them little attention. Given the entrenched interests of industry and bureaucracy, some of his proposals may also feel politically unrealistic. At times, his solutions are presented as self-evident truths rather than contested ideas.
Readers looking for detailed pathways to implementation may find the book light in that respect.
Euclid's Army is not meant to be the final word on force design. Rather, it is a call to debate. In that sense, it succeeds brilliantly. By challenging orthodoxy, Owen reopens questions that many assume are settled. Do we need ever-heavier infantry vehicles? Are complex systems a liability in expeditionary warfare? How much training time is wasted on activities with no combat value? These are questions that every military professional and defence thinker should grapple with.
For a British audience, and indeed for allied readers, the relevance is obvious. As defence budgets tighten and the character of conflict remains uncertain, armies cannot afford to get force design wrong. Owen's plea for simplicity is timely. His message that training, doctrine, and organisation matter more than technology should resonate with anyone who has served on exercise or deployment. Even if one disagrees with his conclusions, the act of engaging with them is worthwhile.
Euclid's Army is a provocative and valuable addition to contemporary military debate. Its strength lies in its clarity and its insistence on fundamentals. Its weakness lies in its lack of nuance and occasional overconfidence. Yet that is also what makes it powerful: it forces readers to think, argue...

Introduction
This year marked the 80th anniversary of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Since then, the non-use of nuclear weapons has remained the single most significant phenomenon of the nuclear age. Central to any discussion of global nuclear politics is the term nuclear taboo, which refers to a de facto prohibition against the first use of nuclear weapons. The nuclear taboo is not the act of non-use itself, but the deeply rooted belief that such use is illegitimate.
This belief has endured for nearly 80 years, but the foundations are beginning to crack.
While the nuclear taboo has historically played a significant role in limiting the use of nuclear weapons, contemporary geopolitical shifts, rhetorical normalisation of nuclear use, and the weakening of nuclear diplomacy indicate a gradual erosion of this norm. What the world is now witnessing is an exponential increase in stockpiles, an escalation in nuclear rhetoric, and the erosion of arms control regimes.
In the meantime, there is also an acceleration in the production and deployment of new nuclear weapons, with the rising geopolitical tensions.
Escalating Nuclear Rhetoric
Rhetoric holds a constitutive role when it comes to international politics. We can see how the power of language can shape issues such as national identity or give birth to social movements. One of the reasons why the tradition of nuclear non-use is a taboo, but not only a norm, is the subjective and intersubjective sense of taboo-ness. It manifests itself in how nuclear weapons have been discussed and interpreted over the years.
How state actors speak about nuclear use is critical in altering the normative structures governing their use. For instance, in January 2024, Israeli Heritage Minister Amihai Eliyahu made headlines by commenting that a "nuclear attack" was an option in case of Gaza. His remark was eventually met with international outrage, which led to his suspension from cabinet meetings. More worryingly, it signalled a normalisation of extreme language when referring to conflict and war.
From the East…and the West
Only a matter of months after Eliyahu's statement on Gaza, a similar shift in rhetoric was adopted by Russian President Vladimir Putin. He expanded Moscow's nuclear doctrine to allow any conventional attack by non-nuclear states that were allied to a nuclear power to be met with a nuclear strike, as if they themselves were armed with nuclear weapons.
In April 2025, the senior Iranian official Ali Larijani declared that Iran would be obliged to reevaluate its nuclear stance, should the Western powers act irresponsibly. This sharply contrasted with Iran's former assertions that aimed to maintain its intentions were peaceful about its nuclear program. The erosion of conventional deterrence after direct strikes by Israel and the United States eventually developed into nuclear signalling.

Rhetoric from the West, particularly following the return of Donald Trump to power, has become more confrontational. This hardening stance has likely led to the changing perception of a threat to Iran, paving the way for miscalculation. Moreover, the growing normalisation of aggressive nuclear signalling across conflict zones increases the risk of escalation and misjudgment. In a recent statement, President Donald Trump defended the American strikes against Iran.
He compared them to the use of nuclear weapons against Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which, according to him, brought an end to the Second World War. This type of language promotes the rhetorical normalisation of escalation by reframing the conversation around nuclear use, which eats away at the taboo over time.
A world that is rearming at an alarming rate
What makes this rhetorical shift more alarming is the material reality that accompanies it. As nuclear discourse grows more casual, nuclear states overtly invest in hard (military) power, as evidenced by the record levels of global military expenditure. In 2024, global defence sp...

You may have thought that another book on Arnhem was not necessary or that it could not possibly tell you anything you did not already know about this iconic battle from World War Two. However, Gary Buck's new book, A Risk Too Far, takes a new and novel approach to the subject that has you reappraising the commonly held views and your own long-held conceptions.
Whilst past commentators have been quick to apportion blame for the planning and execution of Operation Market Garden, Buck seeks to ask why and how errors might have been made.
A Risk Too Far blends historical research with psychological models and theories to examine the different cognitive influences and biases that individuals face when making decisions under stressful conditions.
It focuses on three of the prominent commanders of Operation Market Garden: Field Marshall Bernard Montgomery, the commander of 21st Army Group who first conceived of the operation; Lieutenant-General 'Boy' Browning, the deputy commander of the First Allied Airborne Army and overall tactical commander for the operation; and Major-General Roy Urquhart, commander of the British 1st Airborne Division.
It draws on both primary and secondary sources including memoirs, personal letters and reflections of both the subjects and their superiors and subordinates.
Whilst referencing important psychological theories and models, the book is structured around the OODA (Observe, Orientate, Decide, Act) loop which will be familiar to military readers. In so doing, Buck deftly brings out the human element of conflict, putting one in the shoes of those commanders, seeking to understand the decisions taken against the context and pressure they were under.
Studying Montgomery and the strategic level, Buck asks why he choose to embark on such a high-risk operation when he was usually so deliberate, meticulous, and careful? He examines the problems of supply and an acute manpower shortage faced by 21st Army Group that were becoming critical in the face of stiffening German resistance.
Monty's options are considered in light of the political impetus to prevent further V2 launches against London and his growing frustration with Eisenhower's insistence on a broad front strategy. Analysing his character, Buck finds that Montgomery was facing acute pressures and had succumbed to what is known as a grip reaction in which he abandoned his normal analytical logical approach. Operation Market Garden was a gamble, but he had decided that it was worth it.
For that to be true it needed some likelihood of success. For that, Buck turns to the operational level and Lieutenant General 'Boy' Browning.
Examining 'Boy' Browning we find that he was pushing for use of the First Allied Airborne Army, accepted risks in planning, and inexplicably opted to deploy his own Corps HQ in the first lift. A colourful character driven by pride and ambition, he was concerned with the diminishing possibilities for field command and to prove the continued utility of airborne forces.
Faced with similar pressures to Montgomery, he was too optimistic and failed to raise concerns about a plan that could only really be successful under the best circumstances and with a significant amount of luck.
At the tactical level, Buck asks why Urquhart's plan was so rigid and lacking in focus to the extent that only one battalion ever made it to the bridge in Arnhem? He examines how his lack of airborne experience led him to fall back on inadequate experience, to make illogical decisions under time pressure and to not question clear failings in the plan over a fear that his division might be broken up to solve Monty's manpower shortage.
A Risk Too Far presents a thorough investigation of the span of strategic, operational and tactical aspects of the operation. It provides considerable food for thought with regards to how other fateful operations may have been planned and executed under similar circumstances. Usefully, Buck also articulates the ways in which c...

The recent Defence Committee report, Defence in the Grey Zone, brings renewed focus to the challenge of hostile activity below the threshold of conventional war. The term 'Grey Zone' suggests a novel ambiguity, a modern strategic dilemma born of new technologies; this ambiguous environment challenges not only our strategic doctrines but also our classical ethical frameworks for conflict. However, while the character of this struggle is undeniably new, its foundational principles are not.
The Grey Zone is the modern evolution of ancient principles of statecraft, supercharged by technology and the unique vulnerabilities of a hyperconnected world. To navigate this strategic evolution requires both re-understanding the classical strategists, from Sun Tzu and Kautilya to Clausewitz and Liddell Hart, while simultaneously grappling with profound ethical questions they could never have envisioned.
The Timeless Why
The strategic intent underpinning Grey Zone activity, to "coerce governments or simply erode their ability to function", is as old as statecraft itself. It is the practical application of "the acme of skill" according to Sun Tzu's Art of War: "to subdue the enemy without fighting". This ideal, which finds echoes in the "silent war" of Kautilya's Arthashastra, offers an intellectual foundation for modern Grey Zone Operations.
From a Consequentialist perspective - where morality is based on outcomes alone - this is a grim yet vital calculus aimed at avoiding the greater evil of devastating state-on-state conflict.
The report is replete with modern manifestations of ancient approaches. The use of propaganda and disinformation, "driving a wedge between social groups", is a direct heir to the classical strategy of attacking an adversary's societal cohesion. Sun Tzu notes that "all warfare is based on deception", while Kautilya takes this further, highlighting Bheda (sowing dissent) as one of the four primary tools of statecraft.
The employment of "proxies, including sub-state actors such as rebel groups, mercenaries, criminal gangs, or cyber 'hacktivists'", offers the same plausible deniability sought by ancient spymasters. Sun Tzu dedicates an entire chapter to the use of spies for gaining intelligence and manipulating the enemy, while Kautilya describes vast and intricate spy networks as the primary tool for both internal control and external influence.
The report's observation that "attribution of grey zone activity is often challenging" is equally neither a new nor unforeseen problem but the intended outcome of a strategy designed to achieve political effect while adhering to the Jus Ad Bellum ('justice to war', the principles governing righteous initiation of war) principle of Right Intention (from the aggressor's perspective at least) by avoiding an overt act of war.
The goal, now as then, is to weaken the adversary from within, making them politically, economically, and socially unable to resist.
The Transformative What
While the strategic why is timeless, the what - the nature of modern warfare and in particular that of the Grey Zone challenge - has fundamentally transformed. Technology has not merely supplied new tools for the strategist's arsenal, but created entirely new domains of conflict and systemic vulnerabilities that are without historical precedent.
The report correctly states that "technology has magnified the impact and global reach of grey zone attacks, and identified new areas for prosecuting operations that did not exist a generation ago, particularly regarding cyberattacks".
This has created a geographically boundless cyber domain where adversaries may conduct countless operations on a scale, and at a rate, previously unimaginable - such as the "over 90,000 sub-threshold attacks" launched against the MoD's networks over just two years.
This digital dependency has birthed a new critical national vulnerability: the physical infrastructure of the internet. The report highlights the "approximately 60 under...

Aligned to His Majesty's Government (HMG) priorities of curtailing irregular migration and associated connections to human trafficking from Albania, efforts to address the drivers of migration and organised crime at source are underway. The British Army's ongoing specialist survey work in Albania's Kukës Subterranean Complex (KSC) may lead to livelihood creation, mitigating some of the risk factors of human trafficking. This demonstrates the military instrument's contribution to Human Security.
UK Strategy on Irregular Migration from Albania
Enabled in large part by online messaging applications such as TikTok Albanians made up a quarter of all arrivals to the UK by small boats at a reported peak in 2022.
The UK's Home Affairs Committee June 2023 report details the legal, social and political context of migration to the UK from Albania. Three key drivers identified are:
1. Economic migration because of Albania's comparative poverty
2. Refugees (particularly women) who have been trafficked or made modern slaves; and
3. Organised crime
In 2023 and 2024, the UK returned more Albanians (2624) by nationality than any other, but irregular detections from Albania continued throughout 2024 (825).
Time should be taken to understand migration terms and figures (see here), but the key takeaway is that the UK's intent is to reduce migration and where possible, minimise push factors at source
To achieve this effect, cross-government strategy in partnership with international state and non-state partners has been pursued, complimented by a plethora of UK-Albania bilaterals, culminating in a Bilateral Cooperation Plan signed in December 2022 which centred around 'security and home affairs' with a focus on 'organised crime and illegal immigration'.
Development of Kukës city - a vulnerable area prone to criminality and trafficking 'from which a substantial proportion of Albanian emigration to the UK occurs' - has been recognised as means to combat emigration. The UK has already worked with local NGOs, UNICEF and conducted fact finding missions in Kukës on perceptions and drivers of emigration.
Defence Integrating into UK Strategy
On 17 July 2023, the then Secretary for Defence Ben Wallace received Albanian Defence Minister Niko Peleshi in London, with former Minister of State Baroness Goldie later signing a Statement of Intent (SoI) between the two MoDs with Peleshi.
The SoI is wide ranging, and leaves plenty of scope for 'any new potential areas of cooperation'. Likely by design, the SoI does not detail expected outcomes, but does list some specific outputs, one of which includes 'infrastructural development'.
While the military instrument is not positioned as the lead actor in counter-trafficking efforts, those drafting the SoI seem aware that military activity could contribute meaningfully to the conditions which reduce trafficking risk.
The Overseas Security and Justice Assistance (OSJA) form completed for bilateral activity reinforces this interpretation. The military engagement is framed in terms of defence engagement, recognising 'representatives of other [Albanian] government and academic institutions also attend activity delivered by the UK Defence Section in support of UK Partners Across Government'.
The effect is subtle but significant: rather than overstate Defence's role, the SoI and OSJA position military activity as a potential discreet net contributor to broader foreign policy and Human Security outcomes - reduction of emigration and associated trafficking through targeted development programmes at source.
In this context, the absence of outcome language should be read not as an oversight, but as policy discipline. It reflects a conscious decision to align with HMG objectives without mischaracterising the military's role or inadvertently committing Defence to outcomes it alone cannot deliver.
The Plan
'Exploring the potentials of the tunnels' was agreed as an output in the Defence and Security Bilateral Cooperation planned o...

In the not-so-distant future, a U.S. military commander in the Indo-Pacific could be forced to fight two major wars at once - one against a Chinese assault on Taiwan, the other against a North Korean attack on the Korean Peninsula. This dual-front crisis scenario, long considered unlikely, is now routinely modeled in wargames and quietly debated in high-level policy circles.
Yet the United States and its East Asian allies remain unprepared - not in terms of firepower, but in coordination, planning, and execution.
Today's alliance architecture is not designed to handle a simultaneous conflict in Taiwan and Korea. The existing command structures are fragmented, force designs are nationally siloed, and procurement choices are often politically misaligned. In short, there is no unified playbook for fighting two wars in East Asia - let alone winning them.
But the United States has faced a similar problem before. From NATO's founding in 1949 through West Germany's integration in 1955, Washington confronted a world where it had to deter simultaneous threats in Europe and Asia. It responded by building institutions - not just capabilities. The first phase of NATO's evolution offers enduring lessons in how to organize allies, align procurement, and prepare for multi-theater war.
Today, the U.S.-Japan-South Korea triangle urgently needs to draw from that experience before the next crisis begins.
Learning from NATO's Blueprint
At the 1952 Lisbon Conference, NATO members committed to fielding 50 divisions - an ambitious goal that drove significant increases in defense spending across Europe. Washington played a central role in catalyzing this shift through economic leverage, strategic vision, and the shared threat of Soviet aggression. But what mattered more than raw spending was the coordinated structure that emerged: NATO didn't just build forces; it built a cohesive force.
A parallel dynamic is unfolding in East Asia. Japan has pledged to double its defense budget by 2027, investing heavily in standoff missiles, ISR, and munition stockpiles. South Korea already spends over 2.7% of GDP on defense and is expanding long-range strike capabilities, naval power, and missile defenses. But unlike the early NATO experience, these efforts remain nationally fragmented. Without integration, the investments of today may become the inefficiencies of tomorrow.

NATO's lesson is clear: deterrence is not created by defense spending alone. It depends on force structure coherence, shared priorities, and a division of labor among allies.
If Japan fields Tomahawk cruise missiles and South Korea invests in submarine-launched cruise missiles and explores the development of a light aircraft carrier, who integrates and sustains these systems when crises erupt? Which ally reinforces which theater, and how quickly? Without institutional answers to these questions, military planning becomes guesswork.
The lack of a trilateral command mechanism is one of the most pressing gaps. In 1951, NATO established SHAPE - the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe - as a centralized node for operational planning, logistics, and interoperability. Nothing like SHAPE exists in the Indo-Pacific today. The U.S.-ROK Combined Forces Command and U.S.-Japan coordination under USFJ and INDOPACOM remain bilateral and compartmentalized.
The result is a strategic blind spot. In a Taiwan conflict, U.S. naval assets might be redeployed from Korean waters. Simultaneously, while Japan's 2015 security legislation enables expanded support for U.S. operations, political and legal constraints could still delay or limit Japan's full-spectrum support in a Korean contingency - particularly absent a trilateral planning framework.
Rather than creating an "Asian NATO," the immediate solution could be the establishment of a trilateral planning cell within INDOPACOM - drawing staff from South Korea's Joint Chiefs of Staff and Japan's Self-Defense Forces. With access to real-time intelligence and s...

The rapid advancement of military technology continues to transform the operational landscape of modern warfare. Cavalry operations (CavOps), traditionally focused on reconnaissance and rapid manoeuvre, now increasingly rely on sophisticated sensor systems and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to maintain battlefield superiority.
This article explores the integration of the Observation Targeting and Surveillance Systems (OTAS) and drone swarms controlled from the CV90 infantry fighting vehicle (IFV), coupled with the Digital Aided Fire Solution (DAFS). Focusing on the Norwegian Army's implementation efforts, it
evaluates how this technological fusion enhances targeting capabilities and situational awareness whilst critically examining the cost-effectiveness and tactical trade-offs associated with tethered drone systems.
Cavalry Formations and Their Operational Concepts: The Case of Porsanger Battalion
A cavalry formation primarily conducts its missions as part of enabling operations (US ARMY, 2016, p. 12) . Enabling operations are operations that facilitate a transition to either offensive or defensive operations (NATO Standardization Agency, 2009, p. 185) . Within this spectrum, a cavalry formation must be capable of conducting reconnaissance and security operations. Therefore, it is important to combine firepower, manoeuvre, and protection with the ability to identify targets.
Porsanger Battalion, within the framework of the Finnmark Brigade, is Norway's only pure cavalry formation dimensioned for this role. Norway has chosen to use the CV90 platform for the concept development of such a cavalry formation. Similar to several Nordic countries, more are now recognising the platform's utility in terms of adaptability and flexibility, acquiring the CV90 platform for their own armed forces (Ministry of Defence, 2025)
The CV90 Platform and OTAS Capabilities
The CV90 Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV), developed by BAE Systems Hägglunds and fielded by several NATO countries, is a modular, highly adaptable platform tailored for reconnaissance and combat operations in demanding environments. Its open digital architecture enables integration of advanced mission systems, transforming the vehicle into a networked sensor and command node.
A key capability enhancer is the Observation Targeting and Surveillance Systems (OTAS), which significantly improves the CV90's effectiveness in surveillance, target acquisition, and precision engagement.

In the Norwegian CV90 reconnaissance configuration, OTAS incorporates the Chess Dynamics Hawkeye Modular Mission Pod (MMP); a mast-mounted, multi-sensor suite combining electro-optical and infrared sensors, a high-power daylight camera, a long-range laser rangefinder (>30 km), a laser pointer, and a compact radar system for target detection and tracking. This radar capability provides persistent surveillance and allows for wide-area situational awareness, even in degraded visual environments.
The system meets Category 1 Target Location Error (TLE) standards, the highest level of geolocation accuracy in NATO, enabling precise engagement at ranges beyond 20 km. Integrated into either a local Combat Management System (CMS) or a broader Battlefield Information System (BIS), and enhanced by AI-powered classification and tracking tools, OTAS delivers near-real-time threat detection and dissemination across the network.
This dramatically increases the unit's operational autonomy and survivability in fast-paced, sensor-dense battlespaces (Chess Dynamics, 2023) .
Drone Swarms and Digital Fire Solutions Integration
Integrating drone swarms directly into the CV90's command ecosystem represents a fundamental shift in how reconnaissance and targeting operations are conducted. Unlike conventional UAV operations that depend on external ground control stations, deploying and controlling drone swarms from within the vehicle reduces communication latency and enhances tactical responsiveness (Edvardsen & Hansen, 2024)...

Introduction
Like many of us, I love listening to our veterans' tales, exploits and adventures. They regale stories from their long careers, dits about the changes in warfare and the disruptions following the digital transformation of our armed forces. Suddenly, I feel my age as they talk about some of the equipment I worked on, but in the past tense. As I reflect on this, I think that maybe the military got digital transformation all wrong.
Instead of focusing on the transformation of warfare by digitalisation, we have been preoccupied with the digitalisation of the equipment, not on the transformation of our Armed Forces and how we should prosecute a digital war using it. Instead of welcoming AI and digital transformation as a new paradigm for our Armed Services, did we merely apply it as a trendy veneer on legacy ways-of-war models, processes and practices?
In the first major digital war, Ukraine quickly learnt that their legacy Soviet and even adopted legacy NATO doctrine, models, processes and practices, built for the last war, were defunct in this new digital battlespace. As new conflicts arise, this challenges our fundamental assumptions about how we think, work, and measure success in the new AI-enabled profession of arms.
The rise of AI is giving us all a moment of pause.
Do we choose to also apply a veneer of AI to the same old legacy processes and practices, making them incrementally a little faster and more efficient … or do we work to focus on the important things in the next war - applying AI to increase our efficiency, effectiveness and lethality? At the same time, we must also chart new skills pathways for all our people and harness everyone's creativity so we can deliver a truly transformed AI-enabled military.
Augmenting and fusing the human mind with advanced AI technologies could provide a pivotal moment for us if we are bold enough to seize it.
Digitalisation isn't transformation
It has only been a decade since General Barrons presented his vision on Warfare in the Information Age. It promised to revolutionise us for a new way of war. But for many, the outcome was far from revolutionary; instead of truly investing in digital transformation, we faffed and frittered away the opportunity, making only superficial changes and tweaks rather than complete transformation.
This approach reinforced and cemented traditional tactics, techniques and procedures from the Cold War era, without dismantling the barriers that separated individuals, tasks and data within our formations. Each team, function and arm got its own ICS, which was meant to enhance efficiency but ended up complicating future efforts to aggregate data and interoperate as one.
While much of our equipment changed, how we operated on the battlefield did not fundamentally change the nature of our work or transform it. We introduced new, better equipment, interfaces, and architectures, improving the speed, security and quantity of the same things we always did. It allowed us to maintain the same old Cold War practices, with the data being passed and workflows remaining disparate, still siloed within different domains.
Instead of transforming how we fight, we extended, prolonged, and gave a lifeline to the old ways of warfare with which we were comfortable. We didn't challenge the politics or conventions, retire outdated thinking or butcher any sacred cows. How often have we heard "Why do we keep doing it this way?" We failed to change our perspective on how we think. We failed to question whether our traditions were right in this modern battlespace.
We failed to understand how we should fight in this digital world. As with digital transformation, there is no one-size-fits-all for AI enablement either, but iteration or refinement of past legacy practices is not the answer.

A reimagined military
A few organisations fundamentally understood the real power of digital; they reimagined their purpose and developed a whole new way of delivering their product/s...