B.F., a surgical nurse, has a child, E. B.F. and E.’s father are separated and, in 2019, were engaged in litigation about parenting rights. An interim ruling in that case in early June 2019 granted E.’s father supervised access, which B.F. resisted. At this time, B.F. was residing with her mother, I.F.On June 12, 2019, after the interim ruling, a neighbour found B.F., I.F., and E., then 19 months old, in B.F.’s home. All three were unconscious in B.F.’s bedroom; E. was in her crib. First responders found five empty insulin pens at the scene, each of which originally contained many times the normal adult dose. There were nine visible injection marks on E.’s body and evidence that E. had resisted the injections; no injection marks were visible on B.F. or I.F. The first responders also located a handwritten letter at the scene that they characterized as a suicide note. Due to the quantity of insulin injected into her system, E. suffered serious and permanent brain damage, as well as permanent damage to other organs. She was diagnosed with cerebral palsy and spasticity, and suffers from seizures. She requires constant medical care. B.F. and I.F. have since fully recovered. B.F. was arrested and charged with two counts of attempted murder by administering a noxious substance (a potentially lethal amount of insulin by injection), and two counts of aggravated assault.The jury convicted B.F. of the attempted murder of E. and I.F., and of the aggravated assault of E. The jury acquitted B.F. of the aggravated assault of I.F.B.F. appealed her conviction and sentence. The conviction appeal in relation to the attempted murder of E. was dismissed. The conviction appeal in relation to the attempted murder of I.F. was allowed and a new trial ordered. Argued Date 2025-05-22 Keywords Criminal law — Offences — Elements of offence — Charge to jury — Party liability — Attempted murder and aiding suicide — Suicide pact defence — Whether victim of a crime may also be a principal of an offence — Whether accused may be liable as a party to an offence without a principal offender being found guilty — Whether trial judge erred by failing to instruct the jury on the scenario presented by counsel for B.F. — Whether jury instructions were misleading to the point of error — Whether jury instructions raise a reasonable apprehension of biais — Whether suicide pact defence available — Whether Court of Appeal erred in approach to causation — Whether Court of Appeal incorrectly required additional elements that must be satisfied for an act that may assist suicide to also constitute murder Notes (Ontario) (Criminal) (By Leave) (Publication ban in case) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The respondent was arrested without warrant by the police 11 days after the date of an alleged crime. At his trial, he brought a motion in which he claimed that his arrest and his detention following his arrest were unlawful pursuant to s. 495(2)(b), (d) and (e) of the Criminal Code and s. 9 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. He argued that the power to arrest and detain without warrant for a hybrid offence is lawful only if the peace officer has reasonable grounds to believe that an indictable offence was actually committed or is about to be committed and that such measures are necessary in the public interest.The trial judge summarily dismissed the motion on the ground that it had no chance of success. The police officers could, pursuant to s. 495(3) of the Criminal Code, proceed solely on reasonable grounds to believe that an indictable offence was actually committed. There was nothing unlawful about his arrest. The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge had erred in refusing to hold a voir dire on the motion, because the motion was not bound to fail. The right to challenge the lawfulness of the arrest without warrant is guaranteed by the terms of s. 495(3) in accordance with a viable interpretation of the limitations imposed on the power of arrest without warrant set out in s. 495(2). The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial. Argued Date 2025-05-21 Keywords Criminal law — Arrest — Police — Powers — Arrest without warrant — Whether s. 495(2) of Criminal Code modifies peace officer’s power to arrest person without warrant — Whether s. 495(3) of Criminal Code excuses non compliance with s. 495(2) — Whether Court of Appeal erred in finding that trial judge had erred in summarily dismissing motion in which unlawfulness of arrest by reason of non compliance with s. 495(2) was alleged — Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C 46, s. 495. Notes (Quebec) (Criminal) (By Leave) (Publication ban in case) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

On December 6, 2021, S.A. was charged with assault and sexual assault. He elected to be tried by judge and jury. A trial date of April 17, 2023 was set but, on April 17, 2023, the trial could not commence because no judge was available. A trial date was set for February 12, 2024. Forestell J. held that delay of 6 to 10 months was unreasonable and breached s. 11(b) of the Charter. Notwithstanding that net delay was below the presumptive ceiling of 30 months set in R. v. Jordan, 2016 SCC 27, she stayed the proceedings. The Court of Appeal allowed an appeal and set aside the stay of proceedings. Argued Date 2025-05-16 Keywords Charter of Rights and Freedoms — Right to tried in reasonable time — How should delay caused by judicial vacancy be treated under s. 11(b) of the Charter? Notes (Ontario) (Criminal) (By Leave) (Publication ban in case) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

In 2019, Mr. Dorsey and Mr. Salah both applied for transfer to a minimum security institution. At the time, Mr. Dorsey, a dangerous offender, was incarcerated at a medium security facility; Mr. Salah was sentenced to concurrent life sentences and is incarcerated at a different medium security facility. Mr. Dorsey’s case management team, his Manager of Assessment and Intervention, and his Warden all agreed that he met the criteria for reclassification to minimum security but, because of his dangerous offender status, his transfer request had to be approved by the Regional Deputy Commissioner and then the Assistant Commissioner of Correctional Operations and Programs. In September 2019, the Regional Deputy Commissioner assessed Mr. Dorsey’s public safety rating as moderate. His request was denied.Mr. Salah’s case management team, his parole officer, and his Manager of Assessment and Intervention recommended reclassification and transfer to a minimum security facility, but, in October 2019, a new Manager of Assessment and Intervention and Intervention was assigned to his file. He assessed Mr. Salah as a moderate escape risk, so the Warden wrongly denied his transfer request.Mr. Dorsey and Mr. Salah each applied under the Habeas Corpus Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H-1, for a writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum with certiorari in aid. Although they did not apply under the Charter, they alleged that the denial of their transfer requests engaged ss. 7, 9, 10(c) and 12 of the Charter. On consent, the applications were joined for the purpose of determining a common threshold legal issue: whether Mr. Dorsey and Mr. Salah could resort to habeas corpus to challenge the denials of their applications for transfer to lower security prisons.The applications were dismissed on the grounds that habeas corpus was not available for denials of reclassification, which were not deprivations of residual liberty. After the application judge’s decision, Mr. Dorsey was reclassified and transferred to a minimum security institution, but he continued his appeal. The appeal was dismissed. Argued Date 2025-05-13 Keywords Prerogative writs — Habeas corpus — Prisons — Deprivation of residual liberty — Security classification — Transfer — Denial of reclassification — Denial of transfer to lower security institution — Whether denial of reclassification and transfer to lower security institution is deprivation of residual liberty reviewable by way of habeas corpus. Notes (Ontario) (Civil) (By Leave) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The respondent is a criminal defence lawyer whose client was the subject of a wiretap authorization under the Criminal Code. The authorization did not permit live monitoring of phone calls with a lawyer; such calls could be recorded, but a judge’s order was required to access them. During the surveillance operation, the respondent called her client, which was automatically recorded. A civilian employee also listened to a portion of the call before disconnecting.A reviewing judge concluded that an initial portion of the telephone call was not subject to solicitor-client privilege and it was released to the Crown. The recording revealed the respondent informed her client that a third party had been arrested and that the police would likely be obtaining search warrants for places where the third party had been. The respondent was charged with wilfully attempting to obstruct, pervert or defeat the course of justice by interfering in an ongoing police investigation, contrary to s. 139(2) of the Criminal Code.In a voir dire, the trial judge concluded that the respondent’s rights under s. 8 of the Charter were not breached with respect to the civilian employee listening to her phone conversation. However, she also concluded that her rights under ss. 7 and 11(d) of the Charter had been breached due to her inability to access the second, privileged portion of the recording. She ordered the entire recording excluded under s. 24(1) of the Charter. The Crown called no evidence and the respondent was acquitted.A majority of the Court of Appeal affirmed the acquittal and the trial judge’s decision with respect to the breaches of the respondent’s rights under ss. 7 and 11(d) of the Charter. However, it also concluded that her rights under s. 8 had been breached, and it therefore would have excluded the evidence of the telephone call under s. 24(2) of the Charter rather than s. 24(1). The dissenting judge would have held that the respondent’s ss. 7 and 11(d) rights were not breached. He agreed with the majority that there was a breach of her s. 8 rights, but he would have held that the evidence should not be excluded under s. 24(2). He would have ordered a new trial. Argued Date 2025-05-20 Keywords Criminal Law — Charter of rights — Search and seizure (s. 8) — Full answer and defence (ss. 7 and 11(d) — Solicitor-client privilege — Wire-tap authorization — Interaction between solicitor-client privilege and an accused’s lawyer’s Charter rights — Wire-tap monitoring and recording of phone call between defence counsel and client — Whether the respondent’s right to make full answer and defence was breached by not having access to the full recording of a phone call protected by solicitor-client privilege — Whether evidence obtained by s. 8 breaches should have been excluded. Notes (Saskatchewan) (Criminal) (As of Right) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The respondent Ms. Cibuabua Kanyinda entered Quebec on or about October 9, 2018, via Roxham Road following a stay in the United States. Originally from the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ms. Cibuabua Kanyinda made a claim for refugee protection under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27, when she arrived. She has three children, who accompanied her and were very young at the time the application was filed. During the waiting period for the processing of her claim for refugee status, which was lengthy, she obtained a work permit allowing her to work in Quebec, and she approached three childcare facilities to find subsidized spaces for the children. However, she was denied access to subsidized childcare because such childcare is reserved for those whose refugee status is formally recognized by the federal authorities, which excludes those waiting for a decision in this regard. On May 31, 2019, Ms. Cibuabua Kanyinda filed an application for judicial review, which was amended on August 16, 2019. In the application, she challenged the legality, on the basis of an absence of valid statutory authorization, and the constitutional validity, on the basis of an infringement of certain rights guaranteed by the Canadian Charter, of s. 3 of the Reduced Contribution Regulation, CQLR, c. S 4.1.1, r. 1. Argued Date 2025-05-15 Keywords Charter of Rights — Right to equality — Discrimination based on sex — Disproportionate impact of exclusion from subsidized childcare on women claiming refugee protection who have obtained work permit ? Whether s. 3 of Reduced Contribution Regulation infringes right to equality protected by s. 15(1) of Canadian Charter — If so, whether this infringement is justified under s. 1 of Canadian Charter — If this Court were to find that s. 3 of Reduced Contribution Regulation unjustifiably infringes s. 15(1) of Canadian Charter, what should appropriate remedy be? — Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 1, 15(1) — Reduced Contribution Regulation, CQLR, c. S 4.1.1, r. 1, s. 3. Notes (Quebec) (Civil) (By Leave) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The respondent Ms. Cibuabua Kanyinda entered Quebec on or about October 9, 2018, via Roxham Road following a stay in the United States. Originally from the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ms. Cibuabua Kanyinda made a claim for refugee protection under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27, when she arrived. She has three children, who accompanied her and were very young at the time the application was filed. During the waiting period for the processing of her claim for refugee status, which was lengthy, she obtained a work permit allowing her to work in Quebec, and she approached three childcare facilities to find subsidized spaces for the children. However, she was denied access to subsidized childcare because such childcare is reserved for those whose refugee status is formally recognized by the federal authorities, which excludes those waiting for a decision in this regard. On May 31, 2019, Ms. Cibuabua Kanyinda filed an application for judicial review, which was amended on August 16, 2019. In the application, she challenged the legality, on the basis of an absence of valid statutory authorization, and the constitutional validity, on the basis of an infringement of certain rights guaranteed by the Canadian Charter, of s. 3 of the Reduced Contribution Regulation, CQLR, c. S 4.1.1, r. 1. Argued Date 2025-05-14 Keywords Charter of Rights — Right to equality — Discrimination based on sex — Disproportionate impact of exclusion from subsidized childcare on women claiming refugee protection who have obtained work permit ? Whether s. 3 of Reduced Contribution Regulation infringes right to equality protected by s. 15(1) of Canadian Charter — If so, whether this infringement is justified under s. 1 of Canadian Charter — If this Court were to find that s. 3 of Reduced Contribution Regulation unjustifiably infringes s. 15(1) of Canadian Charter, what should appropriate remedy be? — Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 1, 15(1) — Reduced Contribution Regulation, CQLR, c. S 4.1.1, r. 1, s. 3. Notes (Quebec) (Civil) (By Leave) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Mr. Rousselle was arrested for impaired driving and administered a breathalyser test. Based on the results of the test, he was charged with having a blood alcohol concentration equal to or exceeding 80 mg of alcohol in 100 mL of blood within two hours of ceasing to operate a motor vehicle. At trial, a Certificate of Qualified Technician from the officer who administered the breathalyzer test was admitted into evidence but the trial judge refused to admit two certificates of analysts who had certified the target value of the alcohol standard used by the qualified technician to conduct a required system calibration check of the breathalyzer device. The trial judge held the Certificate of Qualified Technician was not evidence of the target value of an alcohol standard and proof of the target value of an alcohol standard was a pre-condition to the Crown relying on the presumption in s. 320.31(1) of the Criminal Code that breathalyzer test results are conclusive proof of blood alcohol concentration. The trial judge acquitted Mr. Rousselle. A summary conviction appeal was allowed, the acquittal was set aside and a conviction was entered. The Court of appeal dismissed an appeal. Argued Date 2025-04-24 Keywords Criminal law — Evidence — Breathalyser test results — Target value of alcohol standard — Whether Court of Appeal erred in interpretation of s. 320.31(1)(a) of Criminal Code as permitting Crown to prove alcohol standard was certified by an analyst through hearsay evidence of qualified technician? Notes (New Brunswick) (Criminal) (By Leave) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The complainant was at that time, a grade 7 student at an all-male boarding school in Alberta. The respondent was a teacher at the school. After a trial by judge and jury, the respondent was found guilty of sexual interference (count 1), invitation to sexual touching (count 2), and sexual assault (count 3) of a person under the age of 14 years. The offences occurred in 1993 and 1994. In view of the multiple incidents in this case, the sentencing judge was satisfied that it was appropriate to sentence the respondent on counts 1 and 2. Convictions were entered on counts 1 and 2. The charge of sexual assault was stayed in accordance with Kienapple. The respondent was sentenced to a six year prison term with the counts to be served concurrently. A majority of the Alberta Court of Appeal (Wakeling and Feehan JJ.A.) allowed the respondent’s sentence appeal reducing the sentence to 47 months. Crighton J.A., dissented and would have upheld the six year sentence imposed by the sentencing judge. Argued Date 2025-04-23 Keywords Criminal law – Sentencing – Did the Alberta Court of Appeal err in law in finding the sentencing judge’s reasons for sentence to be insufficient? Do the principles articulated in R. v. Friesen apply to historic offences? Did the Alberta Court of Appeal err in interfering with the sentence imposed at trial? Notes (Alberta) (Criminal) (By Leave) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

After a trial by judge alone, the appellant, Buddy Ray Underwood, was convicted of robbery, kidnapping, unlawful confinement and murder. The trial judge acquitted the appellant of first degree murder but entered a conviction for the included offence of second degree murder instead. The respondent Crown appealed the acquittal and the appellant cross-appealed the conviction. The Court of Appeal unanimously allowed the Crown’s appeal, quashed the acquittal on first degree murder and substituted a conviction for first degree murder under ss. 231(2) and (5) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. First, the court agreed with the Crown that the trial judge erred in law in his analysis of constructive first degree murder by narrowing the causation analysis to focus exclusively on the direct medical cause of death. Second, the court concluded that the trial judge erred in law by misapprehending the time frame for assessing planning as well as the meaning of “planned” more generally. The appellant’s cross-appeal, not at issue, was dismissed. Argued Date 2025-04-17 Keywords Criminal law – Appeals – Murder – First degree murder – Elements of offence – Constructive first degree murder – Planning and deliberation – Whether the Court of Appeal erred in law in convicting the appellant of first degree murder by concluding that his actions satisfied the elements of s. 231(2) and (5)(e) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. Notes (Alberta) (Criminal) (As of Right) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

In 2020 the Chief Medical Officer of Health for Newfoundland and Labrador issued certain orders under the province’s Public Health Protection and Promotion Act, in an effort to curtail the spread of COVID-19. These orders restricted travel, by limiting the circumstances in which non-residents were permitted to enter the province. Appellant Kimberley Taylor resides in Nova Scotia. Her mother, a resident of Newfoundland and Labrador, passed away suddenly in 2020. Ms. Taylor sought an exemption from the travel restrictions in order to attend her mother’s funeral. Her request was denied. Ms. Taylor brought an application seeking a declaration that the travel restriction orders, and the provision of the Act under which they were issued, were beyond the legislative authority of the province and of no force and effect. Ms. Taylor also argued that the travel restrictions violated her rights under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The Supreme Court of Newfoundland and Labrador dismissed the application. The application judge held that the legislation at issue was constitutional, but that the right to remain in Canada, protected by s. 6(1) of the Charter, included a right of mobility simpliciter within Canada. The decision to deny Ms. Taylor entry into the province infringed her s. 6(1) right to mobility, but the infringement was justified under s. 1 of the Charter. By the time the appeal and cross-appeal from that judgment came before the Court of Appeal of Newfoundland and Labrador, the travel restrictions were no longer in effect. The Court of Appeal declined to hear the appeal and cross-appeal on the basis that they were moot. Argued Date 2025-04-16 Keywords Charter of Rights – Mobility rights – Public health – COVID-19 – Chief medical officer of health issuing orders pursuant to provincial legislation to restrict travel into province during public health emergency – Appellant seeking to enter province to attend funeral – Appellant denied entry – Whether travel restriction order unconstitutional – Whether travel restriction order violates s. 6(1) of Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms – Whether travel restriction order violates s. 6(2)(a) of Charter – Whether s. 6 violation justified by s. 1 of Charter – Whether Court of Appeal correct to reject appeal as moot – Public Health Protection and Promotion Act, S.N.L. 2018, c. P-37.3, s. 28(1)(h). Notes (Newfoundland & Labrador) (Civil) (By Leave) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The appellant, Shamar Meredith, and a co-accused were charged with first degree murder. The victim was shot multiple times in the washroom area of a restaurant. Prior to the trial, the Crown brought a motion to have a video admitted as prior discreditable conduct evidence. The trial judge ruled that the video was admissible. After the written ruling was released and before the video was played for the jury, the appellant and the co-accused brought a motion to have the trial judge reconsider his decision on the prior discreditable conduct motion, which was dismissed. The appellant was eventually found guilty of second-degree murder by a jury. The appellant appealed his conviction. He raised, among other grounds of appeal, that the trial judge erred in admitting the video as evidence of prior discreditable conduct and/or failed to properly instruct the jury on the permissible use of such evidence. The majority of the Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal. The majority found that the trial judge applied the correct legal test in deciding to admit the video, and that his assessment of the probative value and prejudicial effect of the video was reasonable. Further, the majority found that trial judge correctly instructed the jury on the permitted and prohibited uses of the video. In dissent, van Rensburg J.A., would have allowed the appeal and directed a new trial on the charge of second-degree murder. She found that the trial judge erred in law (1) in concluding that the video was probative of whether the appellant and the co-accused were engaged in a joint enterprise to kill the victim, and admitting the video for this purpose; (2) in admitting the video for any purpose after the appellant and the co-accused offered to make certain admissions under s. 655 of the Criminal Code; and (3) in his instructions to the jury about the permitted and prohibited uses of the video, which were internally inconsistent, specifically instructed the jury to use the video for an improper purpose, and did not alleviate the significant prejudice to the appellant and the co-accused that resulted from the admission of this evidence. Argued Date 2025-03-24 Keywords Criminal law — Evidence — Admissibility — Prior discreditable conduct evidence— Charge to jury — Whether the trial judge erred in admitting evidence of prior discreditable conduct as probative of whether the appellant and his co-accused were involved in a joint enterprise to kill the victim — Whether the trial judge erred in admitting the evidence of prior discreditable conduct after the appellant and his co-accused proposed to make admissions covering and negating its probative value — Whether the trial judge erred in his instructions to the jury regarding the permitted and prohibited uses of the prior discreditable conduct and failed to alleviate the prejudice to the appellant and his co-accused. Notes (Ontario) (Criminal) (As of Right) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The appellant, P.B., was charged with sexual assault for having allegedly sexually assaulted the complainant on three occasions in the course of one night. At trial, the complainant was the only witness called. The appellant argued that the complainant’s testimony was not sufficiently credible or reliable to prove the case against him beyond a reasonable doubt. In particular, he alleged that her evidence was unreliable because she claimed that her memory of the relevant events was based on “flashbacks”. The trial judge accepted the complainant’s evidence and found the appellant guilty. The appellant appealed his conviction on the basis that the trial judge failed to give sufficient reasons for his decision, in that he failed to make concrete factual findings about which parts of the complainant’s evidence he accepted and which he did not, and that the trial judge erred in evaluating the credibility and reliability of the complainant’s evidence, notably her “flashback” memory. The majority of the Court of Appeal for Saskatchewan dismissed the appeal. On the first issue, the majority found that the trial judge’s reasons were sufficient. Having read the trial judge’s reasons in a functional and contextual manner, the majority concluded that there is no difficulty discerning what the trial judge decided, from a factual standpoint, and why. The majority found the reasons also contained enough detail to permit appellate review for error. As for the second issue, the majority found that the trial judge’s conclusion on the credibility and reliability of the complainant’s evidence is one that a reasonable view of the evidence supports. As such, the majority concluded that there was no proper basis to interfere. In dissent, Barrington-Foote J.A. would have allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction, and ordered a new trial. He concluded that the trial reasons are insufficient to permit effective appellate review and that the trial judge’s analysis on the reliability issues arising from the evidence was very brief and was not enough in the circumstances of this case. Argued Date 2025-03-21 Keywords Criminal law — Evidence — Assessment — Credibility — Sufficiency of reasons — Whether the trial judge erred by failing to provide sufficient reasons — Whether the trial judge erred by failing to identify and apply the correct approach to the analysis of the reliability of evidence of recovered memories based on flashbacks. Notes (Saskatchewan) (Criminal) (As of Right) (Publication ban in case) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

In 1978, the appellant, R.A., was babysitting the then five-year-old complainant at his home. In a statement made to the police, he explained that he asked the complainant to touch him and she did so. The appellant was charged with one count of indecently assaulting the complainant contrary to s. 149 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34. Following a trial in the Provincial Court, the appellant was acquitted on the basis that there had been no “assault” under the Criminal Code. There had been no direct, intentional application of force to the complainant and no attempt or threat by an act or gesture to apply force to the complainant.On appeal, the Crown submitted that the trial judge erred by misinterpreting the elements of assault and holding that the sexual touching had to be physically initiated by the accused. The Court of Appeal unanimously allowed the appeal and set aside the acquittal. It concluded that the appellant touched the complainant in a manner constituting an assault and that any intentional contact with a child by an adult that is committed in circumstances of a sexual nature constitutes a direct and intentional application of force by the adult to the child’s person, regardless of whose physical movement initiated the contact. Considering that the only issue was whether the appellant’s conduct amounted to an assault and that the question had been answered in the affirmative, the court entered a conviction for indecent assault and remitted the matter to the Provincial Court for the appellant to be sentenced. Argued Date 2025-03-20 Keywords Criminal law — Indecent assault — Elements of offence — Intentional application of force — Did the Court of Appeal for British Columbia err in holding that in order to ground the offence of indecent assault in 1978, the element of assault did not require the intentional application of force by an accused? — Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, s. 149. Notes (British Columbia) (Criminal) (As of Right) (Publication ban in case) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

During a roadside stop, the police found a handgun in the fanny pack belonging to the appellant, Mr. Amari Donawa. The handgun was sent to the Centre of Forensic Sciences, but for reasons that were not explained, the police did not send the magazine or the ammunition.At trial, the expert testified that the handgun could not be fired easily without the magazine. The trial judge, Justice Edward of the Ontario Court of Justice, found that the handgun was not a firearm because making it operational, according to the expert, required special expertise, considerable time, and part not readily available. The Crown appealed Mr. Donawa’s acquittals entered by the trial judge on the various firearm offences. The central issue in the appeal was whether the trial judge was correct in his finding that the handgun was not a firearm as defined in s. 2 of the Criminal Code. The Court of Appeal unanimously allowed the Crown’s appeal and set aside the acquittals. It entered convictions on two counts (careless storage of a firearm and possession of a firearm with an altered serial number) and ordered a new trial on other counts. In its view, the trial judge made a number of errors in reaching his conclusion. He failed to consider whether the handgun, as found, was operable, based on the evidence. The failure to consider all of the evidence in relation to the ultimate issue of guilt or innocence was an error of law. Argued Date 2025-03-26 Keywords Criminal Law —Firearm — Definition of firearm in Criminal Code — Evidence — Assessment — Does the definition of a “firearm” under s. 2 of the Criminal Code always dispense with proof of the availability of a functional magazine? — Did the Court of Appeal for Ontario err in finding that the trial judge had failed to consider all of the evidence in relation to the ultimate issue of guilt or innocence? — Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 2 “firearm”. Notes (Ontario) (Criminal) (As of Right) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The respondents are various professionals who obtained judgments against the appellant in 2004, to which a ten-year prescriptive period applies under art. 2924 of the Civil Code of Québec. Certain actions interrupted prescription between 2005 and 2007, after which prescription started running again.A bailiff served a notice of execution on the appellant in 2016, which authorized the bailiff to seize the appellant’s movable property. However, the bailiff concluded that the appellant’s movable property was exempt from seizure pursuant to section 89 of the Indian Act. The bailiff later had discussions with the appellant’s Grand Chief and was informed that there was no property outside of its land base. The bailiff did not prepare and file minutes of seizure. Subsequently, the appellant informed the respondents that it held a property outside of its land base but that it was exempt from seizure. The respondents registered a legal hypothec against that property.The appellant sought a declaration that the prescriptive period applicable to the judgment had expired before the respondents registered the hypothec. The trial judge concluded that prescription had been interrupted in November 2016 when the respondents served a notice of execution on the appellant. The actions of the respondents amounted to a judicial application that interrupted prescription per article 2892 C.C.Q. Although the seizure was unfruitful, it had not been dismissed or annulled by a court, in which case prescription would not have been interrupted, per article 2894 C.C.Q. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and affirmed the trial judge’s decision. Argued Date 2025-03-19 Keywords Prescription — Extinctive prescription — Interruption of prescription — Whether service of notice of execution interrupted prescription — Whether service of notice of execution amounts to unsuccessful seizure if there are no assets available to seize — Whether section 89 of the Indian Act applies so as to render appellant’s movable property unseizable — Civil Code of Québec, arts. 2892, 2894 — Indian Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-5, s. 89. Notes (Quebec) (Civil) (By Leave) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Stephen and Claudette Emond lived in a home on the Ottawa River that was located in the catchment area of the Mississippi Valley Conservation Authority (“MVCA”). They had purchased a standard form residential homeowners’ insurance policy from Trillium Mutual Insurance Company. The Emonds’ home was deemed a total loss as a result of flooding in April 2019. Although the insurer acknowledged coverage for the loss under the policy, the parties could not agree on what, if any, costs of replacement of the insureds’ home were excluded from coverage under the policy. The Emonds claimed that the Guaranteed Rebuilding Cost (“GRC”) coverage endorsement fully guaranteed their rebuilding costs. Trillium acknowledged that the GRC coverage applied to replace the insureds’ home, but took the position that the costs to be incurred to comply with the MVCA’s regulation policies and other by-laws and regulations enacted after the original building of the home were excluded from coverage by an exclusion in the policy. The application judge accepted the Emonds’ position that the GRC coverage was intended to guarantee the costs of rebuilding their home, without any limitation of coverage resulting from the operation of any rule, regulation, by-law, or ordinance. The Ontario Court of Appeal allowed the insurer’s appeal and concluded that the exclusion applied to exclude coverage for increased costs to comply with any law, including by-laws and regulations such as the MVCA regulation policies. Argued Date 2025-03-18 Keywords Insurance — Homeowner’s insurance — Home deemed total loss as a result of flooding — Home insured through standard form residential homeowners’ insurance policy including endorsement for guaranteed rebuilding cost — Policy containing exclusion for increased costs of replacement due to operation of any law regulating construction of buildings — Insurer disputing homeowners’ claim for coverage for costs of complying with regulatory policies to rebuild home — Application judge concluding coverage included and Court of Appeal concluding coverage excluded — What is the correct interpretation of the guaranteed rebuilding cost endorsement? — Whether an exclusion clause in the basic policy can be used to deny expanded coverage granted by the guaranteed rebuilding cost endorsement. Notes (Ontario) (Civil) (By Leave) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Judge Gagnon of the Court of Québec acquitted the appellant, Frédéric Rioux, of the offence of sexual assault committed between August 1 and 2, 2019, in Bonsecours. Although the Crown had laid only one charge for a sexual assault that occurred in Bonsecours, the Crown’s evidence related to two instances of sexual intercourse, one in Magog and the other in Bonsecours. With regard to the first sexual act, which took place in a park in Magog, the judge found that the accused’s evidence was probative of the complainant’s consent and had not been contradicted by the complainant, who had no memory of the incident. The actus reus was therefore not established beyond a reasonable doubt. As for the second instance of sexual intercourse, which occurred at the accused’s house in Bonsecours, the judge found that the Crown had met its burden but that Mr. Rioux’s version raised a doubt concerning his honest but mistaken belief in the complainant’s consent.For the reasons given by Bachand J.A. and concurred in by Hamilton J.A., the Quebec Court of Appeal allowed the Crown’s appeal and ordered a new trial, but only with respect to Mr. Rioux’s criminal liability for the events that took place in the park in Magog on the evening of August 1, 2019, since the Crown had decided not to challenge the trial judge’s conclusion that Mr. Rioux had no criminally liability for the events in Bonsecours. The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge had made errors of law in analyzing the issue of the complainant’s capacity to consent to the sexual acts that had taken place in Magog. Those errors of law on the issue of the consensual nature of the sexual acts made it necessary to hold a new trial. Mainville J.A., dissenting, would have dismissed the appeal, as he was of the view that the trial judge had considered all the circumstantial evidence but had found that Mr. Rioux could nevertheless be acquitted based on the probative value of his testimony. Mainville J.A. expressed serious reservations about the validity of the Crown’s appeal with regard to events that were not part of the charge, given that the accused had been acquitted of the offence directly covered by the indictment. He added that it was not appropriate to order a new trial when Mr. Rioux would be tried again for an offence of which he had been finally acquitted. Argued Date 2025-01-22 Keywords Criminal law — Evidence — Assessment — Sexual assault — Capacity to consent — Absence of direct evidence from complainant — Consideration of all evidence — Appeal — Powers of Court of Appeal — Charge — Order limiting scope of new trial — Whether majority of Court of Appeal erred in law in holding that trial judge had failed to consider all evidence on ultimate issue of guilt or innocence — If trial judge made error of law, whether majority erred in law in failing to address question of whether respondent had shown with reasonable degree of certainty that verdict would not necessarily have been same without that error in light of trial judge’s conclusion that he believed appellant. Notes (Quebec) (Criminal) (As of Right) (Publication ban in case) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The appellant, Roger Patrick Bilodeau, was found guilty by a jury of two counts of manslaughter for the shooting deaths of two men. He was found liable as a party under s. 21(2) of the Criminal Code, for having formed an intention to carry out an unlawful purpose common with his son, who shot the deceased. He appealed his convictions, arguing that the jury was improperly instructed, including regarding the common unlawful purpose. The majority of the Alberta Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. It concluded that many errors identified benefited the appellant, often by imposing on the Crown an unduly onerous burden. No substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurred: s. 686(1)(b)(iii) should be applied. Pentelechuck J.A., dissenting, would have allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial. In her view, there were additional legal errors in the charge not identified by the majority, one or more of which were not harmless, precluding a route under s. 686(1)(b)(iii). There was a real risk that the common unlawful purpose alleged by the Crown merged into the secondary offence of murder. The dissenting judge was not convinced that the evidence was so overwhelming that, notwithstanding the serious nature of the error, a reasonable and properly instructed jury would inevitably have convicted. Argued Date 2025-02-19 Keywords Criminal law — Charge to jury — Party liability — Common unlawful purpose — Whether the Court of Appeal erred in determining that the instruction to the jury with regard to the appellant’s alleged liability as a party, pursuant to s. 21(2) of the Criminal Code, contained no prejudicial error — Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 21(2). Notes (Alberta) (Criminal) (As of Right) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

After a jury trial before Blanchard J. of the Superior Court, the appellant, Maxime Chicoine-Joubert, was convicted of one count of second degree murder and one count of assault with a weapon. On appeal, Mr. Chicoine-Joubert argued that the judge had erred in his instructions regarding manslaughter and in his answer to questions from the jury by failing to mention the necessary mens rea.The Quebec Court of Appeal, for the reasons of Vauclair J.A., Hamilton J.A. concurring, dismissed Mr. Chicoine-Joubert’s appeal. It found that the instructions to the jury were correct in the context of the case. Since Mr. Chicoine-Joubert conceded his guilt for the manslaughter verdict, the question from the jury on that offence did not require that the judge address it. Bachand J.A., dissenting, would have allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial on the grounds that the trial judge had not adequately answered the questions from the jury and that there was a reasonable possibility that the jurors had misunderstood the requisite mens rea for second degree murder. Although the dissenting judge agreed with the majority that the initial instructions contained no error warranting the court’s intervention, he found that the trial judge had not fulfilled his obligation to answer questions from the jury clearly, correctly and comprehensively. He did not instruct the jurors on manslaughter or provide them with an example. Argued Date 2025-02-20 Keywords Criminal law — Charge to jury — Questions from jury — Manslaughter — Whether trial judge erred in his instructions and in his answer to questions from jury regarding offence of manslaughter, offence that appellant does not acknowledge having committed — Whether majority of Court of Appeal made reviewable error in declining to order new trial. Notes (Quebec) (Criminal) (As of Right) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).