For decades, the United States has used its position at the center of global financial, commercial, and technological networks to punish adversaries and pressure allies, exploiting what the political scientists Henry Farrell and Abraham Newman call “weaponized interdependence.” Lacking any alternatives, the rest of the world has had no choice but to rely on American payment systems, American technology, and American corporate might, even as Washington turned that reliance to its own strategic advantage. Now, however, the tables have turned. Other states—starting with China—have begun to weaponize their own chokepoints in the global economic infrastructure. As Farrell and Newman write in the new issue of Foreign Affairs, “The United States is discovering what it is like to have others do unto it as it has eagerly done unto others.” Where it once pioneered the weaponization of interdependence, Washington may now be increasingly at the mercy of its rivals. To Newman and Farrell, this is more than just another salvo in global competition. It is evidence of a major transformation in geopolitics, as national security and economic power have merged—and ushered in a new era of economic warfare. You can find sources, transcripts, and more episodes of The Foreign Affairs Interview at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/podcasts/foreign-affairs-interview.

During his second term, Donald Trump has railed against the United States’ closest allies. He has imposed tariffs, threatened to upend security commitments, and openly challenged the borders of Canada, Panama, and Greenland. Historians often look to the past for insight about the present and future. But although alliances have collapsed for many reasons over past centuries, Margaret MacMillan argues in a recent essay for Foreign Affairs that Trump’s current behavior toward allies has little precedent. His approach, she writes, “does not suggest a clever Machiavellian policy to enhance American power; rather, it shows a United States acting against its own interests in bewildering fashion, undermining one of the key sources of that power.” A renowned historian and professor emeritus of international history at Oxford University, MacMillan is one of the greatest chroniclers of the grand alliances of the twentieth century and the world wars they fought. She joined Editor-at-Large Hugh Eakin on August 18 to discuss the normalization of conquest and the war in Ukraine, how U.S. allies are calculating their next steps, and what the United States’ approach to its alliances will mean for the future. You can find sources, transcripts, and more episodes of The Foreign Affairs Interview at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/podcasts/foreign-affairs-interview. 

In an episode released in January 2025, Senior Editor Kanishk Tharoor spoke with the political economist Nicholas Eberstadt about the global crash in fertility rates and the looming prospect of depopulation. Over the past century, the world’s population has exploded—surging from around one and a half billion people in 1900 to roughly eight billion today. But according to Eberstadt, that chapter of human history is over, and a new era, which he calls the age of depopulation, has begun. That subject has become even more prevalent in the past year. The United States, for example, recorded its lowest ever birthrate in 2024. Eberstadt is the Henry Wendt Chair in Political Economy at the American Enterprise Institute and has written extensively on demographics, economic development, and international security. In a 2024 essay for Foreign Affairs, Eberstadt argued that plummeting fertility rates everywhere from the United States and Europe to India and China point to a new demographic order—one that will transform societies, economies, and geopolitics. You can find sources, transcripts, and more episodes of The Foreign Affairs Interview at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/podcasts/foreign-affairs-interview. 

In 2023, Dan Kurtz-Phelan spoke with the historians Stephen Kotkin and Orville Schell about what drives Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin and how they are (and are not) like Mao and Stalin.  Xi and Putin loom over geopolitics in a way that few leaders have in decades. Not even Mao and Stalin drove global events the way Xi and Putin do today. Who they are, how they view the world, and what they want are some of the most important and pressing questions in foreign policy and international affairs.  Kotkin and Schell are two of the best scholars to explore these issues. Kotkin is the author of seminal scholarship on Russia, the Soviet Union, and global history, including an acclaimed three-volume biography of Stalin. He is a senior fellow at Stanford University’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and the Kleinheinz Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution. Schell is the Arthur Ross director of the Center on U.S.-China Relations at the Asia Society. He is the author of 15 books, ten of them about China. He is also a former professor and dean at the University of California, Berkeley Graduate School of Journalism. 

In a recent essay in Foreign Affairs, the scholar and former U.S. official Ashley J. Tellis makes a provocative argument about India’s foreign policy. In a piece titled “India’s Great-Power Delusions,” Tellis argues that Indian policymakers have their priorities wrong. Instead of pushing for what they call “multipolarity” in the international system, Indian leaders should align more closely with the United States. Tellis insists that India will be able to fend off China, its far stronger rival in Asia, only with U.S. backing. But it may lose that support if it continues to express skepticism about U.S. leadership and courts U.S. adversaries. Tellis’s essay has provoked huge debate—in Washington, in New Delhi, and in the pages of Foreign Affairs. In this episode, Dan Kurtz-Phelan brings Tellis into conversation with two of his critics: the former Indian foreign secretary Nirupama Rao and the analyst Dhruva Jaishankar. Kurtz-Phelan spoke with them on July 25, a few days before the Trump administration announced 25 percent tariffs on India, the latest twist in ongoing negotiations with New Delhi over a new trade deal. Tellis, Rao, and Jaishankar debate India’s pathways to power in the September/October 2025 issue of Foreign Affairs. Their disagreements touch not just on the directions of Indian and U.S. foreign policies but also on the very nature of international order in the twenty-first century.

For decades, Joseph Nye was one of the true giants of American foreign policy. His career, in government and in the academy, spanned epochs, and his body of work as a scholar of international relations remains unparalleled.   Nye, who passed away at the age of 88 in May, served in the Carter and Clinton administrations and headed the Harvard Kennedy School for nearly two decades. But he may be best known for his contributions to the study of international relations. Nye coined the term “soft power” and co-authored Power and Interdependence, a pathbreaking analysis of geopolitics, with Robert Keohane.   Fifty years later, Nye and Keohane, longtime colleagues and friends, reunited for a final time in Foreign Affairs’ pages, to argue that President Donald Trump’s single-minded fixation on hard power risks weakening the real sources of U.S. strength. It is a fitting, if not exactly valedictory, culmination of a life in the American century.   Over the decades, Keohane got to know Nye the thinker and Nye the man better than almost anyone. Dan Kurtz-Phelan spoke with Keohane about Nye’s legacy and about what a changing American foreign policy will mean for the future of international relations. You can find sources, transcripts, and more episodes of The Foreign Affairs Interview at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/podcasts/foreign-affairs-interview. 

It wasn’t long ago that both heads of state and prominent policymakers could speak seriously about a world without nuclear weapons. But in the course of just a few years, nuclear concerns have come back in force. Arms control has broken down almost entirely. China has started a massive expansion of its arsenal, putting basic assumptions about deterrence in doubt. Vladimir Putin has threatened nuclear use in Ukraine—threats that were taken very seriously by American officials. And proliferation risks have grown, with regard to both American adversaries like Iran and American allies in Europe and Asia who may no longer trust security commitments from the United States. Vipin Narang and Pranay Vaddi until recently oversaw nuclear policy in the Pentagon and on the National Security Council. In a new essay for Foreign Affairs, they call the situation nothing short of a “Category 5 hurricane.” And for the United States, that means putting nuclear strategy back at the center of foreign policy. Editor-at-large Hugh Eakin spoke with Narang and Vaddi about this changing nuclear landscape and what the United States must do to survive this new nuclear age. You can find sources, transcripts, and more episodes of The Foreign Affairs Interview at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/podcasts/foreign-affairs-interview.

For all its promise of disruption, Donald Trump’s first term as president transformed American foreign policy less than most critics feared and some supporters hoped. Alliances held up, the rules-based order largely endured, and American global leadership appeared resilient. When Joe Biden was elected president in 2020, he could proclaim “America is back” and proceed with a foreign policy that was in many ways quite traditional. But Trump’s second term has been different. In just a few months, he has broken with decades of precedent on everything from trade to alliances. And as Rebecca Lissner and Mira Rapp-Hooper argue in a new Foreign Affairs essay, this time there will be no going back. Trump’s presidency will fundamentally change American leadership and global order. As senior officials on Biden’s National Security Council, Lissner and Rapp-Hooper helped chart the way forward after Trump’s first term. They argue that the task now is to understand and, in a few regards, learn from the consequences of Trump’s disruption. Contending with the world after Trump will be a tall order. But they also see it as an opportunity: a clean slate on which to write the future of American foreign policy. You can find sources, transcripts, and more episodes of The Foreign Affairs Interview at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/podcasts/foreign-affairs-interview. 

For years, U.S. presidents have complained that European governments spend far too little on their militaries, leaving the United States to pick up a disproportionate share of the tab for the transatlantic alliance. But in the past few years, Europe’s defense spending has exploded. At the NATO summit last week, U.S. allies committed to spending five percent of GDP on defense. That’s far more than the two percent target U.S. policymakers long called for. It’s even more than the United States itself spends on defense—the result of both escalating pressure from U.S. President Donald Trump and escalating threats from Russian President Vladimir Putin. But Celeste Wallander, until recently the top defense official overseeing U.S. policy toward Europe and Russia, warns in a new Foreign Affairs essay that this transformation will have more complicated consequences than most Americans expect. A more capable Europe will also mean a more independent Europe, more willing to defy U.S. priorities and make demands for cooperation. Wallander has been a key player in the transatlantic alliance as a top official on the National Security Council and in the Pentagon, including as assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs during the Biden administration. She is now executive director of Penn Washington and an adjunct senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security. The United States, in her view, will have to take a very different approach to the transatlantic alliance—at a time when it’s as vital as ever, in Ukraine and beyond. You can find sources, transcripts, and more episodes of The Foreign Affairs Interview at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/podcasts/foreign-affairs-interview. 

Donald Trump pledged not to entangle the United States in wars in the Middle East. But last weekend, he joined Israel’s air campaign against Iran, bombing three nuclear sites before claiming that Iranian facilities targeted by U.S. aircraft and missiles had been “obliterated.” Iran responded by firing missiles at U.S. bases in the region just before Washington announced a cease-fire. But key questions remain unanswered—about the risk of continued fighting, about Iran’s nuclear capability and ambitions going forward, and about the shifting balance of power and rapidly changing regional order in the Middle East. To make sense of the conflict, Dan Kurtz-Phelan spoke with Eric Edelman, Suzanne Maloney, and Andrew Miller. All three have served in senior positions overseeing U.S. Middle East policy in the White House, the State Department, and the Defense Department across multiple administrations. They spoke on June 25 about the war’s escalation and abrupt de-escalation and about its long-reaching consequences—for Iran, for Israel, and for the United States. You can find sources, transcripts, and more episodes of The Foreign Affairs Interview at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/podcasts/foreign-affairs-interview.

Less than a week ago, on June 12, Israel launched a barrage of attacks against Iran, targeting nuclear sites, missile depots, and military and political leaders. Since then, the two countries have exchanged a series of attacks. Philip Gordon is the Sydney Stein, Jr. Scholar at the Brookings Institution and a longtime observer and analyst of the Middle East, and his writing has appeared in Foreign Affairs for over 20 years. He has also been one of the key practitioners of U.S. Middle East policy, as White House Middle East coordinator during the Obama administration and, more recently, as national security adviser to Vice President Kamala Harris. Shortly after the start of the Trump administration, Gordon wrote in Foreign Affairs, to the surprise of many, about the opportunity Donald Trump had to make progress in the Middle East. On June 17, he joined Dan Kurtz-Phelan to discuss the dangers of this latest round of escalation—and also how wise U.S. policy could prevent it from ending in catastrophe. You can find sources, transcripts, and more episodes of The Foreign Affairs Interview at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/podcasts/foreign-affairs-interview.

U.S. President Donald Trump famously tweeted during his first term, “Trade wars are good, and easy to win.” But the record of the trade war that Trump started with his so-called Liberation Day tariffs in early April suggests that things are a bit more complicated.  In an essay for Foreign Affairs appropriately titled, “Trade Wars Are Easy to Lose,” the economist Adam Posen argues that the United States has a weaker hand than the Trump administration believes. That’s especially true when it comes to China, the world’s second-largest economy and perhaps the real target of Trump’s trade offensive. “It is China that has escalation dominance in this trade war,” Posen writes. “Washington, not Beijing, is betting all in on a losing hand.” Dan Kurtz-Phelan spoke to Posen, who is president of the Peterson Institute for International Economics, on June 9 about the short- and long-term effects of Trump’s tariffs and the economic uncertainty they’ve caused, about what it would take to constructively remake the global economy, and about the growing risks to the United States’ economic position at an especially dangerous time. You can find sources, transcripts, and more episodes of The Foreign Affairs Interview at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/podcasts/foreign-affairs-interview.

It has become a trope to lament and lambast the wishful thinking that shaped U.S. policy toward China in the two decades after the Cold War. That policy rested on a prediction about China’s future: that with economic growth and ongoing diplomatic, economic, and cultural engagement—with the United States and the rest of the world—China would become more like the United States—more politically open at home and more accepting of the existing order abroad. It is hard to deny that this prediction proved wrong. But Rana Mitter, the S.T. Lee Chair in U.S.-Asia Relations at the Harvard Kennedy School and one of the great historians of China, reminds readers that predictions about China almost always prove wrong. And as he writes in a new essay in Foreign Affairs, it would be equally foolish to assume that China must remain on its current trajectory of more confrontation abroad and repression at home. “Another China remains possible,” Mitter argues. And how that China develops will be one of the most important factors in geopolitics for decades to come. You can find sources, transcripts, and more episodes of The Foreign Affairs Interview at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/podcasts/foreign-affairs-interview.

The war in Sudan gets only a fraction of the attention that conflicts in Ukraine and Gaza and potential conflicts elsewhere get. But after two years of fighting, it has created the biggest humanitarian crisis ever recorded. And as the two sides in the conflict, the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces, vie for control of the country and its resources, there is little hope of a conclusion any time soon. As the war goes on, and a growing number of outside powers look for advantage in the carnage, the consequences are likely to get even worse, argue Mai Hassan and Ahmed Kodouda in a recent Foreign Affairs essay—not just for Sudan, but for the rest of its region as well. Both Hassan, an Associate Professor of Political Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and Kodouda, a humanitarian policy expert who was based in Sudan until March 2023, have spent years watching what is happening in Sudan. They joined senior editor Eve Fairbanks to discuss the roots of what has become an intractable conflict, and whether a path out of it is possible. You can find sources, transcripts, and more episodes of The Foreign Affairs Interview at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/podcasts/foreign-affairs-interview. 

Donald Trump just finished his first tour of the Middle East since returning to the White House. The region has changed a lot since he was last there as president. There’s been Hamas’s attack on Israel, the ensuing Israeli retaliation, the weakening of Iran and its proxies, and the fall of the Assad regime in Syria. Trump used the visit to announce flashy deals with Gulf leaders and to commit to lifting sanctions on Syria. But with big questions remaining about Gaza and about nuclear negotiations with Iran, the future of the region and the U.S. role in it remain unsettled. In a recent essay for Foreign Affairs, Dana Stroul argues that a new regional order could emerge from the recent upheaval—but only if Washington takes the lead in what will undoubtedly be an intricate political process. Stroul is director of research and the Shelly and Michael Kassen senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. During the Biden administration, she served as deputy assistant secretary of defense for the Middle East, witnessing firsthand how quickly new regional power dynamics can take shape—and how quickly they can unravel. Stroul spoke with Dan Kurtz-Phelan on May 20 to discuss the prospect of a new Iranian nuclear deal, the future of Israeli policy in Gaza, and what Trump’s recent moves herald for the new Middle East. You can find sources, transcripts, and more episodes of The Foreign Affairs Interview at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/podcasts/foreign-affairs-interview.

In a little more than 100 days, Donald Trump has set about dismantling much of the international order that has prevailed since World War II. That’s true of traditional U.S. approaches to trade, to conflict, alliances, international organizations, and more. But as much as we focus on Trump, Michael Beckley argues that much of this change in U.S. foreign policy has deeper roots, going to the very nature of American power. The United States is increasingly a “rogue superpower,” Beckley has written, “neither internationalist nor isolationist but aggressive, powerful, and increasingly out for itself.” How this America interacts, not just with adversaries like China but also with allies and others, may be the most important question in geopolitics today. Beckley is an associate professor of political science at Tufts University, a nonresident senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, and Asia director at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, and has been one of the sharpest analysts of American grand strategy in an era of deepening great-power competition.  Beckley joined Dan Kurtz-Phelan on May 13 to discuss both the resilience of American power and the risks to it—and what the global transformation now underway will mean for U.S. interests going forward. You can find sources, transcripts, and more episodes of The Foreign Affairs Interview at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/podcasts/foreign-affairs-interview. 

Donald Trump’s first National Security Strategy, released at the end of 2017, announced the start of a new era for American foreign policy—one that put great-power competition at its center and focused especially on intensifying rivalry with China. For all the dissension and turbulence in American politics since then, that framework for American foreign policy has proved remarkably durable. Nadia Schadlow is a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute and served as deputy national security adviser in the first Trump administration. She was the primary author of Trump’s first National Security Strategy and helped crystallize the return of great-power competition as the organizing principle of U.S. strategy. But what great-power competition means for America’s greatest challenges today—and whether it still accurately describes Donald Trump’s view of the world—is an entirely different question. Schadlow joined Dan Kurtz-Phelan to talk about Trump’s second-term approach—in Ukraine, in Asia, with global trade, and more—and laid out a vision of what a successful Trump foreign policy might look like. You can find sources, transcripts, and more episodes of The Foreign Affairs Interview at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/podcasts/foreign-affairs-interview.

Donald Trump famously promised to end the war in Ukraine within 24 hours of returning to the White House. But he is just over 100 days into his presidency, and the war is certainly not over. With Kyiv opposed to territorial concessions, and with Russia’s military campaign showing no signs of slowing down, the Trump administration has threatened to walk away from the conflict if both sides don’t agree to a cease-fire and a path to peace—leaving Ukraine and its European partners planning for a future in which Russian aggression continues, but U.S. support does not. In a recent article for Foreign Affairs, Jack Watling, senior research fellow for land warfare at the Royal United Services Institute in London, argues that Europe can, in fact, replace the United States as Ukraine’s primary backer. Senior Editor Hugh Eakin spoke with Watling on April 28 about the latest developments on the battlefield—and what the coming months will demand of Ukraine and its partners in order to avoid a catastrophic defeat. You can find sources, transcripts, and more episodes of The Foreign Affairs Interview at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/podcasts/foreign-affairs-interview.

Donald Trump’s embrace of tariffs should come as no surprise. For decades, he has claimed that other countries are ripping Americans off—and promised to use tariffs to remake a global trade system that, in his view, has been deeply unfair to the United States. But almost no one anticipated a trade and tariff policy as extreme and erratic as the one the world has seen since Trump proclaimed “Liberation Day” at the beginning of April. The sweeping tariffs on U.S. partners and rivals alike unleashed panic in the financial markets and in capitals across the world. Even a pause and negotiations on many of those tariffs has done little to assuage the concerns of foreign leaders, businesses, and consumers, who remain uncertain about the effects of the tariff regime, and the strategy behind it. The economists Kimberly Clausing and Michael Pettis both agree that the global economic system was in need of an overhaul—but they disagree about what that overhaul would look like. For a special two-part episode, Dan Kurtz-Phelan spoke with each of them about Trump’s signature economic policy. Clausing, a professor at UCLA, makes the case against Trump’s protectionism and sketches out a progressive blueprint for the global economy. And Pettis, a professor at Peking University in Beijing and a longtime skeptic of the free trade consensus, argues that this reckoning in global trade has been decades in the making—and considers what an alternative economic system could look like. In these separate conversations, they discuss the state of the world economy, the logic behind Trump’s tariff gambit—and whether the U.S. president’s attempt to rewrite the rules will pay off. You can find sources, transcripts, and more episodes of The Foreign Affairs Interview at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/podcasts/foreign-affairs-interview.

For years in U.S. foreign policy circles, discussions of China focused on its growing wealth, power, and ambition, and the fear that it would supplant the United States. But a few years ago, the conversation took a sharp turn. Rather than fixating on China’s rise, most analysis began to focus on the country’s stagnation and even decline. There were good reasons for this: disappointing post-COVID economic growth, dire demographics, and a foreign policy alienating much of the world. And so a new consensus took hold—that a weakened China might not overtake the United States after all. In a new essay for Foreign Affairs, Kurt Campbell and Rush Doshi argue that this new consensus dangerously underestimates Chinese power and the challenge it represents for U.S. foreign policy. Washington, they warn, is missing Beijing’s key strategic advantage—an advantage that only a new approach to alliances will offset. As they write, if America goes it alone, “the contest for the next century will be China’s to lose.” Campbell is the chairman and a co-founder of The Asia Group and served as deputy secretary of state and Indo-Pacific coordinator at the National Security Council during the Biden administration. Doshi is an assistant professor at Georgetown University and director of the China Strategy Initiative at the Council on Foreign Relations, and served as deputy senior director for China and Taiwan affairs at the National Security Council during the Biden administration. They joined Dan Kurtz-Phelan on April 14 to discuss the sources of Chinese power, what U.S. observers of China get wrong, and whether the Trump administration has an endgame in its confrontation with Beijing. You can find sources, transcripts, and more episodes of The Foreign Affairs Interview at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/podcasts/foreign-affairs-interview.