The U.S. Navy faced multiple threats in an emerging technology environment. The past two years have offered many lessons about the efficacy of anti-ship ballistic missiles and unmanned platforms and we must identify and learn them. The lessons from Ukraine and Yemen are shaping fleet design for the next generation. Understanding the context of the lessons from the conflicts is crucial. What can the Battle of Lissa tell us?
In 1866, the navies of Austria and Italy fought near the island of Vis. Cutting the story short, the Austrians attacked in formations designed to aggressively ram the Italian ships, winning the battle despite an inferior status. The lessons of Lissa would impact naval design for the next 50 years. Before the Battle navies believed in the big gun. After Lissa navies were copying the Austrians and adding rams to new ships and developing ram-based tactics.
But the lesson was wrong and the torpedo was the future.
As modern navies prepare for future conflict, it is important to understand the context of lessons, or risk drawing faulty conclusions.
Past as Prologue
For nearly 150 years, from De Ruyter until Nelson, naval tactics were static. Wooden ships fought each other with broadsides. Technical innovations squeezed more efficiency at the margins. Copper sheathing improved ships' maneuverability with additional speed. The carronade increased the lethality of a ship's broadside while decreasing cannon weight. These technological advances did not change the general tactic of pummeling ships with cannon broadsides.
The 19th century was an age of technological revolution and emerging technology. In 1807, Robert Fulton tested his first steamboat in New York. This technology would continue to develop throughout the century. The steam engine revolutionized naval warfare because ocean-going warships were no longer beholden to the wind for maneuver. Developments in artillery meant that cannons were capable of firing explosive shells on flat trajectories to destroy wooden-hulled warships.
By the 1840s, France and Britain sold these weapons to any nation that had the coin for them. Even the Republic of Texas Navy employed explosive shells fired from cannons. Explosive shells were great equalizers in naval combat. Armored warships appeared in the 1850s to counter improved artillery. France was the first nation to use armored warships during the Crimean War. Armored ships were impervious to the explosive shells of the age.
The naval question of the second half of the 19th century was how to defeat armored vessels while naval guns improved sufficiently to threaten armored warships. The see-saw between warships' armor and artillery lasted until the end of the battleship era.

Ramming
Austria, Prussia, and Italy fought a war in 1866. Most historians know the War of 1866 as the Austro-Prussian War, but in Italy it is known as the Third Italian War of Unification. Ashore, the Austro-Prussian War was decided at the battle of Sadowa (Königgrätz). In Italy, Austria defeated the Italian army at Custozza again and at sea at Lissa.
The Austrians were commanded by Admiral Wilhelm von Tegetthoff. His officers all understood his battle plans and they had painted their ships different colours to help identification. Although Tegetthoff's ships were smaller and carried smaller guns they would attempt to break the Italian line with three V-shaped formations. The first V composed his ironclads, the second V composed his large steam frigates, and the third V composed the fleet's smallest ships.
Just before the battle the Italian commander, Admiral Persano shifted his flag to another ship. This caused tremendous confusion in the Italian Fleet because the shift was not planned for. Italian commanders looked to the old flagship for leadership and direction but found none.

Tegetthoff's fleet broke the line in two places. The first V, led by Tegetthoff, engaged the central portion of the fleet. The second V of unarmoured ships broke the line n...

It was our own fault, and our very grave fault, and now we must turn it to use, We have forty million reasons for failure, but not a single excuse!" Rudyard Kipling
Context
This short story aims to bring tactical lessons from contemporary conflicts to life for junior commanders. Inspired by Captain (later Major General) Ernest Swinton's classic work The Defence of Duffer's Drift, it follows a young British officer and a small group of soldiers tasked with defending a key position, using a series of 'dreams' as a device to enable the defenders to iteratively improve their tactics.
While Swinton's original was set during the Second Boer War (a "drift" being a vernacular term for a ford), this updated version shifts the setting to a near future war in the Baltics. Each failed attempt to defend the position, in this case a bridge, resets the scenario, giving the defenders another chance for success. The memories of the previous failures remain available to the protagonist, allowing a series of lessons to emerge through trial and error.
This narrative device may feel familiar to modern audiences from the Duffers-inspired Tom Cruise film Edge of Tomorrow (or Live. Die. Repeat. for American viewers). No new resources are available at the commencement of each attempt. No new tech, no new kit, no external support. Much like the contemporary British Army, the defenders must adapt to fight tonight with what they have.
It must be stressed that this is not an 'academic' piece. It is intended to be a light, quick read for the junior commander. The lessons are also not intended to be definitive or prescriptive; rather, they represent a curated set of observations drawn from military, academic, and open-source material. Indeed, many of the basic lessons have not changed since Swinton's original text and simply need to be re-learned.
The chosen dream sequence for this story focuses on the infantry platoon the bedrock of our warfighting capability, but the style could (and should) and should beused as a prism through which to teach and refine other capabilities. As the character of conflict continues to shift, in evolutions and revolutions, this specific story will also likely need to be augmented by new 'dreams' to address new tactical challenges.
How we defended the bridge over the Šventara By Lt Foresight Backthought, 5 LOAMS.
Prologue
Upon a still summer's afternoon, after a long and bone-rattling journey across the flatness of the Baltics, we arrived at our objective: the bridge over the River Šventara. The long day of travelling, and the Vegetarian Mushroom Omelette ration pack that I had consumed, was likely responsible for the unsettled sleep and the resultant repetitive series of dreams I experienced that night.
Each dream began the same, with our arrival that afternoon to that key bridge over the river, but each one played out differently. With each new dream I learnt new lessons and, somehow, I carried the lessons of each dream forward with me to the next.
The First Dream - relearning the basics

I felt a pang of dread and elation as the last of the column of vehicles rumbled across the bridge, down that straight tarmac road amongst the Baltic pines, and away into the distance towards the front line. This was the first time that I, Lt Backthought, had ever been alone in command of soldiers on a real operation.
My platoon's task was clear: as part of the Division's Rear Area Security Group, we were to hold this bridge, some distance behind the FLOT and on a secondary route, to enable future operations. We would be here for 48hrs, after which time we would be relieved by follow-on forces. I had some thirty-odd soldiers with which to achieve the task, the rest of the company having now rumbled off to secure other bits of key terrain.
The rest of our division was committed away to the east, towards the border, where it remained engaged in efforts to break through the enemy's frontage. It was doing its best to manoeuvre, to try and ave...

On June 1st 2025, Ukraine carried out well-coordinated drone attacks on four airbases deep inside Russia. In the operation codenamed 'Spider's Web', 117 drones were utilized to allegedly hit over 40 Russian strategic bombers inflicting a damage of around seven billion dollars. As part of the operation, drones were first smuggled into Russia, hidden inside wooden sheds and subsequently loaded onto the trucks.
When the trucks were in close proximity to the air bases, the roof panels were remotely lifted, allowing the drones to initiate the assault. Ukraine claims that the targeted bomber fleet was being used by Russia to strike infrastructure inside the Ukrainian territory.
The increased utilization of drones in contemporary times is indicative of the future face of warfare. While the Ukraine-Russia war has seen widespread drone use, similar patterns have emerged in other conflict zones including the Azerbaijan-Armenia war and the India-Pakistan conflict of May 2025.
It is pertinent to note that the India-Pakistan conflict did not witness the same level and intensity of drone usage, possibly due to its short four-day duration, contrary to the Ukraine-Russia and Azerbaijan-Armenia wars. However, these instances collectively signal the pattern of future warfare, which would be dominated by the increasing use of drones, particularly drone swarms.
During the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, drones played a prominent role in countering Armenian ground forces on the battlefield, highlighting the vulnerability of conventional military equipment to drones. Utilization of drones by Azerbaijan played a significant role in determining the outcome of the war. The war concluded with Armenia accepting a ceasefire agreement under severe terms.
Similarly, the May 2025 India-Pakistan conflict, saw the use of drone from both sides. During the four-day conflict, India used a variety of drones in an attempt to saturate air defence environment and take out the air defence and radar installations deep inside Pakistan. However, after detecting the threat, Pakistan likely switched to radar silence to prevent emission of signals and intercepted the incoming drones using soft and hard kill mechanisms.
In response to India's use of drones, Pakistan also launched drones that hovered over the Indian military installations and major cities making it the first instance of drone warfare between the two nuclear armed states.
All of these instances suggest that drones are dominating the present conflict environment and future conflicts might see a surge in the employment of drones. Previously, countries were investing in large drones, however, more recently these platforms are optimized for targeted strikes and are less suited for the dynamic and saturated threat environments of modern conflicts.
Recognizing this limitation, countries are now shifting their focus towards developing scalable and cost-effective drone swarms capable of overwhelming enemy air defences.
In this context, the US, in August 2023, announced Replicator initiative with the goal to harness advancements in autonomous technology to mass-produce expendable systems capable of providing a strategic edge in contested operational environments through Suppression of Enemy Air Defences (SEAD) and Destruction of Enemy Air Defences (DEAD) missions. The program focuses on developing drones, Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS), and Unmanned Surface Vehicles (USVs).
Similarly, China's military drone capabilities have seen significant growth. Chinese President Xi Jinping has portrayed, drones as capable of "profoundly changing war scenarios" and pledged during the Communist Party's Congress in 2022, to "speed up the development of unmanned, intelligent combat capabilities".
In this context, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) operates an arsenal of diverse drone types, with estimates suggesting a fleet size in tens of thousands, vastly outnumbering the drone fleets of the US.
Besides this, countries are also raci...

President Putin has only been able to sustain his war by bribing the poor, desperate and marginalised. The deal has been straightforward: sign up and you will be paid a fabulous lump sum and generous salary. You will receive benefits and a veteran's pension. In the event of your death your family will be compensated. A surprising majority believe they are signing one-year contracts and are unaware that service is indefinite until the end of the war.
Even when told they still sign on, taking the gamble that the war will be over soon and anxious not to miss out on a get-rich-quick scheme. Just five percent of volunteers have a higher education and 40% are 50-year olds and older (last year the recruitment age was increased to 70 years-of-age, and the oldest recorded death has been a 72 year-old).
The sums offered are stupendous. The one-time signing on bonus in Nizhny Novgorod can be as high as 3 million roubles ($38,300). Impoverished Bashkortostan - which has suffered the most war losses with over 3,100 confirmed volunteer deaths - offers 1.5 million roubles. 'You'll earn 3.7 million roubles [$44,000] your first year!' shouts an advertisement in Novosibirsk. Who wants to be a millionaire? The reality, naturally, is different and the subject of this article.
The reality of life in occupied Ukraine
A volunteer may earn a monthly salary of between 200,000-300,000 roubles $2,550-$3,800). This is many times higher than the average Russian salary and unimaginable in the poorer regions of Russia. Yet the soldiers are not kings of the castle. The costs of serving in occupied Ukraine swallow salaries. Some of those costs are itemised below:
Food: Soldiers have to supplement inadequate rations by buying their own food. Locals routinely double and triple prices to Russian soldiers because they know they can pay. A monthly bill can run to 20,000-30,000 roubles ($255-$380). In one unusual case, a Russian soldier serving in 68 Motor Rifle Division on the Kupyansk front saved on food money by turning cannibal and eating a dead comrade. Reportedly this provided him with sufficient meat for two weeks.
Water: Occupied Donbas is a water disaster area with daily rationing and water cuts. Tap water - when it runs - is undrinkable ('you cannot even wash in it', one soldier has averred). A daily five litres of water costs 100-150 roubles, or around $38-$57 per month.
Sex: The Donbas has been transformed by a sex industry chasing roubles. As much as 500,000 roubles ($6,380) can be earned in week. Roughly one third of prostitutes work from stationary brothels and the remainder do 'shift work', or two-week shifts in rented houses in Mariupol, Berdyansk, Melitopol, Donetsk and Luhansk. A chat with a prostitute can cost 15,000 roubles ($190). One night costs 120,000 roubles ($1,530). Payments are in cash.
'It seems to me that 90% of my clients feel regret [about joining the war],' one prostitute has opined. Another has said that every second order she gets is 'just to sit down and talk, because they don't see anything there except men and corpses.'
Cigarettes: The issue cigarettes are unsmokable and thrown away. Cigarettes are sold at inflated prices in the Donbas (around 200 roubles or $2.50 per packet) and are smoked apace. Roughly half of all Russian males smoke, one of the highest rates in the world. Smoking in the army is widespread.
Alcohol: There are no numbers for alcohol consumption. There is abundant anecdotal evidence that the high alcohol consumption rates of Russian civilian society - and alcoholism - have been exported to the frontline. Indeed, some volunteer to get their lives in order, having lost control to alcohol in their home towns and villages.
Clothing: Soldiers invariably resort to buying their own uniforms, especially cold weather clothing. There are mobile 'uniform shops' operating in the Donbas. They can charge as much as 10,000 roubles for a uniform ($125), or twice the going rate in a shop in 'the mainland' (it is telling th...

The publication of Human Augmentation - The Dawn of a New Paradigm by the Defence Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC) in 2021 demonstrated the importance of this topic within UK defence.1 Human Augmentation (HA) is also referenced in the recent Defence Command Paper (Defence's response to a more contested and volatile world)3 relative perceived effort,4 reduction in muscle EMG activity,5 cognitive function,6 and metabolic activity7 inter alia.
In addition, translation of these outcome measures to military utility is not yet convincing. Another fundamental challenge with exoskeletons for military applications is power requirement. The reported improvements in physical performance in tethered systems described in these studies need to be viewed with scepticism as they will be reduced significantly once the systems carry their own power supply.
Finally, there is evidence that while performance in one domain (lifting / carrying) may be augmented, this comes at the cost of reduced performance in another (walking).8
Remote sensing and measurement has been explored as a means to prevent injury and assure the health of our fighting force. Several remote sensing systems have reached an advanced technology readiness level and have shown promise in the field.9 However, there are several key problems that range from technological challenges (e.g.
signal noise, calibration, drift, attachment-related artefact, etc) to the lack of causal evidence in the literature to link injuries or illness states with particular measurable parameters.10 This last problem is a fundamental barrier to this technology finding a military utility. We are currently at the stage of discovering what we can measure, but to be useful we need to know what we should measure.
This problem of lack of fundamental knowledge is profound in the more invasive areas of HA. Much of the means by which HA can be delivered remains entirely theoretical. For example, the specific genetic modifications of the human genome to improve muscle strength or prevent MSK injury are not known. Our literature search has not revealed any human research in these areas, meaning that deficits in understanding are unlikely to be resolved soon.
If the HA technology is to transform our fighting force within a generation then significant investment in basic human research is required now.
The scientific problems discussed above are not the only difficulties in this area. Key ethical, legal, societal, and economic problems will need to be overcome for HA to deliver meaningful performance gains. Ethical issues are discussed clearly in the original paper (1) and relate to permanence, harm, societal acceptance, military proportionality, and fairness. Another ethical problem that has not been discussed in the literature is the question of whether HA is a medical therapy.
HA intended to mitigate traumatic injury may be argued to be analogous to preventative medicine such as vaccination and may be considered within the remit of our current understanding of healthcare and medical ethics. However, HA that has no preventative medical application has no current medical analogy and cannot be considered part of healthcare as we currently understand it.
Multiple unanswered legal questions will need to be answered before HA can be used in practice (table 2). However, the UK government has no legislative agenda to clarify the law surrounding this area so these questions are likely to remain unanswered for now.
Legal Concept
Legal Questions
Informed consent
Montgomery ruling: patients must have individualised discussion of potential risks, benefits, alternatives, and implications.
If HA is not defined as a medical technology, what consenting safeguards apply?
Liability
Who is liable if harm is caused to the individual as a result of augmentation if something goes wrong during augmentation procedure or during use?
Who is responsible for the removal of HA technology in the case of obsolescence or request from the use...

At around the same time the video headlining this article was recorded, President Putin was hosting Russian Language, or Pushkin Day. This precedes Russia Day which is celebrated on 12 June. Putin spoke virtually from Novo Ogaryovo, his favoured residence on the outskirts of Moscow which boasts a heated, indoor, Olympic-sized swimming pool. Russian was one of the most expressive languages in the world, he extolled, 'reflecting our spiritual and moral traditions, culture, and unique identity.'
The Russian president often blathers about Russia as a great 'civilisational-state'. It is even written into the country's national security doctrine: 'Russian World'(Russkiy mir) as counterpoint to the wicked 'Collective West'.
A reader glancing at the image would likely imagine it shows two Ukrainian soldiers at the bottom of a sand pit. Not so. The two unfortunates are Russian soldiers - refuseniks. Not visible in the footage is another Russian firing live rounds into the sand around them and taunting them. This 'Russian World' - a reality far removed from the scented, polished corridors of presidential villas in Moscow - is the subject of this article.
'On the Russian Peasant'
In 1922, the Russian writer Maxim Gorky wrote a later much-quoted essay 'On the Russian Peasant'. Why, Gorky mused, were Russians capable of apparently bottomless cruelty? 'I experienced and saw many atrocities. I could never find a justification for their existence …Where does this human cruelty come from?' His view of the Muscovite (Russian) national character was low and deserves to be quoted in full:
'It seems to me that the most striking feature of the Moscow national character is actual cruelty, just like English humour. This is a special cruelty, and at the same time a cold-bloodedly invented measure of the degree of endurance and resistance in patience that man can attain…
The most interesting feature of Moscow brutality is its devilish finesse, its, I would say, aesthetic refinement. I do not think that these features can be explained by such words as "psychosis", "sadism" or similar. Because in essence, they do not explain anything. A consequence of alcoholism? - But I do not think that the people of Moscow were more poisoned by alcohol than other European nations.
However, it must be admitted that the influence of alcohol on the psyche of a Muscovite is particularly fatal because our nation is worse off than others.
I am not talking here about cruelty, which appears sporadically, like an explosion of a sick or perverted soul. These are exceptions that will chill a psychiatrist: here I am talking about mass psychology, about the nation's soul, about collective cruelty.'
In Russia, he concluded, almost everyone enjoys beating someone.
On the 'Special Military Operation'
Putin's 'Special Military Operation' will be remembered for its barbarism. The Russian president arrogantly presumed to take Kyiv in three days and the rest of eastern and southern Ukraine in two weeks. Instead he has mired Russia in a disaster and revealed to the world the true nature of 'Russian World'.
The Donbas, which he presumed to 'liberate', has been turned into a ravaged, depopulated wasteland, a region drained of children, jobs, hope or a future. Scores of settlements and towns have been erased from the map. The 'Russian way of warfare' has proved to be naked banditry.
'This is not the 'second army' of the world,' as one Ukrainian expressed following the invasion, 'this is a bunch of marauders, degenerates, executioners and rapists.' From Kherson to Kharkiv, daily and nightly drone attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure have not stopped for over three years.
Russian contempt for the Laws of Armed Conflict and International Red Cross (IRC) has been breath-taking. Ukrainian PoWs are currently dispersed in around 300 prisons across Russia (Ukraine maintains five transit centres and five permanent prisons).
Moscow will not allow the IRC anywhere near Ukrainian PoWs and...

"Russia's hybrid attacks against NATO look like war", writes Deborah Haynes for Sky News. She is referring to grey-zone warfare, attacks that sit under the threshold of conventional war and include sabotage, cyber hacks, and assassination plots. Significantly, this is not the first caution published in the recent media of Russia's employment of this type of warfare and the risks of a failed NATO response.
As Edward Lucas warns in The Times, Russia's war in the grey zone is actually chipping away at the heart of NATO.
When I read these warnings, my gendered military experiences are at the forefront of my mind. I am a female, current serving RAF Reservist and former RAF Regular. I am also a PhD student, with my research centres around gender and RAF organisational culture.
Whilst connecting diversity, inclusion and sub-threshold warfare may seem a stretch to some and arguably to others, a further distraction from the more immediate threat of war, I am well aware that the impact of grey-zone warfare has far reaching consequences.
Grey-zone warfare conducted in 'peacetime' using information, money, or even physical force is powerful. Not only does it have a physical impact on UK and NATO defence through the seemingly endless impact of drones, hired thugs, and now "seabed sabotage" damaging infrastructure, energy, computer networks or transport systems; but most significantly, the cohesive nature in which we fight together, reducing the ability to defend against threats.
By "posing dilemmas and stoking divisions" the MoD is being pulled in ways which undermine the foundations of the organisations purpose.
The real target, as Edward Lucas writes, is decision making. The act of distracting and undermining decision making equates to sub-threshold warfare, reducing the ability to effectively operate. So where does gender and diversity link in?
In the real world?
In November 2024, the HMNZS Manawanui, a New Zealand Naval ship, crashed and subsequently sank under the command of Yvonne Gray, whose Naval career notably spanned over 30-years in both the New Zealand and Royal Navy. Despite this, her gender and sexuality were directly attributed to the incident. As a "diversity hire", she has faced a barrage of hostile and toxic abuse in the street.
Quoted directly in The Times, John Mclean, author of A Mission of Honour: The Royal Navy in The Pacific, clearly outlines the problem. "The Navy is over-promoting women beyond their capacity in order to meet gender and sexual orientation goals". In New Zealand, other women in uniform received similar abuse in the wake of the incident.
March this year saw one of the worst weeks for aviation history in the US, as a commercial jet and military helicopter collided in Washington DC. In immediate response, President Trump blamed D&I initiatives and so called 'diversity hires' as the reason for the accidents and a Transgender pilot was wrongly blamed and vilified for the crash.
When only 2 days later a small medical transport plane crashed in Philadelphia, it was unsurprising that the mourning family of one of the pilots refuses to release their name, out of concerns for gendered attacks and abuse.
Pervasive and closer to home, these type of gendered attacks are gaining momentum and increasing in prevalence. When a group of Palestine Action protestors recently broke into RAF Brize Norton and vandalise a Voyager aircraft, the Station Commander of RAF Brize Norton, a female Group Captain, was outwardly mocked as a 'woke wing commander' and forced to deactivate her social media due to gendered trolling attacks.
The attacks against her cite her gender as the reason for her position, and it is because of this that the airfield security failed.
In a paradoxical twist, the effort to resolve such issues of gendered discrimination is far reaching in its risk of being a mere rhetoric of inclusion. Within the same week of the sinking of the HMNZA Manawanui, Kevin Maher states in The Times, "I couldn't interview ...

The United Kingdom's procurement of the Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II, encompassing both the F-35B and F-35A variants, reflects a complex interplay of strategic, operational, political, and industrial considerations spanning decades. The 1998 decision to select the F-35B, driven by industrial pressures and inter-service rivalries, laid the foundation for the UK's Carrier Enabled Power Projection (CEPP) capability via the Royal Navy's Queen Elizabeth-class aircraft carriers.
The recent announcement to procure 12 F-35A jets, as part of the planned 138 F-35s, introduces a tactical nuclear role for the Royal Air Force (RAF) within NATO's nuclear-sharing framework. This paper examines the 1998 F-35B selection, the rationale for excluding the F-35A and F-35C, the motivations for the 2025 F-35A acquisition, and the multifaceted challenges, including impacts on the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP), infrastructure, training, sovereignty, and CEPP.
It argues that while the F-35A's assignment to 207 Squadron (OCU) and short-term cost savings address immediate needs, the legacy of 1998 decisions, combined with current policy shifts, risks undermining GCAP, increasing long-term costs, and enables Lockheed Martin to exploit tensions with GCAP partners Italy and Japan, jeopardising the our strategic autonomy and future air combat capabilities.
The 1998 Decision to Select the F-35B and Inter-Service Pressures
The UK's commitment to the F-35B originated in the late 1990s, formalised in the 1998 Strategic Defence Review (SDR), which prioritised restoring a credible carrier strike capability lost with the retirement of the Invincible-class carriers and Sea Harrier FA2 by 2006.
As a Tier 1 partner in the US-led Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) programme, the UK evaluated three F-35 variants: the F-35A (conventional take-off and landing), F-35B (Short Take-Off and Vertical Landing, STOVL), and F-35C (carrier-based, catapult-assisted take-off but arrested recovery, CATOBAR).
The Royal Navy initially favoured the F-35C, which offered greater range (1,200 nautical miles versus 900 for the F-35B), higher payload, and compatibility with CATOBAR systems, aligning with ambitions for a more capable Queen Elizabeth-class carrier design. However, political and industrial pressures tipped the scales toward the F-35B.
Rolls-Royce exerted significant influence, advocating for the F-35B due to its role in developing the LiftSystem for STOVL operations, securing substantial workshare and economic benefits for British industry. Other UK firms, including BAE Systems, supported the F-35B, as it ensured integration with the Queen Elizabeth-class carriers' STOVL configuration, avoiding costly CATOBAR retrofits estimated at £2 billion per carrier.
The Labour government, under Tony Blair, prioritised industrial jobs and domestic manufacturing, aligning with the SDR's emphasis on economic dividends from defence spending. The F-35B's selection promised thousands of jobs in Rolls-Royce's Bristol facilities and BAE's supply chain, outweighing the Royal Navy's operational arguments for the F-35C.

Inter-service rivalries further shaped the decision. The RAF, keen to consolidate its dominance in fixed-wing aviation, supported the F-35B's joint RAF-RN operation, arguing it could serve both carrier and land-based roles, simplifying logistics and training. This contrasted with the F-35C, which would have entrenched the Royal Navy-centric carrier operations.
To fund the F-35B programme and the carriers' development, the MoD faced intense inter-service pressures, leading to the controversial early retirement of the Harrier fleet. The RAF lobbied to retire the Royal Navy's FA2 (Sea Harrier) by 2006, citing its limited air-to-air capabilities compared to the F-35B's multi-role potential. Subsequently, the 2010 SDSR accelerated the retirement of the RAF's Harrier GR9 fleet, completed by 2011, despite its proven effectiveness in Afghanistan and Libya.
RAF leaders argued that resou...

War in the Smartphone Age explores how modern technologies, particularly smartphones, are transforming the character of conflict. Dr Matthew Ford, an Associate Professor in War Studies, makes a compelling case that "peeling back the layers of technology makes it possible to use the smartphone for the purposes of war." The smartphone is no longer just a communications tool; it is rapidly becoming both a weapon and a battlefield. Military readers may think we already know this.
We argue that you don't, and that War in the Smartphone Age will add to any readers understanding.
But this is not a book solely about phones. Rather, War in the Smartphone Age is a study of the wider technological infrastructure, physical and data, that underpins modern warfare. Ford examines the evolving relationships between governments and tech companies, the weaponisation of information, and the role digital platforms play in shaping conflict.
Through case studies from the Middle East, Ukraine, and the Israeli Defence Force, using both conventional militaries and other groups, he demonstrates how these technologies are being deployed in powerful and transformative ways.
Things we can now see and do on a smartphone have already changed how wars are conducted . This is not the future, the smart phone age is now.

One of the book's core concepts is the "stack": a layered model that connects physical systems with abstract decision-making. At the top is data storage; at the bottom, the human decision-maker. Ford argues persuasively that to navigate or fight effectively in this new battlespace, we must understand every layer in between.
Through the case studies, Ford shows how different actors have weaponised the smartphone environment. The Israeli Defence Force's tight control of data and infrastructure is one such example, albeit dependent on physical infrastructure. The limits and dependencies of the strategy are explored and Ford shows that a whole society approach is needed to fight effectively in the smartphone age.
From the selection of the future fighters to how the power of data is used by the most simple soldier, War in the Smartphone Age left us feeling that we probably should have had a better understanding of it all before we did.
But Ford doesn't stop at strategy. He also explores the moral and legal questions these technologies raise. Should facial recognition be permitted as a tool of war? When civilians use their phones to collect targeting data, do they become combatants? These questions strike at the heart of international humanitarian law in an era of participative warfare.
This idea, participative warfare, is a central theme. Ford highlights, for instance, Ukrainian civilians uploading images to military apps, directly contributing to the targeting process. Civilians have always reported enemy activity, but smartphones make this instantaneous, radically increasing the speed and precision of strikes.
War in the Smartphone Age also adds insights to legal and operational debates. For example, how can evidence gathered from open-source intelligence meet legal thresholds for prosecution? Ford notes that states, corporations, and individuals apply different ethical standards, and he questions whether big data companies should play a greater role in regulating wartime data flows.
There are areas you could find to disagree. The prevalence of data networks, which seem easily targetable in a 'real' war, or the resource required, and surely not all war will be this way in the future, we'll run out of energy before it can happen? Futurists have been wrong before, after all. And then the books title will bring you back to earth as you pick up your smart phone.
Smartphones are everywhere, as Ford notes they are the last things we lose and have a global dependency on them far deeper and more engrained than most imagine. Ford doesn't offer easy answers, but he certainly raises the right questions.
Perhaps the most sobering chapter is the last, titl...

"Nothing After Two O'clock" or "No Action, Talk Only" are well-worn jabs at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) that once resonated with a certain truth. They conjured images of bureaucratic inertia and a disconnect between lofty pronouncements and concrete action. This has changed. NATO's Allied Command Operations is shifting its culture to rapidly adopt new technologies and capabilities at record breaking speed.
A prime example is the recent acquisition of Palantir's Maven Smart System in under six months - a process that previously took up to two decades. A surging movement of digital insurgents within NATO is redefining what is achievable. The time for talk has ended; it is now an era of relentless execution and swift delivery of crucial capabilities to the warfighter.
A landscape rewritten
While the Alliance's core mission of collective defence enshrined in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty remains sacrosanct, the strategic environment has undergone a seismic shift, demanding a fundamental reassessment of NATO's capabilities and operational posture. This is not your father's NATO.
The comfortable certainties of the Cold War era, with its clearly defined adversary and predictable battlefields, have given way to a complex and fluid landscape characterised by resurgent great power competition, the weaponisation of information, the blurring lines between peace and war, and the rapid advance of technology transforming how wars are fought and won.
As underscored by the 2022 Strategic Concept and the Deterrence and Defence of the Euro-Atlantic Area strategy, NATO faces a multitude of evolving threats, from state-sponsored aggression and terrorism to cyberattacks, hybrid warfare, and the disruptive potential of emerging technologies. These all converge to challenge the international rules-based order that underpins the security of NATO's nearly one billion citizens.
This necessitates a renewed focus on deterrence and defence across all domains, including the increasingly critical digital sphere.
The rise of artificial intelligence (AI), cloud computing, and other advanced technologies is not merely a technological evolution; it represents a revolution in military affairs, fundamentally altering the character of contemporary warfare. The analytic horsepower backing these technologies creates an unmatched acceleration within a decision cycle. This reality has spurred a top-down and bottom-up movement for change within Allied Command Operations, the Alliance's military instrument of power.
Led by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, Allied Command Operations is driving a transformation aligned with NATO's evolving strategy and plans, ushering in a renaissance in Allied operations.
From within the ranks
At the forefront of this effort is a nascent but increasingly influential bottom-up group of "digital insurgents," a cross-generational, multinational cohort of tech-savvy individuals. These insurgents are working to drive NATO's transition towards rapid and effective technology adoption, focused on warfighting and warfighters.
This is not a nostalgic yearning for a romanticized past or empty slogans; it's about recognising the imperative for NATO to be more agile and lethal, leveraging the most powerful technologies available to maintain its strategic edge. The world's most powerful Alliance in history needs the most powerful tools to plan, operate, and fight.
We, the authors, are active participants in this digital insurgency - we are Task Force Maven. On March 25, 2025, the NATO Communications and Information Agency (NCIA) and Palantir Technologies Inc. (Palantir) finalised the acquisition of the Maven Smart System for employment within the Alliance. Our task now is implementation and fostering an environment of speed, agility, and adaptability.
Yet, this is not a story about a specific technology but one about NATO's people, culture, and the fight to keep pace with an accelerating future.
Task Force Maven was for...

Amongst contemporary systems, the Russian S-400 has been perceived as one of the most advanced air defence system. With a layered defence of 4km, 120 km, 250km and 400km respectively, the system is claimed to cover a wide range of aerial threats ranging from aircraft, Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS), ballistic and cruise missiles. In South Asia, the S-400 was perceived as a one-stop solution for protecting India's airspace against aerial threats.
In fact, the system was tagged as Sudarshan Chakra in India, signalling divine power. However, the recent India-Pakistan conflict has helped debunk such heightened claims.
Till now, three batteries have been deployed by India near the border region, with the remaining two expected to be delivered in late-2025 and 2026. The technology is aimed at augmenting India's layered defence system comprising Prithvi Air Defence System (PAD), Advanced Air Defence System (AAD), Barak-8 Medium-Range Surface-to-Air Missile System, Aakash Area Defence Missile System, and National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System II (NASAMS-II)
India's S-400 system made its debut in South Asia in the recent Indo-Pak standoff, where the robustness of aerial assets was extensively tested via the use of aircraft, missiles, loitering munitions and advanced drones. One key takeaway from the brief conflict appears to be the vulnerability of the system. This is despite official claims from the Indian Air Force of its robustness..
While such high-profile systems may serve symbolic or deterrent functions, their limited coverage often creates exploitable gaps, enabling the intrusion of aerial assets
It has been claimed that a Chinese-made CM-400AKG air-to-surface missile, launched by Pakistan Air Force JF-17s was used successfully against the S-400 batteries in Adampur and Poonch, inflicting damage to the radar components. In order to refute the claim, Prime Minister Modi's media team used an image of an S-400 launcher in the background of his address at Adampur base. However, the image of the intact launchers does not negate Pakistan's stance.
Merely attacking the launchers is not the only way to render an ADS ineffective given that the same can be achieved via attacking its radars, sensors and network nodes. The fact remains that during combat, the S-400 failed to intercept or protect against the downing of six Indian aircraft by the Pakistan Air Force (PAF).
Notably, Pakistani JF-17s, operating well within the S-400's stated engagement envelope, evaded detection and successfully penetrated the defensive shield to strike at the system's radar. This reflects PAF's effective use of deception, strong electronic jamming, and BVR strike capabilities.
The fog of war further complicates air defence operations. On May 7th, India deployed nearly 70 aircraft against 42 advanced Pakistani jets creating overlapping tracks that strained its air defence system (ADS). Low- and high-altitude threats can also challenge the system's readiness, with success rates varying across different target types, including ballistic and cruise missiles.
Integration is further hampered by India's multi-origin arsenal from the United States, Israel, Russia, and France, which limits interoperability and network cohesion. Pakistan's use of largely Chinese-sourced air defence systems removes this level of complexity. Compounding this is the lack of seamless coordination between the Indian Army, Navy, and Air Force, undermining unified ADS performance. Hypersonic technology adds a new layer of complexity for any ADS.
While the S-400 is technically mobile, its relocation is logistically complex and resource-intensive. Each battery comprises heavy transporter-erector-launchers (TELs), multiple radar units, command and control vehicles, and trained personnel making rapid redeployment during conflict both time-consuming and operationally demanding.
Relocation also creates a vulnerability window that can be exploited through preemptive strikes.In future aerial...

It is the lot of the infantry to hold ground and get shot at. This is the mundane history of the infantry, not the story you hear during training at Catterick or Brecon. But our social media feeds show us the reality. Soldiers in Ukraine are repeatedly filmed sitting in trenches waiting to be mortared, attacked by artillery or chased by a suicide FPV drone.
Encounters involving small infantry units engaging each other are rare; instead, remote firepower remains the dominant killer on the 21st century battlefield. Despite this, however, we are once again considering changes to small arms and small arms ammunition. This is being driven by discussions of lethal effect against body armour at over 600 metres.
In this short commentary piece, I want to put the selection of a new rifle and ammunition into its wider societal, historical and organisational context. In the process I hope to persuade readers that the Army should not put new ammunition at the top of its priority list.
Although relative to the specific environment and type of conflict, comparatively speaking, the infantry is the least lethal branch of the armed forces.1 Paradoxically, however, the infantry sits at the heart of the army's identity and purpose. As representatives of the polity, infantry soldiers embody the social contract between the citizen and the nation.
As I argue in Weapon of Choice this contract is underwritten by the engineer and the rifles they create.2 Framed this way, the rifle is more than a weapon. It becomes the tangible symbol of the bond between the state and its soldiers.
If the state cannot provide a reliable and effective rifle, then it has failed at upholding its side of this foundational bargain. Getting small arms acquisition wrong not only jeopardises military effectiveness but it also risks the legitimacy of the sovereign state. The stakes are therefore far greater than the practicalities of small arms calibre or the frailties of weapon design. They touch on the very principles of governance and trust between the nation and its defenders.
If the state cannot provide a reliable and effective rifle, then it has failed at upholding its side of this foundational bargain.
Unfortunately, since at least the middle of the 19th century, the introduction of every new service rifle with the British Army has been associated with controversy of some sort. The Martini Henry failed in the Sudan in 1884. The Short Magazine Lee-Enfield heralded arguments about the utility of the cavalry. The introduction of Fabrique Nationale's Self-Loading Rifle occurred only because the Americans rejected an intermediate calibre in the 1950s.
And of course, the SA80 failed in the desert during the First Gulf War and was subsequently suspended - at the request of the UK's NATO delegate on small arms - from the Alliance's Nominated Weapon List.3
Rifle failure
Given the symbolism and significance of the rifle and the long history of failure associated with its introduction into the Army, buying a new design of small arms and ammunition needs to be done with considerable care. In part this is because the UK no longer has the industrial capacity to produce a large fleet of weapons and will need to recalibrate existing ammunition production for a new calibre.
Buying small batches of bespoke ammunition and specialist weapons does not necessarily create problems. However, buying a new fleet of rifles to fill the requirements of an entire Army brings with it unique practical challenges associated with introducing a new system, a new ammunition and the development of a new production line.
Take, for example, the Enfield Weapon System (EWS). The EWS was the pre-cursor to the SA80. Initially designed for a 4.85mm round, the weapon was specifically intended to allow the infantry to fight from an armoured fighting vehicle and be used in close quarters.
The small calibre was selected primarily because 7.62mm ammunition was completely inappropriate for use in Northern Ireland wher...

The end of the Warfare Officer?
You're not unskilled, they're the wrong skills.
In a rain-beaten marina on a rugged coastline, near a nameless village more familiar with fishing than fleet operations, a teenage Able Seaman sits inside a converted shipping container. Watching a laptop screen, they remotely pilot a small crewless boat through choppy waters via a suite of cameras and RADAR feeds. For all intents and purposes, they are the Captain.
Down the road, on a slipway framed with lobster pots and fishing gear, a Petty Officer and Leading Hand haul 15-metres of uncrewed craft onto a trailer. With a police escort arranged and explosives securely stowed in a separate vehicle, they tow it down narrow B-roads to its next launch site. Followed by a small convoy of HGVs containing ancillary equipment and spares.
Armed with little more than an expense account the skill to reverse an oversized trailer, they fulfil the traditional roles of Navigator and Officer of the Watch where moving naval fighting capabilities is concerned.
These scenes stand in stark contrast to the age-old image of a Commanding Officer directing a Frigates movement across open sea from his chair on the bridge. Modern navies are undergoing a seismic shift in relevance, away from the skill set of their senior officers who cut their teeth on 5,000-tonne, 130-metre warships and bigger, and toward young operators and technicians independently deploying tiny uncrewed systems from the backs of lorries to greater maritime effect.

The hierarchy of most navies has long been built around crewing entire flotillas of ships, with only a limited number of shore-based roles supporting operations from the rear. But the rise of autonomous platforms is disrupting that structure, challenging the relevance of the traditional command pipeline.
In tomorrow's navy, do expert leaders qualified in seamanship and commanding operations from capital ships offer more value than an Able Seaman who can command multiple vessels from a single screen? What does it mean to grow officers through the classic path of shipboard appointments when the conventional warship is fast becoming the exception, not the rule? If most naval capability in the future is delivered from shore, operated remotely, or automated entirely, then is the role of the seagoing
'sailor' now something rare and specialised, less a core function and more a niche within a much broader system biasing towards land operations with maritime effectors deployed at reach?
Today, battles at sea are already being won by lone teenagers remotely piloting a USV with helm controls mapped to a modified Xbox controller and laptop from miles away, supported by a mechanic with a Cat C+E licence hauling the latest capability on a trailer, as by a seasoned commander on the bridge of a warship with charge of a crew several hundred strong.
Modern Navies are discovering that expertise in the latest iteration of nautical skills no longer guarantees expert opinion in utilising modern technology. This article argues that autonomy and uncrewed systems are reshaping naval power, placing greater importance on digital literacy and low level mechanical skills found in trades once considered vocational, rather than the strategic conversations based on traditional strategic warfare roles.
Navies around the world are rapidly adopting uncrewed systems, on the surface, underwater, and in the air, to take on roles once reserved for fully crewed warships. The U.S. Navy's Ghost Fleet Overlord programme, for example, fields 90-metre drone ships that have sailed thousands of miles and even launched missiles under remote supervision by operators too junior to stand a traditional bridge watch.
Australia has followed suit with Sentinel, a converted patrol boat and now the country's largest autonomous vessel, monitored by a skeleton crew of engineers camping onboard and advanced autonomy software.
The Royal Navy, meanwhile, has demonstrated this shift through its NavyX...

Editor's note: This piece is slightly different to our normal ones. It's more akin to a blog and written in the first person. However, we deemed it interesting given the writer, where they are, and the wider context.
Although I am not an infantryman, I am assigned to an infantry unit here in the USA. At our recent dining out, talk inevitably turned to Saint Maurice. For those who do not know, Saint Maurice is the patron saint of infantrymen. When it came time for the commander to induct a select few into the Order of Saint Maurice, I heard the script - which includes the story of Saint Maurice - as if it was for the first time.
Maurice was ordered to have his legionnaires offer pagan sacrifices before battle near the Rhone at Martigny. The Theban Legion refused to participate, and also refused to kill innocent civilians in the conduct of their duty, and withdrew to the town of Agaunum. Enraged, Maximian ordered every tenth man killed, yet they still refused. A second time the General ordered Maurice's men to participate and again they refused.
Maurice declared his earnest desire to obey every order lawful in the eyes of God. "We have seen our comrades killed," came the reply. "Rather than sorrow, we rejoice at the honor done to them."
I had been in a funk for the preceding few weeks. Like all members of the profession of arms I had been trying to make sense of the changes in Department policy and U.S. foreign policy that had been cascading out of the National Command Authority. Everything seemed to be in flux. Opinions among my peers differed. Nothing seemed to make sense. And then I heard this story and suddenly I felt better.
I am not a religious man. And even if I were, the religion of my ancestors did not include the veneration of saints (if you must know, I'm Jewish, but you can only get military inspiration from the stories of the Maccabean Revolt so many times before you need to look further afield for inspiration). But in a time when everyone is talking about "warrior culture" - and not necessarily in a way that made good sense - the story of Saint Maurice seemed like it held some sort of answer.
As a good cavalryman, I went straight to the story of Saint George.
As a result of his personal bravery, this man - then known as Nestor of Cappodocia - became a member of the Roman Emperor Diocletian's personal bodyguard. In 303 AD, Diocletian issued an edict in Nicodemia, now a part of Turkey, that ordered the destruction of all Christian Churches, sacred writings and books, and outlawing all Christians who did not, on the surface at least, conform to paganry.
Upon seeing the edict, Nestor tore it down. For his act and his refusal to abide by the pagan emperor's edict, Nestor was imprisoned, tortured, and executed. Early Christians changed Nestor's name to George, and he became associated with bravery, dedication to faith, and decency.
The legend of St. George's defeating the dragon perpetuates the might of the mounted warrior over the forces of evil. It is an Italian legend dating from the 12th Century, and the story goes like this: Near the city of Silene, a frightful dragon came to live in a marshy swamp, and its breath poisoned all who attempted to drive it away. To protect themselves, the citizens offered the dragon two sheep every day. Soon, however, they ran out of sheep, and human sacrifices were then drawn by lot.
One day, the lot fell to the king's daughter. She was left in the swamp to face the dragon, and this is where St. George finds her during his travels. In a fierce combat, George defeats the dragon but does not kill it. Instead, he ties the princess' waistband around the dragon's neck and has her lead it back to the city. There he promises to slay the dragon if the people will embrace the Christian faith. This they agree to do, and he kills the dragon.
Later, of course, the dragon came to represent the embodiment of evil and hatred rather than an animal, but the moral remained. The heroism and faith of S...

With the imminent publication of the new government's first Strategic Defence Review this article throws out a challenge. Can we make the first cheap British Army division of the modern period? Can we afford not to?
The 'world-beating' delusion
Britain has a 'world-beating' epidemic. It would be funny if we were not paying such a high cost for this delusion. Who started it may be debated. That it has become an empty boast is indisputable. The graph below shows the frequency of use of the phrase in Parliament. It has only got worse.

How is Britain world-beating? Our social statistics certainly attract attention:
40% of adults pay no income tax, because their annual income does not exceed the £12,570 personal allowance threshold;
One third of 35-45 year olds in England now rents (it was one in ten at the beginning of the century), and four in every ten of the private renters is receiving housing benefit (or they would be on the street);
By the time Universal Credit is fully rolled out, one in four working age households will be receiving it;
Almost one fifth of Britain's school children, apparently, have special educational needs;
At the other end of the scale, Britain's graduates now collectively owe around £240 billion in student loans;
Over one million16-24 years olds are neither in education, employment nor training (the NEETs), the main reason cited is 'mental health', remedied by a Personal Independence Payment (PIP) (over 3.3 million Britons in England and Wales were claiming a PIP last year).
And so we could go on.
How the British Army is 'world-beating' also raises questions. Marlborough's Grand Alliance army at the beginning of the 18th century was bigger. Cromwell had more cavalry regiments. The country that invented the tank can today deploy and sustain one tank regiment (plainly, there must be a reserve or you would be unable to rotate troops). The British Army is effectively air defenceless.
In one of the most painful sagas of many in recent times, the Army will finally be receiving a new armoured personnel carrier, 20 years late, and with no weapon beyond a machinegun. And personnel statistics, perhaps reflecting wider society, do not make happy reading. Just five years ago, around 4,500 service personnel brought claims against the MOD.
Today the number has jumped to almost 7,000 - or roughly, one in every 17th serviceman or woman on a parade square is making a claim against the MOD. Is serving in the (smaller) non-operational Army really so dangerous? Has the MOD become more negligent in the last five years?
We can't go on like this. The first thing we must do is face reality and drop the 'world-beating' delusion.
Good, better, best
In the early 1960s, Defence Secretary Robert McNamara - America's most talented holder of the post in the second half of the 20th century - coined the phrase 'Good, better, best', in an interview with LIFE magazine. The Ford 'whizz kid' ('human IBM machine' was his other nickname) had been recruited by Kennedy to reform the bloated Department of Defence. He did, against some opposition.
'Good, better, best' referred to defence kit. The majority of defence kit, McNamara argued, just needs to be good. A small proportion needs to be better. And the smallest proportion needs to be 'the best'. The reason was cost. If each of the services proposed the best kit, every time, the defence budget would be bankrupted. Who knows what McNamara would make of Washington's trillion dollar defence budget today. His wisdom is certainly missed.
Or cheap is good enough
Or, perhaps, we could shorten McNamara's dictum and simply state cheap is good enough, most of the time. We were good at cheap. It was the foundation for what today would be called 'success stories'. The Land Rover story began in 1947 with Rover responding to a War Department requirement for a cheap, jeep-like, utility vehicle. Millions have since rolled off the production line.
In contrast, a recently procured patrol vehicle (this auth...

Introduction
President Donald Trump's attempt to end the war in Ukraine continues, but for how much longer? He has recently stated that his patience is wearing thin. Even if a meaningful ceasefire materialises, the extent to which the U.S. might provide security guarantees is still unknown.
One thing that appears to be clear is that European nations will be taking the lead in any peacekeeping force used to enforce whatever peace deal might be negotiated, and that NATO security guarantees, such as Article 5, may not extend to this force. This poses a unique risk when it comes to potential nuclear escalation should further conflict occur in the future. A lack of NATO security guarantees may leave a European peacekeeping force in Ukraine vulnerable to nuclear strike.
A brief hypothetical scenario may help demonstrate this.
The year is 2029…
President Donald Trump is coming towards the end of his second term as president, and it looks like a more pro-Ukraine candidate is going to be elected. Russia, having seen a significant easing of sanctions as part of a peace deal, has reconstituted and improved its military capability and learned its mistakes from the 2022 invasion. Worried by the possibility that the U.S. will soon be more likely to intervene to defend Ukraine, President Putin decides to act.
After conducting a series of false flag operations - designed to look like Ukrainian aggression - Russia launches another invasion, banking on the European peacekeeping force being unwilling to take significant casualties, and the U.S. not intervening.
However, Russia still suffers from significant command and control issues, and the European nations have also improved their own military capabilities. Russian forces make little progress and suffer heavy casualties - European casualties remain surprisingly limited. In Moscow, the prospect of another failed military operation sees pressure mounting on Putin - talks of a coup swirl. Putin decides to make good on a threat that was now falling on deaf ears.
Russia launches a SS-26 Stone SSM with a 10-kiloton tactical warhead.

Deliberately used in a less kinetic area of the front, targeting reconnaissance forces proving routes for a potential advance, the military impact of the detonation was limited, as was intended by Russia; however, the strategic impact was huge. With the U.S. still unwilling to provide material support, despite overwhelming condemnation of Russia's actions, Europe and Ukraine struggle to come up with a response, with Russia threatening further use of its tactical nuclear weapons.
Sheltering under a Anglo-French umbrella?
Anyone with a vague knowledge of the Ukraine conflict could probably poke holes in the scenario above, but it illustrates a point. A peacekeeping force in Ukraine may face the risk of nuclear escalation by Russia. The U.K. and France may offer to have Ukraine under their 'nuclear umbrella'; however, with only strategic weapons at their disposal, a nuclear response to a tactical nuclear strike would be grossly disproportionate.
Given this, any force in Ukraine needs to ensure it can deal with a nuclear strike in a conventional way. This will include ensuring maneuver forces can continue to operate in a nuclear environment, as the employment of tactical nuclear weapons by Russia will likely, at least in part, be designed to limit freedom of movement.
Fighting in a nuclear environment
A nuclear strike would require a military force to deal with a number of challenges. The blast itself will almost certainly lead to casualties, just like a conventional munition. The thermal radiation of even a 10-kiloton warhead is likely to cause anything flammable within hundreds of meters to ignite and cause severe burns to those in the vicinity.
Ionizing radiation will soon see cases of radiation sickness beginning to appear, which, even if not fatal, will require specialized medical treatment. Residual radiation from unfissioned weapon debris and radioactive fission ...

A golden opportunity in the era of Labour's Procurement Act
The dust has barely settled on Labour's Procurement Act, which kicked in back in February 2025, and defence SMEs find themselves at a crossroads. On one hand, they're facing some real headaches; on the other, there's a chance to make their mark as genuine trailblazers in social impact. With government scrutiny on spending ramping up, smaller players can actually stand out from the crowd by showing they're serious about making meaningful change happen.
The changing landscape of Social Value
The Social Value Act was first introduced in 2012 when 'social value' was little more than a footnote in procurement discussions. It has been on quite the ride since then. Fast forward to 2020, when we saw the introduction of a proper framework with five clear themes: COVID-19 Recovery, Tackling Economic Inequality, Fighting Climate Change, Equal Opportunity, and Wellbeing.
Labour hasn't wasted any time putting its stamp on things. Rayner's 'National Procurement Plan' has teeth, making Social Value non-negotiable in contracts and holding suppliers' feet to the fire. Since February, the new Act forces both buyers and suppliers to publish their Social Value KPIs in black and white. No more hiding in the shadows.
The SME challenge: David vs Goliath
It's a totally different ball game for SMEs compared to the big boys. When that 10% Social Value threshold landed with PPN 06/20, industry giants barely blinked - Jacobs simply bought half a consultancy and created Simetrica-Jacobs overnight. Job done.
SMEs just don't have that luxury - their piggy banks aren't big enough for that kind of splash. To make matters worse, the advice they're getting often comes from forums dominated by the very primes they're competing against. Talk about the fox guarding the henhouse!
The measurement problem is another thorn in their side: current systems that love to attach pound signs to everything naturally favour those with deeper pockets. When an SME takes on one apprentice, it's a big deal for them but it gets lost in the noise when compared to a multinational hiring a small army of graduates.
The SME advantage: agility and authenticity
But it's not all doom and gloom. Defence SMEs have some aces up their sleeves - their nimble structure means they can weave Social Value into their DNA, rather than bolting it on as an afterthought.
As smaller and more flexible businesses, SMEs have the advantage of fully integrating Social Value into their core values, culture and everyday operations. Larger businesses often struggle to retrofit Social Value,but we, at RUK have been able to build it into the fabric of everything we do.
This isn't just corporate speak - it translates into real-world impact. SMEs' local roots mean they actually understand what communities need. With Labour banging the drum for regional development, that local knowledge is pure gold. They can pivot quickly, create initiatives that actually matter, and build partnerships that deliver more than just PR points.
Building Defence SME success in Social Value
At RUK, collaboration underpins everything we do and we believe that SMEs can punch above their weight by focusing on these partnerships that matter, creating their own bespoke tracking tools.
Developing a solid Social Value strategy takes graft, but we've found that having the right relationships in place makes all the difference when bidding for contracts. For RUK, Social Value isn't a box-ticking exercise; it's central to our entire approach to winning business.
SMEs can flip the script on their limitations. By zeroing in on quality rather than quantity, and developing focused initiatives that play to their strengths, they can create impact that resonates far more deeply than the scattergun approach often adopted by larger players.
A call to action for government and industry
For this potential to be realised, we need some fundamental changes. Government bodies must craft guidelines that...

In August 2024 a surprise Ukrainian incursion in Kursk Oblast resulted in the capture of 1,376 square kilometres of Russian territory. Over the next six months the enclave was repeatedly attacked. Ukrainian-controlled territory shrunk to an area anchored on the town of Suzhda. In the second week of March the Ukrainian defence collapsed. Units withdrew to the border zone. The Russian command hailed a bold operation involving infiltration via a gas pipeline as catalyst for the Ukrainian retreat - Operacija Potok, or Operation Flow. This article assesses Operation Flow and the wider Ukrainian withdrawal from the Kursk salient.
Preparations for Operation Flow
Operation Flow was three weeks in the making. Command was vested in the Chechen Lieutenant-General Apti Alaudinov. Alaudinov has been a tireless self-promoter during the Kursk campaign. Operation Flow provided him with another opportunity to burnish his credentials with the Kremlin.
First, methane gas residues had to be cleared from a 15 kilometre stretch of the Urengoy-Pomary-Uzhgorod pipeline that runs north-east of Suzdha. This was not entirely successful and a number of soldiers were hospitalised with neurotropic poisoning. Some Russian bloggers reported suffocations. Next, ammunition, food and water had to be ferried down the pipeline on special barrows. Toilets were also sent down.
One Russian channel described the conditions thus: 'Walk, crawl almost 16 kilometres through a narrow dirty tunnel 1.45 m in diameter with vapours from the remains of liquefied gas; sit in a pipe waiting for the command to storm for several more days. Breathe in methane vapours, excrement, vomit of those who were the first to be poisoned, and there is no longer any possibility of calling for evacuation from this point, when the enemy is closer than our own.'
Volunteers were drawn from multiple units: 11th Airborne Brigade, 106 Airborne Brigade, 72nd Motor Rifle Division, 30th Separate Guards Motor Rifle Brigade, the Veterans Airborne Assault Regiment, the Vostok Airborne Assault Regiment, and Akhmat (Chechen) special forces. A total of 800 troops were involved (General Gerasimov reported a lower number of 600 to President Putin in a later staged meeting).
Due to the conditions, troops had to enter in small groups of five people with a distance of at least ten meters between groups. At halts soldiers moved a couple of meters away from each other so that they could breathe. A distance of 11-12 kilometres was covered over four days. Some spent as long as a week in the pipeline.
As many as four exit points are believed to have been made in the pipeline, but possibly only one used. The Ukrainians actually intercepted communications between Russians complaining about the awful conditions in the pipeline. On Saturday 8 March the order was given to break cover and infiltrate northern Suzdha.
Was the pipeline operation a success?
Ukrainian reporting suggests Operation Flow achieved limited tactical success. The Ukrainian command was aware of the scheme and was keeping the pipeline under surveillance. YouTube video evidence shows a group that emerged in fields was quickly struck by artillery fire and dispersed in a nearby wood line.
Another group reportedly reached a two-storey building in the industrial area of Suzdha but was destroyed. In total, Ukrainian sources report only around 100 soldiers actually emerged from the pipeline. That no Russian video or imagery was presented showing soldiers hoisting unit flags - a common practice to demonstrate success - suggests Ukrainian reporting is credible.
Even so, an 82nd Air Assault Brigade soldier (the formation that engaged the Russians) also reported that although his unit was aware of the plan and repelled Russians that emerged from the pipeline, a number still managed to infiltrate the area of northern Suzdha. He told this was 'the reason why his brigade was forced to destroy part of its available equipment and withdraw from the eastern flank to the...

On the eve of the invasion of Ukraine, there were around 31,000 servicewomen and female MOD employees in the Ukrainian armed forces. This represented around 15% of the total force with one in ten serving as officers (but rarely above major rank). Following Soviet-era practice, servicewomen were mainly restricted to non-combat roles such as medical staff and clerks. The neglect of servicewomen was such that there were no female-standard uniforms on issue, a deficit addressed in typical Ukrainian fashion by volunteers such as the Arm Women Now project that enlisted help to sew uniforms more compatible with the female body shape. How has the war changed this? There are a lot more Ukrainian female soldiers now:
Post the invasion restrictions were eventually lifted with women able to serve in any branch, subject to selection procedures. The age limit for women enlisting was also raised to 60, matching that of men. However, compulsory mobilisation remained only for males. This meant all women enlisting were, and today continue to be, volunteers.
At first, recruitment was slow, mainly due to a lack of organisation and opportunities. Many found employment through 'private' recruiting (units posting job applications), rather than centralised recruiting through MOD schemes. By October 2023, female volunteer numbers had jumped 40%. But this only added another 12,000 servicewomen, bringing the total to 43,000 after two years of war.
By March 2024, the numbers had risen to 62,000, including 5,000 in officer posts, and with 10,000 serving in active combat zones. By this point, 14,000 servicewomen in total had qualified as 'participants in hostilities' (effectively 'veteran' status for which there is a financial benefit). In the summer, the number rose to 67,000, but with clarification, 19,000 were 'employees with non-military tasks'. By the end of 2024, the number had stabilised around the 68,000 mark where it stands at the time of writing.
The opening of over 40 nationwide recruitment centres - a programme which only started a year ago - has helped boost numbers. Today, roughly one in five applicants at the recruitment centres are women. The roles they fill are tabulated below:
Female applicants at recruitment centres and roles assigned
Staff positions
24%
Combat medics, doctors and nurses
22%
Drone units
13%
Chefs
12%
Snipers (shooting specialists)
6%
Communications and Cyber
6%
Psychologists
3%
Examples of frontline service have been varied. In March 2024, the first all-female drone unit was raised. Tetyana Bondarenko was a theatre actress before the war. Today she is call sign 'Bond' (after 007) and an expert drone pilot. Layla, call sign Saratsyn, a former IT worker with striking red dreadlocks, now commands a drone strike unit. Olga Yehorova - a keen sportswoman before the war - is an example of female sniper. She has been wounded twice, once catching shell splinters in her stomach ('the pain became unbearable' she remembered), and on a second occasion receiving a bloodied eye from a shell blast. Liudmyla Meniuk joined 24th Aidar Separate Assault Battalion in 2016 and eventually progressed from clerk, to chief sergeant of an assault company, to commander of an armoured service unit. Some have achieved fame: in November 2024 soldier Natalia Hrabarchuk downed a cruise missile with a MANPADs. Before the war she was a kindergarten teacher. This was her first launch.
From left to right, and top to bottom: Sniper Olga Yehorova, theatre actress now drone pilot Tetyana Bondarenko, Commander of Armoured Service Unit Liudmyla Meniuk, and former IT worker today strike drone platoon commander Layla.
Former kindergarten teacher Natalia Hrabarchuk downs a cruise missile with a MANPADs then falls to her knees with the realisation of what she has just achieved. Source: United 24 Media
It is not all about the frontline. Servicewomen also serve in the GUR and SBU (Intelligence Directorate and Security Service) where they have been praised for their ...

On January 19, 2025, a ceasefire was agreed to after nearly 16 months of continuous combat in Gaza between Israel and Hamas. In short order, every side immediately began to claim victory, glory, or defeat. As predicted in 2021, Israel's victory operational concept led it down a path of two further indeterminate outcomes against Hamas and Hezbollah.
Hamas initiated its genocidal total war on October 7, 2023 with a genuinely deluded sense of their own combat power, expecting Israel to collapse under the weight of a few thousand irregular fighters. Instead, the war soon turned into one of the most punishing urban conflicts of the 21st century, transforming Gaza into a ruin. The war would kill around 50,000 Palestinians, with 1,200 people killed, raped, and tortured in the initial Hamas attack, 251 hostages taken, and nearly 1,000 Israelis killed in ground combat. It would end with Hamas's governance and military capabilities, as well as the social bonds of Gaza, significantly degraded, even as the fighting continued.
Acknowledging Owen's point that there is no official, singular, victory doctrine, the intended purpose of the mosaic of changes to Israeli strategic thought, often colloquially described as its 'victory doctrine', was to ensure victory into the future. This was to be achieved via, according to Eran Ortal,
A "turn on the light and extinguish the fire" maneuver would be able to attack deep into enemy territory to conquer main nerve centers and inflict a decisive [military] defeat, while suppressing enemy rockets and missiles launched nearby toward Israeli forces and toward the home front.
Having learned from the 2021 short war between Israel and Hamas, Israel had the benefit of additional years of capability purchases and training before October 7. While Gaza was the primary battlefield, it was ultimately used most powerfully against Hezbollah.
The Cry for Total Victory
It was not just the character of the attack by Hamas, the humiliation of the surprise, nor the savagery shown by Hamas on October 7, that drove the Israeli demand for victory. Over the past decades, Israel itself had become increasingly uncomfortable with the outcomes of the various wars, quick battles, and intifadas it had fought. Israeli society became more willing to unleash such destruction in the hope victory would be achieved finally.
Symbiotically, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu would utilize this shift and begin to call for "total victory" against Hamas. What this actually meant in practice was never really described beyond generalised demands for the destruction of Hamas and the return of the hostages, however. It was emblematic of the overall problem with contemporary Israeli strategic thought under Netanyahu: superior military action to defeat enemy military forces that distracted from larger political questions that undermine overall strategic effectiveness.
However, others attempted to fill this vacuum. The most notable idea floated was by Einat Wilf, who suggested "the Palestinians of Gaza, either collectively and individually, surrender." Specifically, that the Palestinians accept the state of Israel, to settle in Gaza as citizens, and to accept the loss of the right of return. This was the closest anyone came to defining goals that meet the real test of victory, contra Owen's peculiar assertion that victory only occurs in the military realm.
No Day After Plan
Israel's victory operational concept focused on high-tech enabled fires, with ground forces to cordon off territory and search and destroy enemy forces within the buildings and underground bunkers in claustrophobic close quarters battle. But those units would soon leave, and operations were then carried out by units raiding from outside the Gaza border into urban areas, as well as special operations units to engage in small unit actions. The effect of this was to destroy Hamas' standing armed units when they could be found, and slowly fracture the bonds of Gaza as flee...