Religious Epistemology, Contextualism, and Pragmatic Encroachment
Oxford University
42 episodes
9 months ago
Alan Hájek (Australian National University) gives a talk for the New Insights seminar series on 21st May 2015. Abstract: A number of prominent authors—Levi, Spohn, Gilboa, Seidenfeld, and Price among them—hold that rational agents cannot assign subjective probabilities to their options while deliberating about which one they will choose. This has been called the "deliberation crowds out prediction" thesis. The thesis, if true, has important ramifications for many aspects of Bayesian epistemology, decision theory, and game theory. The stakes are high.
The thesis is not true—or so I maintain. After some scene-setting, I will precisify and rebut several of the main arguments for the thesis. I will defend the rationality of assigning probabilities to options while deliberating about them: deliberation welcomes prediction. I will also consider application of the thesis, and its denial, to Pascal's Wager. Creative Commons Attribution-Non-Commercial-Share Alike 2.0 UK: England & Wales; http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.0/uk/
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Alan Hájek (Australian National University) gives a talk for the New Insights seminar series on 21st May 2015. Abstract: A number of prominent authors—Levi, Spohn, Gilboa, Seidenfeld, and Price among them—hold that rational agents cannot assign subjective probabilities to their options while deliberating about which one they will choose. This has been called the "deliberation crowds out prediction" thesis. The thesis, if true, has important ramifications for many aspects of Bayesian epistemology, decision theory, and game theory. The stakes are high.
The thesis is not true—or so I maintain. After some scene-setting, I will precisify and rebut several of the main arguments for the thesis. I will defend the rationality of assigning probabilities to options while deliberating about them: deliberation welcomes prediction. I will also consider application of the thesis, and its denial, to Pascal's Wager. Creative Commons Attribution-Non-Commercial-Share Alike 2.0 UK: England & Wales; http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.0/uk/
Alan Hájek (Australian National University) gives a talk for the New Insights seminar series on 21st May 2015. Abstract: A number of prominent authors—Levi, Spohn, Gilboa, Seidenfeld, and Price among them—hold that rational agents cannot assign subjective probabilities to their options while deliberating about which one they will choose. This has been called the "deliberation crowds out prediction" thesis. The thesis, if true, has important ramifications for many aspects of Bayesian epistemology, decision theory, and game theory. The stakes are high.
The thesis is not true—or so I maintain. After some scene-setting, I will precisify and rebut several of the main arguments for the thesis. I will defend the rationality of assigning probabilities to options while deliberating about them: deliberation welcomes prediction. I will also consider application of the thesis, and its denial, to Pascal's Wager. Creative Commons Attribution-Non-Commercial-Share Alike 2.0 UK: England & Wales; http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.0/uk/
Richard Cross (Notre Dame) gives a talk in the New Insights in Religious Epistemology International Conference, held in Oxford in June 2015. The commentator is Christina Van Dyke, Calvin
Hans Halvorson (Princeton) give a talk in the New Insights in Religious Epistemology International Conference, held in Oxford in June 2015. The commentator is John Pittard (Yale).
Keith DeRose (Yale), gives a talk in the New Insights in Religious Epistemology International Conference, held in Oxford in June 2015. The commentator is Jane Friedman (NYU).
Peter van Inwagen (Notre Dame) gives the second talk for the New Insights in Religious Epistemology International Conference, held in Oxford in June 2015. The commentator is Jeffrey Sanford Russell (USC).
Richard Swinburne, University of Oxford, gives the first talk in the New Insights in Religious Epistemology International Conference, held in Oxford in June 2015.
First talk given by Cameron Domenico Kirk-Giannini (Rutgers) at the New Insights and Directions for Religious Epistemology Workshop on Formal Epistemology and Religious Epistemology, Oxford University, 8 December 2014.
Second talk given by Jason Konek (Bristol) and Billy Dunaway (Oxford) at the New Insights and Directions for Religious Epistemology Workshop on Formal Epistemology and Religious Epistemology, Oxford University, 8 December 2014.
Third talk given by Jonathan Weisberg (Toronto) at the New Insights and Directions for Religious Epistemology Workshop on Formal Epistemology and Religious Epistemology, Oxford University, 8 December 2014.
Fourth talk given by Rima Basu (USC) at the New Insights and Directions for Religious Epistemology Workshop on Formal Epistemology and Religious Epistemology, Oxford University, 9 December 2014.
Fifth talk given by Liz Jackson (Nortre Dame) at the New Insights and Directions for Religious Epistemology Workshop on Formal Epistemology and Religious Epistemology, Oxford University, 9 December 2014.
Sixth and final talk given by Professor Roger White (MIT) at the New Insights and Directions for Religious Epistemology Workshop Formal Epistemology and Religious Epistemology, Oxford University, 9 December 2014.
Sixth and final talk given by Professor Michael Bergmann (Purdue) at the Defeat and Religious Epistemology for the New Insights and Directions in Religious Epistemology Workshop, Oxford University on 17th March 2014 Creative Commons Attribution-Non-Commercial-Share Alike 2.0 UK: England & Wales; http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.0/uk/
Fifth talk given by Professor Edward Wierenga (Rochester) at the Defeat and Religious Epistemology for the New Insights and Directions in Religious Epistemology Workshop Oxford University held on 17th March 2014 Creative Commons Attribution-Non-Commercial-Share Alike 2.0 UK: England & Wales; http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.0/uk/
Fourth talk given by Professor John Pittard (Yale Divinity School) at the Defeat and Religious Epistemology for the New Insights and Directions in Religious Epistemology Workshop, Oxford University on 18th March 2014 Creative Commons Attribution-Non-Commercial-Share Alike 2.0 UK: England & Wales; http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.0/uk/
Second talk given by Dr. J. Adam Carter (Edinburgh) at the Defeat and Religious Epistemology from the New Insights and Directions in Religious Epistemology Workshop, Oxford University held on 17th March 2014 Creative Commons Attribution-Non-Commercial-Share Alike 2.0 UK: England & Wales; http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.0/uk/
Religious Epistemology, Contextualism, and Pragmatic Encroachment
Alan Hájek (Australian National University) gives a talk for the New Insights seminar series on 21st May 2015. Abstract: A number of prominent authors—Levi, Spohn, Gilboa, Seidenfeld, and Price among them—hold that rational agents cannot assign subjective probabilities to their options while deliberating about which one they will choose. This has been called the "deliberation crowds out prediction" thesis. The thesis, if true, has important ramifications for many aspects of Bayesian epistemology, decision theory, and game theory. The stakes are high.
The thesis is not true—or so I maintain. After some scene-setting, I will precisify and rebut several of the main arguments for the thesis. I will defend the rationality of assigning probabilities to options while deliberating about them: deliberation welcomes prediction. I will also consider application of the thesis, and its denial, to Pascal's Wager. Creative Commons Attribution-Non-Commercial-Share Alike 2.0 UK: England & Wales; http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.0/uk/
