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Exploring Offshore Litigation
Harneys
60 episodes
23 hours ago
Exploring Offshore Litigation is a captivating podcast series containing audio of written blog content that dives deep into the intriguing world of offshore litigation, including the BVI and Cayman. Each episode sails through complex legal waters, bringing you up-to-date analysis of recent high-stakes cases and expert commentary from the leading minds in this specialised field. Our episodes demystify legal jargon and break down complex cases to make them accessible to all. Harneys, an international law firm with entrepreneurial thinking, brings each episode to you.
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All content for Exploring Offshore Litigation is the property of Harneys and is served directly from their servers with no modification, redirects, or rehosting. The podcast is not affiliated with or endorsed by Podjoint in any way.
Exploring Offshore Litigation is a captivating podcast series containing audio of written blog content that dives deep into the intriguing world of offshore litigation, including the BVI and Cayman. Each episode sails through complex legal waters, bringing you up-to-date analysis of recent high-stakes cases and expert commentary from the leading minds in this specialised field. Our episodes demystify legal jargon and break down complex cases to make them accessible to all. Harneys, an international law firm with entrepreneurial thinking, brings each episode to you.
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Business
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Episodes (20/60)
Exploring Offshore Litigation
Cayman Islands Court of Appeal holds that swift enforcement of foreign arbitral awards is essential
In the recent decision of Suning International Group Co Ltd v Carrefour Nederland BV the Cayman Islands Court of Appeal provided guidance on the procedure to be followed under Order 73, rule 31(6) of the Grand Court Rules for service of proceedings to enforce a foreign arbitral award.
In doing so, the Court of Appeal emphasised the policy of Cayman Islands law in favour of swift enforcement of arbitral awards. It also cautioned that failure to follow the guidance in this judgment will likely result in a service order being set aside.
Background
The respondent obtained an arbitral award in Hong Kong requiring the appellants to pay RMB1 billion (plus interest and costs) arising out of the failure by appellants to make payment pursuant to a put option for shares exercised by the respondent.
Pursuant to section 5 of the Foreign Arbitral Awards Enforcement Act (1997 Revision) and with leave of the Court a Convention award may be enforced in the same manner as a judgment or order of the Grand Court. GCR Order 73, rule 31 deals with the procedure to be followed.
Rule 31(6) provides that an order giving leave may be served personally, by sending to the respondent's usual or last known place of residence or business, or in such other manner as the Court may direct, including electronically.
Grand Court's decision
The Grand Court made an order ex parte granting leave to enforce the arbitral award in the Cayman Islands and directed that the order and associated documents be served on the appellants by delivery to their Hong Kong counsel in the arbitration proceedings. The respondent arranged service pursuant to the terms of the order, and also effected service by hand and registered post on each appellant respectively.
The appellants then applied to set aside the order on various grounds including that the method of service ordered by the Judge was allegedly not in accordance with the relevant law.
The appellants submitted that service of an ex parte order pursuant to rule 31(6) should be by way of service on a body corporate at its principal office or registered address and that the option of serving in some other manner should only be utilised on exceptional grounds.
They submitted there was no evidence before the Court to show that service in according with the Hague Convention would cause any particular difficulty or delay, and there was no justification for in effect ordering substituted service.
Justice Kawaley rejected these submissions and held that the wording of rule 31(6) gave the Court a suite of equal options rather than a suite of options sequentially ranked. He drew a distinction with the wording of GCR Order 65, rule 4 permitting substituted service where personal service is "impractical". He also noted there was no suggestion that serving the documents on the appellants' arbitration attorneys was contrary to Hong Kong law.
The Grand Court dismissed the application to set aside the order but granted leave to appeal on the basis that the manner in which service of an ex parte order giving leave to enforce a foreign arbitral award is a matter of public interest which would benefit from a decision from the Court of Appeal.
The appeal
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal.
Policy of "speedy finality"
The Court of Appeal endorsed Mr Justice Foxton's comments in the English decision of M v N. In particular, the policy of speedy finality reflected in the approach to arbitration cases is even more compelling in connection with applications for enforcement of awards.
Mr Justice Foxton set out factors that he held justified an order for alternative service notwithstanding that the Hague Service Convention applied.
These included that the application was brought to assist with the enforcement of an arbitral award which engages the policy of speedy finality, the respondent had fully engaged (through counsel) with the proceedings that culminated in the award, the award had been outstanding for a considerable period of time (two ...
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3 days ago
11 minutes 25 seconds

Exploring Offshore Litigation
Cayman Court Appoints Provisional Liquidators to New Horizon Health Limited
The Company operates predominantly in China. It is in the business of assisting with screening and diagnosis of cancers of various kinds and has developed products to provide early screening, particularly for bowel cancer. It appeared to have been successful for a number of years. However, in 2023, complaints were made by a third party that the Company's sales figures did not appear to be justifiable.
This triggered an internal investigation which raised questions about the reliability of sales data within the Company and some suggestions that the Company's revenue had been overstated.
Due to the question marks over the accuracy of the figures, the Company's accounts for 2023 were not completed. Moreover, the Company's auditors, Deloitte, resigned and new auditors were appointed but were not (as at the date of the petition hearing) able to complete their audit of the 2023 accounts.
The investigations continued but the issues remain unresolved. As a result, HKEX suspended trading in the Company's shares in March 2024. HKEX further warned that if the company failed to resolve matters to its satisfaction by 27 September 2025, the shares would be de-listed.
The board of the Company determined that it would be in the Company's best interests to appoint PLs to continue to carry out the investigations and at the same time attempt to achieve a rescue, or perhaps a restructuring, to allow it to continue its operations.
On 6 August 2025, in an ex tempore judgment, Justice Asif KC, sitting in the Cayman Court, ordered the appointment of the PLs.
The Court considered that it was clear from the material before it that the Company held valuable assets and appeared to have a viable business (provided that its internal difficulties can be resolved). Justice Asif KC observed that although no restructuring plan had yet been formulated, the board had demonstrated an intention to pursue a restructuring. In those circumstances, the case fell within the scope of appointing PLs to facilitate potential restructuring, if achievable.
The Court was taken to section 104(1) of the Cayman Companies Act which establishes the Court's jurisdiction to appoint PLs. The Court then considered the difference between the appointment of PLs and the appointment of restructuring officers (ROs) and the two cases of Kingkey Financial International (Holdings) Limited (unreported, 12/04/24) and Oakwise Value Fund SPC (unreported, 16/12/24).
Justice Asif KC concluded that in this case, a restructuring officer's powers "would not be sufficiently broad or are unlikely to be sufficiently broad to cover all the various steps that this company is likely to need to happen in order for a rescue to be successful.
The additional powers that are likely to be available to a provisional liquidator makes the appointment of provisional liquidators a preferable one for this particular company." Accordingly, it was appropriate for PLs to be appointed within the meaning of Section 104(3) of the Act.
Following Kingkey, Oakwise and now most recently New Horizon Health, it is certainly not the case, as a matter of practice, that the RO regime has displaced the restructuring provisional liquidator regime. The jurisdiction of the Court to appoint PLs on the application of the company is now broader than it was prior to the coming into effect of the RO regime.
Whereas formerly, restructuring PLs could be appointed on the application of the company where it was unable to pay its debts and intended to present a compromise to creditors, the position now is that upon an application by the company, the Court may appoint PLs "if it considers it appropriate to do so." This is, on its terms, a broader and far less prescriptive jurisdiction.
For a more in-depth discussion of this important issue, see our article Restructuring the Cayman Islands segregated portfolio company: A closer look at in re Oakwise Value Fund SPC.
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3 days ago
4 minutes 52 seconds

Exploring Offshore Litigation
Trust, title and tokens: implications of Singapore High Court's decision in Re Taylor for distribution of unclaimed cryptoassets in liquidation
The rise of digital assets and cryptocurrency has transformed financial markets, but it has also raised novel legal and practical challenges, particularly in the context of corporate insolvency.
For insolvency professionals, trustees and investors navigating the murky waters of cryptoasset recovery, recent common law authorities provide an important guide toward legal certainty, particularly for questions of ownership, fiduciary obligation and the treatment of unclaimed or misappropriated tokens.
Against this backdrop, the Singapore High Court's recent decision in Re Genesis Asia Pacific Pte Ltd (in liquidation), commonly referred to as Re Taylor, is a pivotal moment in the common law's evolving engagement with digital asset ownership.
The decision, which underscores the importance of clarity in custodial arrangements and offers useful guidance on when a trust over cryptoassets may be inferred or implied, is relevant across jurisdictions that regularly deal with digital asset structures, such as the British Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands and Bermuda. These offshore centres often host the holding companies, token issuers and custodian structures that underpin crypto exchanges or decentralised finance platforms.
The Singapore High Court in Re Taylor considered whether unclaimed cryptocurrency held by a liquidated exchange could be distributed to customers on the basis that it was held on trust. The joint liquidators of Eqonex Capital Pte Ltd said the assets were either held on express trust (based on the exchange's user agreements) or that a resulting or Quistclose trust could be inferred.
The court applied orthodox trust principles, requiring the "three certainties" of intention, subject matter and objects. Despite the user agreements stating that digital assets "are custodial assets held by the Eqonex Group for your benefit" and that "title … will at all times remain with you," the court found this insufficient to constitute certainty of intent.
The mere fact that assets were segregated and designated for customer use was insufficient to evidence an intent to create a fiduciary relationship. Additionally, the court rejected the existence of resulting or Quistclose trusts due to the absence of a clear purpose or mutual intention. A similar approach was taken by the Hong Kong courts in Re Gatecoin (in liquidation).
This decision is significant for two reasons. First, it demonstrates that courts are increasingly prepared to apply conventional trust and property principles to blockchain-based assets. Second, it highlights the importance of documentation, platform terms and wallet architecture in determining ownership and fiduciary obligations.
For liquidators and trustees, Re Taylor offers a roadmap. Where a trust can be clearly identified, recovered digital assets can be distributed back to beneficial owners or, in some cases, to shareholders through established trust mechanisms. Where no trust exists, these assets may instead be applied in satisfaction of the company's general liabilities.
Asset recovery during liquidation creates legal, technical maze
Recovering digital assets during liquidation is often a multi-jurisdictional and multidisciplinary exercise. The process typically begins with asset tracing, including reviews of internal ledgers, blockchain transactions and exchange accounts to identify and secure relevant wallets.
In jurisdictions such as Singapore, Hong Kong, the British Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands and Bermuda, liquidators have powerful tools for summoning former officers, compelling document production and initiating proceedings for non-cooperation.
These powers, however, only go so far. In many instances, access to wallets may depend on seed phrases, keys or multifactor authentication devices retained by former insiders.
Liquidator roles are also made difficult by the practical hurdles that necessarily exist with digital and cryptoassets.
These include:
Identifying fraudsters who routinely explo...
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1 week ago
11 minutes 28 seconds

Exploring Offshore Litigation
Cayman Islands Court dismisses application to appoint joint provisional liquidators
In a recent decision of In the matter of TROOPS Inc, the Grand Court declined to appoint joint provisional liquidators (JPLs) on an ex parte basis over TROOPS Inc. (the Company). The ruling provides a useful reminder of the Court's "especially cautious" approach to pressing the "nuclear button" of appointing JPLs, especially when that appointment is sought on an ex parte without notice basis.
The application was brought by Real Estate and Finance Fund (in official liquidation) (the Petitioner), which had obtained a Hong Kong High Court judgment against in the Company and others for approximately HK$405 million (c.US$52 million). The Petitioner alleged that the Company had been involved in a fraudulent restructuring and asset diversion scheme designed to strip value from the Petitioner's assets.
Fearing dissipation of assets, the Petitioner applied without notice for the urgent appointment of JPLs to preserve the Company's assets pending enforcement and/or determination of an appeal of the Hong Kong judgment.
In an earlier decision, Position Mobile Ltd SEZC (7 April 2022 and 31 October 2023) (Position Mobile), Justice Doyle set out (by reference to various earlier authorities) the four "main hurdles" for the appointment of provisional liquidators. These are:
The presentation of the winding up petition hurdle: a winding up petition has been duly presented and a winding up order has not yet been made.
The standing hurdle: the applicant has standing to make the application, i.e. the applicant is a creditor, contributory or CIMA.
The prima facie case hurdle: there is a prima facie case for making a winding up order.
The necessity hurdle: the appointment of JPLs is necessary in order to prevent the dissipation or misuse of the company's assets; and/or the oppression of minority shareholders; and/or mismanagement or misconduct on the part of the company's directors.
In the present case, the same judge presided and affirmed Position Mobile, holding that the Petitioner had overcome the first three of these hurdles. However, he was not persuaded that the fourth "necessity hurdle" was satisfied. Therefore, the Petitioner did not succeed.
In the judgment, the Judge emphasised that the appointment of JPLs is "one of the most intrusive remedies in the court's armoury" and requires clear and strong evidence.
The Judge also reiterated that where less draconian remedies are available, such as injunctive relief, JPLs should not be appointed. In the present case, the Petitioner's position was that the existing injunction that it had obtained in Hong Kong (the HK Injunction) was limited in scope and essentially inadequate to prevent the dissipation of assets.
However, Doyle J was not persuaded by this argument and suggested that there was nothing stopping it from returning to Hong Kong to seek further relief.
Ex parte applications for JPL appointments: applicants must be prepared for the Court to heavily scrutinise an application for the appointment of JPLs on an ex parte basis. The appointment of JPLs is the "nuclear option".
Necessity and proportionality: even with a strong prima facie case, the Court will not appoint JPLs unless it is strictly necessary, and proportionate, to protect the petitioner's position. The existence of alterative remedies may be considered adequate protection, making the appointment of JPLs unnecessary.
Form of order of appointment: the Court criticised various aspects of the draft order (albeit these criticisms were academic, as the relief sought was declined). For example, it was inappropriate for an order providing for the Company to be wound up on an application for the appointment of JPLs on an ex parte basis.
The Judge also questioned why the petition was proposed to be advertised only in the Cayman Islands, and not elsewhere, for example in Hong Kong. The Judge noted that he would have needed to be satisfied as to the wide JPL powers sought, and would have needed to be heard on the issue of the stifling of an...
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3 weeks ago
5 minutes 2 seconds

Exploring Offshore Litigation
Scaling the Summit of Cross-Border Enforcement: A Superb Illustration from Cayman
The Grand Court's recent decision in Re Superb Summit International Group Ltd [2025] CIGC (FSD) 62 offers a legally straightforward, albeit unusual, illustration of how Cayman Islands restoration and winding-up procedures can be utilised to support foreign regulatory enforcement efforts, particularly where cross-border fraud is alleged and local recovery action is essential.
Background
On 22 April 2025 a petition was presented by creditors seeking:
orders restoring Superb Summit International Group Limited (the Company), a Cayman Islands entity, to the register;
a winding up order on insolvency and/or just and equitable grounds; and
the appointment of joint official liquidators.
The petitioners' evidence showed that they had each entered into subscription agreements with the Company in 2014 paying HK$10 million in return for interest payment obligations assumed by the Company which fell due in 2019. They were apparently not alone in having their commercial expectations disappointed.
In 2020 the Company was delisted from the Hong Kong Stock Exchange and on 18 December 2020, Hong Kong's Securities and Futures Commission (SFC) commenced proceedings against the Company's former management and the company in respect of (amongst other things), alleged fraud (the HK Proceedings). However, the fact that the Company had been struck off the register posed a procedural hurdle.
The petitioners therefore brought a restoration application pursuant to section 159 of the Companies Act (2025 Revision). Section 159 relevantly provides:
"Company, member or creditor may apply to court for company to be reinstated
159.(1) If a company or any member or creditor of a company feels aggrieved by the company having been struck off the register in accordance with this Act, the company, member or creditor may apply to the Court to have the company restored to the register.
(2) An application referred to in subsection (1) shall be made by the company or any member or creditor of the company
(a) within two years after the date on which the company was struck off the register; or
(b) where the Cabinet allows, after the two-year period referred to in paragraph (a) but not more than ten years after the date on which the company was struck off the register.
(3) Upon an application under subsection (1), if the Court is satisfied that
(a) the company was, at the time of the striking off, carrying on business or in operation, or otherwise; and
(b) it is just that the company be restored to the register,
the Court may order that the name of the company be restored to the register on payment by the company of a reinstatement fee equivalent to two times the original incorporation or registration fee, and on terms and conditions as to the Court may seem just…" [Emphasis added]
The legal framework
Justice Kawaley granted the restoration under section 159, which, as set out above, permits a company to be restored where "just," even outside the initial two-year window (with Cabinet approval, which was obtained). Restoration was sought to enable the company to:
participate in the HK Proceedings;
receive any compensation awarded; and
potentially pursue claims against former management.
Winding-up and liquidation
It was also held that as the aim of restoration was to enable the Company to take part in the HK Proceedings where the former management were the defendants, it was entirely logical to place the Company into official liquidation.
The Court appointed joint official liquidators (JOLs) and granted targeted powers, including the power to:
participate in and bring ancillary proceedings in Hong Kong;
engage counsel locally and abroad; and
seek recognition from the Hong Kong courts of their appointment.
Takeaways
This case underscores several key themes for offshore practitioners:
Discretion should ordinarily be exercised in favour of restoration: where there is some valid purpose for seeking restoration, for instance the recovery and/or distribution of assets, the di...
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3 weeks ago
5 minutes 43 seconds

Exploring Offshore Litigation
Worldwide freezing injunction in Cayman: a “very big step to take” albeit not impossible
In Target Global Growth Fund II v Liu Xun, the Grand Court of the Cayman Islands granted the Plaintiffs' application for a worldwide freezing injunction against the Defendant's assets up to a value of US$35 million, as well as a proprietary injunction targeting specific assets. The Court clarified the test for the grant of a worldwide freezing order and the standards by which to evaluate the factors concerning a real risk of dissipation.
The Plaintiffs are venture capital entities that invested significant funds of about US$31.5 million pursuant to a subscription agreement signed among the Plaintiffs, the Defendant, Artem Ibragimov and a Cayman Islands company XanGroup holdings Corp (XanGroup).
The Plaintiffs allege that their investment was induced by the Defendant through fraudulent misrepresentation - namely, they were led to believe that the investment funds would be used to further XanGroup's business when in fact the funds were diverted from XanGroup's bank account to an account in the Defendant's name for his personal benefit.
Holding dual Dutch and Hong Kong citizenship, the Defendant is an individual with worldwide connections who seems to also have residency and employment rights in Singapore. Further, the Defendant provided an address in China and stayed in Vietnam during the periods in question.
Among other questionable behaviours, the Defendant purportedly signed a false share repurchase agreement on behalf of XanGroup to disguise the payment transfer from XanGroup's account to his own.
The Plaintiffs, having obtained a worldwide freezing order against the Defendant in Singapore, now brought suit in the Cayman Court seeking a freezing injunction against the Defendant's worldwide assets and a proprietary injunction against specific assets.
Legal principles
At the outset, Justice Doyle noted that a worldwide freezing order is "a very big step to take" and the court must "scrutinise the basis for such an injunction with the utmost care". The central question in granting such an injunction is a requirement that there be a real risk of dissipation of assets, ie, that absent an injunction, the defendant will deal with such assets with the result of leaving the judgment unsatisfied.
The legal test for a freezing order is set out in the recent decision of the Court of Appeal of England and Wales in Dos Santos v Unitel SA, which is followed by Cayman courts. Specifically, the applicant must show:
A good arguable case on the merits (which in effect is equivalent to a "serious issue to be tried", and does not necessarily have to have a better than 50% chance of success);
A real risk of dissipation of assets (defined as "something which is more than fanciful", with no requirement to show a high probability thereof or that dissipation is more likely than not); and
That it would be just and convenient to grant the order.
The plaintiff has the burden of satisfying the threshold of a real risk of dissipation, and in making this determination, the court evaluates the totality of the evidence, looking at the relevant factors cumulatively.
As regards proprietary injunctions, it is well within the court's power to grant such injunctions, provided that there is a serious issue to be tried (meaning that the facts alleged, if proven, would afford the claimant a proprietary remedy), the balance of convenience comes down in favour of granting the proprietary injunctive relief, and it is just and convenient to do so.
Decision
Noting that the application for freezing injunctions was dealt with at an interlocutory stage without complete discovery and any cross-examination of witnesses, the Court was satisfied that all three limbs of the test for freezing injunctions were met.
In particular, the totality of the circumstances in this case shows that there was a real risk, judged objectively, that a future judgment would not be satisfied because of dissipation of assets. In so ruling, Justice Doyle had regard of the following factors:
The De...
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1 month ago
5 minutes 30 seconds

Exploring Offshore Litigation
Contentious estates and temporary administrators
In the course of complex contested succession proceedings in the case of ATH v BNU, Justice Mithani gave an (anonymised) judgment dated 10 July 2025 in the BVI High Court. This is an important judgment of particular significance to practitioners dealing with estates pending a full grant of administration.
Two sisters, BNU and ATH, disputed the division of the estate of their late father.
Their late father's will named an executor, but the executor renounced his right to apply for probate. While the authority of an executor stems from their appointment in a will and takes effect from the death of the testator, an administrator is in a different position because their title depends on the grant of administration itself.
BNU applied ex parte under the Non-Contentious Probate Rules to the BVI Probate Court for the appointment of herself as administratrix ad colligenda bona (AACB) of the BVI estate. A grant AACB is a limited form of authority to collect and preserve the assets of a deceased person's estate before a full grant is issued.
Justice Young made an order appointing BNU as AACB and granted BNU permission to bring a derivative action under section 184C(1) of the BVI Business Companies Act, Revised Edition 2020 (Permission Application). Following the obtaining of that order, BNU applied for and obtained ex parte freezing and proprietary injunctions against ATH's husband and a company of which he was the executive director (Injunction Application).
ATH, her husband and the company subsequently applied to set aside Justice Young's order and discharge the injunctions respectively.
Justice Mithani strongly disapproved of BNU's appointment as an administratrix of an estate on a temporary or emergency basis for multiple reasons, including that the application had been made ex parte, there had been a failure to give immediate notice of the appointment to ATH, and BNU had later applied without notice for a grant to perfect that entitlement.
His Lordship concluded that Justice Young's order did not permit BNU to act without taking out a formal grant of representation. The documents necessary for a formal grant of representation to be issued were not before Justice Young and, therefore, Her Ladyship had had no power to issue the grant to follow on from the order she made appointing BNU as AACB.
Justice Mithani rejected a further contention that he, sitting in the Commercial Court, should issue a grant, rather than a Judge of the Probate Court.
A claim based on a cause of action, where legal capacity to sue is lacking, is a nullity. Accordingly, the High Court held that the Permission Application was simply not valid on account of the lack of authority on the part of BNU to bring it. Further, the Injunction Application, which was brought in the course of the Permission Application, also fell away.
In any event, Justice Mithani concluded that Justice Young's order should itself be set aside because the procedure initiated by BNU to apply for her appointment as AACB was wholly inappropriate.
This is an insightful judgment that that merits careful reading by all those interested in this specialist field.
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1 month ago
3 minutes 24 seconds

Exploring Offshore Litigation
Trust restored - dishonest assistant made to pay for breach of constructive trust
In Stevens v Hotel Portfolio II UK Ltd (HPII), a judgment handed down by the Supreme Court on 23 July 2025, Lord Briggs gave the leading judgment (with only Lord Burrows dissenting), providing a clear statement of the law on compensation for breach of constructive trust by a trustee and a dishonest assistant.
In 2005, HPII sold three hotels to a company owned by Mr Stevens. In fact, both the company and Mr Stevens were nominees for Mr Ruhan who concealed from HPII that he was the real purchaser.
The hotels were sold at market value. Accordingly, HPII suffered no loss at that stage. Between 2006 and 2008, the company sold the hotels at a significant profit. Mr Ruhan benefitted from a dividend by the company of £95 million, which he dissipated for his own purposes and subsequently lost in poor investments.
When the loss was discovered by the liquidators of HPII, HPII sued Mr Ruhan and Mr Stevens; Mr Ruhan for breach of his fiduciary duties and Mr Stevens for dishonest assistance.
The High Court in this case found that Mr Stevens had dishonestly assisted Mr Ruhan in both the acquisition of profits and their dissipation. The Judge found that the dissipation of the profits caused HPII an equivalent loss and ordered Mr Stevens to compensate HPII accordingly.
However, the Court of Appeal allowed an appeal on the basis that (a) HPII was only the temporary beneficial owner since both the gain and the loss were parts of a single pre-arranged fraudulent scheme by Mr Ruhan and (b) the loss caused to HPII by the dissipation was set off by an equivalent gain caused by Mr Ruhan's related breach of fiduciary duty such that there was no loss.
The Supreme Court took a step back and stated that the argument that a complete dissipation by a trustee can have caused the beneficiary no loss defied both equity and ordinary common sense.
There is no fundamental difference between the relationship between trustee and beneficiary and the analogous relationship between fiduciary and principal (such as a director and company).
The recipient becomes a constructive trustee of the dividend immediately upon its receipt with a duty to conserve the trust property for the benefit of the beneficiary and not destroy the beneficiary's proprietary interest in it. From the moment of receipt, the dividend belongs to the beneficiary.
A dissipation of the fund is a breach of trust for which the trustee is liable to compensate the beneficiary.
A dishonest assistant is jointly liable with the trustee.
If the dissipation caused the beneficiary a loss, and if no equitable set-off is available, then that is a loss for which compensation is due.
The questions for the Supreme Court to answer were whether the court can order compensation for loss caused by breach of a constructive trust; whether the dissipation of the dividend caused HPII a loss; and whether Mr Stevens could pray in aid an equitable set-off of the gain made by HPII.
The constructive trust imposed the usual obligation on the trustee not to dissipate the trust property and the usual obligation on both him, and any dishonest assistant, to compensate the beneficiary for that loss.
Applying a but-for analysis, the dissipation caused HPII to lose the whole value of its beneficial interest in the trust property regardless of the fact that the dividend was the fruit of an earlier breach of trust in making the profit in the first place.
The purpose of the constructive trust would be entirely defeated by allowing a set-off of the gain represented by the profit against the loss, since this would wipe out any personal liability by the trustee and dishonest assistant.
The fundamental principles were therefore unaffected by (a) whether there was an earlier breach of fiduciary duty to the same beneficiary; (b) whether the making of the profits caused the beneficiary no loss (and in this case it did not); and (c) whether the effect of the constructive trust was to confer a gain on the beneficiary.
While Harneys does not pra...
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1 month ago
4 minutes 50 seconds

Exploring Offshore Litigation
Anti-enforcement injunction where a foreign judgment has been obtained by fraud
In Commercial Bank of Dubai PSC v Al Sari, the English Commercial Court granted a declaration sought by the Bank that a United Arab Emirates Court judgment in favour of the defendants was obtained by fraud. The decision also clarifies that the rule in House of Spring Gardens v Waite (No 2) does not apply to enforcement proceedings, such that a party is not precluded from re-litigating the issue of fraud in a domestic court where the same issue had been dismissed in the foreign court.
The Bank obtained a judgment in the Sharjah Court in the UAE against the Al Sari defendants. The Bank sought to enforce the judgment by taking control of the shares of several BVI companies formerly owned by the second and third defendants.
The Bank had been unable to realise any value from the real properties held by the BVI companies by reason of what the Bank described as a dishonest scheme designed by the defendants to preserve the properties and their proceeds of sale for the benefit of the Al Sari family, via a series of sham contracts.
The sham contracts first emerged after the Bank commenced enforcement proceedings against the BVI companies. The contracts purported to impose a debt on the BVI companies in favour of the seventh defendant.
The Al Sari defendants commenced proceedings in the Sharjah Court seeking recovery of the purported debt arising under the sham documents, and were successful on appeal in obtaining a judgment against the BVI companies (UAE Appeal Judgment) in a sum significantly exceeding the earlier judgment due from the defendants to the Bank (Bank's Judgment).
The BVI companies (as parties) and the Bank (as non-party) requested the Sharjah Court of Appeal to review its decision in the UAE Appeal Judgment arguing that the contracts between the Al Sari defendants and the BVI companies were fabricated. The Sharjah Court of Appeal rejected the request for a review.
In connection with UK enforcement proceedings of the Bank Judgment, the Bank sought a declaration from the Commercial Court that the UAE Appeal Judgment had been obtained by fraud and sought an injunction restraining the enforcement of the UAE Appeal Judgment against the BVI companies.
In finding that the Bank had established that the contractual documents relied upon were shams, the English Commercial Court concluded that the UAE Appeal Judgment was similarly obtained by fraud and should not be recognised or enforced at common law in the UK. The English Court granted the Bank's claim for declaratory relief, and a permanent anti-enforcement injunction restrain the Al Sari defendants from enforcing the UAE Appeal Judgment in the UK.
In giving its decision, the English Court gave guidance on the scope of application of the rule in House of Spring Gardens v Waite (No 2) and held that the Bank was not precluded from alleging fraud in the English proceedings by reason of bringing a review procedure within the UAE Appeal proceedings in which the allegation of fraud was rejected. Specifically, the decision clarifies that:
1. The principle is a rule of estoppel or abuse of process. It would operate only where the issue has already been raised and adjudicated upon in a separate action, or in new proceedings after a final and enforceable judgment has been entered in earlier foreign proceedings.
2. The review procedure under the civil law of Sharjah does not constitute a separate action and did not determine whether the UAE Appeal Judgment had been obtained by fraud. Rather, the review amounted to a procedural mechanism for the same court to reconsider its judgment, which is fundamentally different to a fresh action before a new court to set aside a prior judgment for fraud.
3. There was no issue estoppel and it was not an abuse of process for the Bank to argue new matters which the Bank could not have argued before the Sharjah appeal proceedings, which was not party to the Sharjah appeal proceedings.
The decision confirms the broad discretion of the English courts to g...
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1 month ago
4 minutes 30 seconds

Exploring Offshore Litigation
UKSC holds that shareholders who invest with knowledge of an amalgamation have standing to demand fair value for their shares
In Jardine Strategic Limited v Oasis Investments II Master Fund Ltd the Privy Council (on appeal from the Court of Appeal for Bermuda) held that shareholders who acquired their shares after the date of notice of the meeting at which a proposed amalgamation would be voted on, and with knowledge that the proposed amalgamation would be approved and implemented, had standing to pursue fair value appraisal proceedings under section 106 of the Companies Act 1981 of Bermuda.
This decision is likely to be considered in other jurisdictions with similar statutory appraisal regimes.
In Jardine, approximately 84 per cent of the shares held by the dissenting shareholders were acquired after the date of the notice and with knowledge that the amalgamation would be approved (due to an undertaking given by the Jardine Matheson group's ultimate holding company to vote in favour of the resolution).
The Company sought to argue that only those shareholders who held shares at the date of the notice had standing to bring appraisal proceedings under section 106 - a position which was rejected at first instance and on appeal.
On appeal, the Board rejected each of the Company's three grounds of appeal.
The Company submitted that as a matter of construction of section 106, the right to apply for a court appraisal is restricted to those who held shares at the date of the notice of the EGM
Section 106(6) provides that any shareholder who did not vote in favour of the amalgamation or merger "and who is not satisfied that he has been offered fair value for his shares" may apply to the court, within one month of the notice, to appraise the fair value of their shares.
The Company submitted that these words demonstrate that a company putting forward an amalgamation proposal is making an "offer" to its shareholders. The Company argued that an "offer" is made to shareholders entitled to receive the notice, being those on the register of members at the date of the notice of meeting (or any applicable record date), and therefore only those shareholders are entitled to apply for relief.
The Board held that:
The Company was seeking to place undue weight on the word "offered". No "offer" to shareholders is made in an amalgamation. There is no offer capable of acceptance or rejection and at no stage is a contract concluded between the amalgamating parties and their shareholders. An amalgamation is a statutory process and the rights of shareholders arise and are enforceable under statute.
The words "he has been offered fair value for his shares" in section 106(6) refer to the fair value of the consideration under the amalgamation proposal or to the fair value stated in the notice. It is therefore irrelevant to identify the group of shareholders to whom an "offer" is made.
There is nothing more generally in section 106 to suggest that the right to apply for a court appraisal is limited to those shareholders to whom notice is sent. The notice is a notice of meeting, not the communication of an offer. As previously noted by Justice Kawaley (in a commercial law publication in Bermuda) a dissenting shareholder is one who does not vote in favour of the amalgamation at the meeting convened by the notice.
That is the only means under the statutory provisions by which a shareholder can dissent. Therefore, it is the shareholders at the date of the meeting who have the right to be paid the "fair value".
The Company also submitted that the legislation of other countries from which the shareholder appraisal regime took its inspiration, particularly Canada, shows that the purpose of the regime was to protect shareholders as at the time when the proposal was made and not those who subsequently acquired shares.
In addition, the Company sought to rely on a decision of the New York Supreme Court (Application of Stern) where the Court held that those in the position of shareholders who had acquired stock after a plan for merger had been adopted and publicised did not enjoy appraisal r...
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1 month ago
9 minutes 38 seconds

Exploring Offshore Litigation
Secured creditors may proceed with confidence
In the recent English case of Waypark Commercial Mortgage Ltd v Vanguard Number 1 Ltd (In Liquidation), the Court had to consider whether the sale of property by a secured creditor of a company in liquidation was impacted by the automatic stay imposed by section 130(2) of the English Insolvency Act, 1986.
Section 130(2) of the Insolvency Act, 1986 provides that:
"When a winding-up order has been made or a provisional liquidator has been appointed, no action or proceeding shall be proceeded with or commenced against the company or its property, except by leave of the court and subject to such terms as the court may impose."
The Court determined that the statutory stay did not impact the sale of property subject to security by a secured creditor. In reaching its decision, the Court considered the definition of "action" and "proceedings" and whether a sale of a property by a secured creditor fell within the scope of these terms.
Neither term is defined in the Insolvency Act but in reliance on common law, the Court concluded that the term "action" referred to Court proceedings, and the word "proceedings" was limited to legal proceedings or quasi-legal proceedings such as arbitrations. It followed, therefore, that it is not necessary for leave to be obtained from the Court before a sale of property that is subject to security may proceed notwithstanding that the debtor company is in liquidation.
The Court's decision provides secured creditors and prospective purchasers of property subject to security assurance that the purchase is not subject to the automatic stay arising under the Insolvency Act. However, Waypark is of no assistance to an unsecured creditor that seeks to realise property of a company in liquidation.
The term "proceedings" had been interpreted to include execution and distress in other case authorities because those remedies are likely to have the effect of conferring an advantage on creditors who avail themselves of such remedy, thereby offending against the pari passu rule of distribution in a liquidation. Property that is subject to security will not normally form part of the general pot of assets available for distribution amongst unsecured creditors.
The ruling in Waypark serves as helpful guidance for liquidators, secured creditors and prospective purchasers of assets of companies subject to liquidation.
The ruling may be persuasive in the Cayman Islands and British Virgin Islands, both having statutory provisions equivalent to section 130(2) of the English Insolvency Act, namely section 97 of the Cayman Islands Companies Act 2025, and section 175(1)(c) of the BVI Insolvency Act 2003 (although note that under BVI law, a secured creditor is expressly empowered to enforce their security against the secured assets despite the appointment of liquidators to the company).
Please note that we do not practise the law of England & Wales.
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1 month ago
3 minutes 7 seconds

Exploring Offshore Litigation
Hitting the right note – ultimate beneficial owner noteholders given standing in English Court
The English High Court recently handed down judgment in Caxton International Ltd v Essity Aktiebolag (Publ), in which Mr Justice Fancourt held that the Claimants not being parties to the subject notes was no bar to seeking declaratory relief that an event of default had occurred under such notes.
The case involves Caxton International Limited and others' claim for declaratory relief against Essity Aktiebolag and Essity Capital BV (collectively Essity), the Defendants, who are the issuers of three series of euro-denominated bearer notes. The notes are held through clearing systems as legal owners and custodians as "noteholders". The Claimants are account holders with the custodians and ultimate beneficiaries of the notes.
Upon Essity's disposal of the entire stake in one of its subsidiaries known as Vinda International, some of the custodians served acceleration notices on Essity on the basis that such disposal constituted "cessation of a substantial part" of Essity's business and that an event of default under the notes has occurred. Essity disputed the occurrence of any event of default, and contended that only the clearing systems are entitled to serve acceleration notices as legal owners of the notes.
The High Court held that the Claimants, despite not being contractual counterparties to the notes, have a sufficient and legitimate interest to seek declaratory relief due to their equitable proprietary interest in the notes.
The Court acknowledged that the Claimants are the real creditors, as recognised in insolvency situations, and went on to find that the Claimants have a good arguable case that their interests are sufficiently affected by Essity's contested legal rights which justify the declaratory relief.
Essity also relied on Secure Capital SA v Credit Suisse AG to argue that allowing ultimate beneficial owners to seek declarations would disrupt the "no look through" structured chain of relationships that exists for such securities in the capital markets for good reason.
However, the Court did not accept that the Claimants were subverting the structure, as there is no contractual term precluding them from seeking a determination of rights under the notes. The Court distinguished Secure Capital, in which the claim was to enforce payment directly, from the declaratory relief being sought in Caxton.
In respect of the utility of the declaratory relief, the Court took the view that the Claimants clearly have a legitimate interest in having the matters in dispute determined, including the validity of the acceleration notices already served. The declaratory relief sought could serve a useful purpose by clarifying the rights under the otes.
The Court further noted that joining the custodians could enhance the effect of the declarations sought and reduce the possibility of further disputes, but the absence of such joinder may be justified for the purpose of saving unnecessary costs.
This English Court ruling has significant implications for both note issuers and investors. Whilst the claim in Caxton is still pending determination, the English Court has recognised ultimate beneficial owners' rights to seek declaratory relief even if they lack direct contractual rights under such notes.
Whilst notes issuers may face increased litigation risks, an avenue is opened for ultimate beneficial owners to bypass clearing systems and custodians to take legal action against note issuers directly in safeguarding their economic interests.
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1 month ago
3 minutes 39 seconds

Exploring Offshore Litigation
Grand Court's Helping Hand to Foreign Courts - Comity & International Legal Assistance
The Grand Court of the Cayman Islands has consistently favoured providing assistance to foreign courts to the fullest extent possible. This has again been demonstrated in the recent decision in Shen v Inspire Inc (No 2).
This case arises from the ongoing divorce proceedings between the plaintiff and the second defendant (i.e. the Wifeand the Husband) in the United States Superior Court of California.
A contentious issue in the divorce was the valuation of the Husband's share options in Inspire Inc (the Company), a company incorporated in the Cayman Islands. The Husband claimed these options are worth US$0, while the Wife contended they could be valued at over US$70 million if exercisable.
The Husband could not provide discovery of the relevant documents, as they were not in his possession, custody, or control. On such basis, the US court requested assistance from the Cayman Islands Grand Court to obtain discovery regarding these share options and related documents which would assist the valuation of such options.
The jurisdictional basis for the Cayman Islands court to give effect to a letter of request from a foreign court is provided for under the Evidence (Proceedings in Other Jurisdictions) (Cayman Islands) Order 1978. In deciding to grant the discovery order, the Grand Court outlined seven principles guiding the exercise of its discretion:
The court will ordinarily give effect to a letter of request from a foreign court so far as it is proper and practicable under local law. This reflects judicial and international comity and conforms with the spirit of the relevant international conventions.
The court must first decide whether it has jurisdiction and then whether it should exercise discretion to make or refuse the order.
The court should accept the foreign court's statement that the evidence is required for civil proceedings, but at the same time must objectively examine the request.
The court should exercise discretion to make the order unless satisfied that the application is frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.
The court has power to accept or reject the request in whole or in part, but should not attempt to restructure, recast or rephrase the request so that it becomes different in substance from the original request.
The issue of relevance falls to be determined by the foreign court controlling the proceedings for which assistance of the Grand Court is sought.
The foreign court should be afforded the fullest help possible.
Despite the Husband's opposition to the disclosure of some documents on the basis that such categories were too widely defined, the Grand Court refused to remove such categories in their entirety, as this would undermine the entire purpose of the letter of request.
Instead, the court only made slight modifications such as deleting ambiguous terms like "portfolio companies" and "affiliates" to avoid unnecessary burden on the Company. This was also to ensure that the nature of documents to be disclosed are sufficiently identified and distinguished from each other.
The court also ordered that the Company be reimbursed by the Wife for the costs incurred in complying with the order, whilst the Husband who had largely failed in challenging the order was directed to pay the costs of the application.
This decision is encouraging for parties involved in foreign proceedings, particularly for those seeking access to corporate information and records which are typically not publicly available. The Grand Court has again demonstrated its willingness to facilitate international judicial comity, providing a viable avenue for obtaining evidence necessary for the determination of complex cross-border disputes.
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1 month ago
4 minutes 7 seconds

Exploring Offshore Litigation
Cross-Border Insolvency and the Immovables Rule
This article examines how the 'immovables rule' intersects with the practice of modern cross-border insolvency under English common law.
The English conflict of laws position holds that rights to land are governed by the law and courts of the country where the land is located (the lex situs). However, in cross-border insolvency, the principle of modified universalism encourages English courts to assist foreign liquidation proceedings to achieve a unified asset distribution. The Supreme Court addressed the tension between these principles in Kireeva v Bedzhamov [2024] UKSC 39 ('Kireeva').
This article discusses certain aspects of English law for general informational purposes only. However, Harney Westwood & Riegels do not practise English law and the contents should not be construed as legal advice on English law.
Download the PDF to read the full article.
This article first appeared in Volume 22, Issue 4 of International Corporate Rescue and is reprinted with the permission of Chase Cambria Publishing - www.chasecambria.com
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1 month ago
1 minute 16 seconds

Exploring Offshore Litigation
The cost of non-compliance with BVI court orders
The Gerald Metals Group was awarded an unprecedented $2.5 million fine against its former joint venture partner China National Gold Group Hong Kong Limited (CNG) for its significant and persistent non-compliance with court orders in the BVI.
The underlying dispute (resolved in arbitration) involved a dispute between a Gerald Metals entity, Global Mining Development LP (Global) and CNG, the two shareholders of a BVI joint venture vehicle, Soremi Investments Ltd (SIL). Global exercised a right of first refusal under the terms of their shareholder's agreement (the SHA) to purchase CNG's shares in SIL.
In breach of the SHA, CNG refused to effect the transfer. Consequently, Global commenced arbitral proceedings in Hong Kong to enforce the SHA. By a first partial award (FPA), the tribunal found that Global was entitled to exercise the right of first refusal.
The tribunal ordered CNG to transfer its 65% shareholding in SIL to Global. Global was therefore the beneficial owner of 100% of the shares in SIL. CNG did not comply with the FPA.
Global & Gerald therefore sought and obtained an order for specific performance from the tribunal (SPA) which along with the FPA were recognised in the BVI as orders of the BVI courts. CNG applied unsuccessfully to set aside the recognition orders and Gerald's BVI counsel Harneys, vigorously pursued an enforcement strategy on their behalf.
CNG unlawfully stripped around USD200 million out of SIL's French bank accounts an transferred this significant sum of cash to accounts in China in breach of undertakings it had given Global. Global and Gerald applied to the BVI Commercial Court for, and were granted, both a freezing injunction against CNG's assets and a mandatory order requiring that the monies wrongly transferred to be repatriated to SIL's French bank account.
As a result of CNG's contumelious conduct, Gerald and Global sought to enforce CNG's delinquent behaviour through contempt proceedings. At the same time, Gerald and Global enforced the FPA and SPA through a rectification order because CNG refused to transfer the shares into the name of Global as required under the recognition orders and SPA.
A four-day omnibus hearing before Justice Mithani (Ag.) took place between 26 to 29 May 2025. Mithani J found in Global and Gerald's favour on every application and made damning findings of dishonesty by CNG and its subsidiary Soremi SA, as well as findings of collusive and deliberately obstructive conduct by CNG's employee Mr Cheng.
Mithani J's displeasure at CNG's defiance of BVI court orders and its devious conduct is reflected in the record fine he ordered against CNG in the sum of $2.5 million at a rate of $100,000 for every week of CNG's non-compliance. This is the highest fine for contempt levied against a party in BVI and English legal history. It is a reminder to litigants in the BVI that compliance is not just expected - it is mandatory.
Jonathan Addo (Partner), Natasha Guthrie (Counsel), Mark Wells (Senior Associate) and James Wilton (Associate) of Harneys represented the Claimants led by Peter De Verneuil Smith KC and Judy Fu of 3VB. Also assisted by Penny Madden KC and Sam Firmin of Gibson Dunn & Crutcher who represent Global in the HKIAC arbitration proceedings.
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1 month ago
4 minutes 8 seconds

Exploring Offshore Litigation
Up Energy U-turn: Hong Kong Court of Appeal sets aside winding up order against Bermuda company
Over the past decade, the Hong Kong courts have given multiple important judgments concerning their power to wind up foreign companies. In a recent judgment, the Court of Appeal provided important clarification regarding a key element of this power.
Background
The judgment arises from the long-running cross-border insolvency of Up Energy Development Group Ltd. The Company is a Bermuda-incorporated coal mining business previously listed in Hong Kong. From early 2016, it experienced financial distress. By mid-2016, this led to different creditors presenting winding up petitions in Hong Kong (its place of listing) and Bermuda (its place of incorporation).
The Company subsequently attempted a restructuring, which failed. It was then wound up by the Bermuda court in March 2022. Shortly afterwards, in May 2022, the Hong Kong court also ordered that the Company be wound up.
Grounds for Hong Kong winding up
The Hong Kong court's jurisdiction to wind up foreign companies is governed by well-established common law principles. A petitioner must satisfy the court that the case meets three jurisdictional thresholds, before the court will exercise its jurisdiction to wind up a foreign company:
1. Sufficient connection to Hong Kong;
2. Reasonable possibility that the winding up will have a "real" - as opposed to "theoretical" - benefit to the petitioner; and
3. Jurisdiction over person(s) involved in the distribution of the company's assets.
At first instance, the Hong Kong court held that all three thresholds were satisfied.
Of particular relevance, the Hong Kong court held that the second threshold was satisfied given that (within Hong Kong) the powers of a Hong Kong-appointed liquidator were more extensive than those of a Bermuda liquidator following recognition in Hong Kong.
The Hong Kong court held that this fact conferred a real - as opposed to a theoretical benefit - even in the absence of any evidence that these wider powers were in fact needed or likely to be used. In other words, the court held that the need under the second threshold for a real benefit was satisfied on the basis that the wider powers available to a Hong Kong liquidator were only potentially necessary or useful.
One creditor appealed to the Hong Kong Court of Appeal, arguing that benefits relied upon by the earlier Hong Kong judge under the second threshold were "either non-existent or theoretical rather than real."
Court of Appeal decision
In setting aside the winding-up order against the Company, the Court of Appeal held that while the second threshold test is low, the requirement was not satisfied because:
There was no prima facie evidence of valuable Hong Kong assets to benefit creditors in a local winding-up; and
The mere availability of the broader liquidator powers under Hong Kong law alone is insufficient: for the Court to accept only a theoretical or speculative advantage would render the second threshold redundant because it would be automatically satisfied in all cases.
With regard to decisions such as Re China Huiyuan, the Court clarified that petitioners must demonstrate a factual basis for a real possibility of some discernible benefit (eg targeted asset or claim investigations) in respect of the second threshold, not theoretical legal advantages.
Takeaways
This decision emphasises the important role Hong Kong's jurisdictional thresholds for winding up foreign companies play in cross-border insolvencies. Of course, the Hong Kong court will not wind up a foreign company where it has no legitimate interest to do so as that would be an exercise of exorbitant jurisdiction contrary to international comity.
In respect of the second threshold, it is important to note that while flexibility exists regarding the required benefits to the petitioner, assertions must be grounded in specific, plausible facts rather than purely theoretical or abstract legal advantages.
Harneys, while not advising on Hong Kong law, assists clients with offshore insolvency and res...
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2 months ago
5 minutes 4 seconds

Exploring Offshore Litigation
Jurisdictional issues in crypto currency disputes (Part 2): service on "persons unknown" and service by alternative means
To overcome these difficulties, victims may need to bring claims against "persons unknown" for the purpose of recovering the assets (or equivalent monetary value). In doing so, it may be necessary or helpful to take steps to reveal the identity of some or all of the above categories of people. As His Honour Judge Pelling KC put it (speaking extra-judicially):
"In a crypto fraud claim it is likely that crypto assets will have been moved multiple times ultimately to an exchange after removal from the claimant's wallet. This is usually for the purpose of enabling assets to be "cross chained" so as to render tracing more difficult or practically impossible or to facilitate the conversion of the defalcated crypto currency and its transfer in a way that makes tracing impossible or practically so.
It may be necessary therefore to bring proceedings against different classes of persons unknown in order to cater for these possibilities."[1]
This article considers the BVI and Cayman Islands courts' jurisdiction to order service against persons unknown in further detail.
The persons unknown jurisdiction: Cameron[2]revisited
The jurisdiction to sue persons unknown, by reference to a description that "is sufficiently certain as to identify both those who are included and those who are not," has been invoked by the English courts on numerous occasions, particularly within the context of abuses of the internet, trespassing and other torts committed by protesters, demonstrators and paparazzi; and, more recently, within the context of crypto fraud.
In Cameron, the UK Supreme Court distinguished between two kinds of cases in which defendants cannot be named and in respect of which different considerations apply:
The first category comprises anonymous defendants whose names are unknown but who are otherwise identifiable (for example, squatters, who are identifiable by their location at the relevant property).
The second category comprises anonymous defendants whose names are unknown and who cannot be identified either (for example, hit and run drivers, who have fled the scene and in respect of which there is no CCTV or other evidence available with which to identify them).
The distinction is that in the first category, the defendant is described in a way that it makes it possible in principle to locate or communicate with him or her and to know, without further enquiry, whether he or she is the same person described in the claim form; whereas, in the second category, that is not possible.
The appeal in Cameron was primarily concerned with the issue or amendment of the claim form on persons unknown, rather than the issue as to how a claim form may actually be served on them. However, the Supreme Court held in that case that the "legitimacy of issuing or amending a claim form so as to sue an unnamed defendant can properly be tested by asking whether it is conceptually (not just practically) possible to serve it. The court generally acts in personam.
Although an action is completely constituted on the issue of the claim form, for example for the purpose of stopping the running of the limitation period, the general rule is that "service of the originating process is the act by which the defendant is subjected to the court's jurisdiction."[3]
The court then went on to hold that an identifiable but anonymous defendant (i.e. the first category of defendant set out above) could be served, if necessary by alternative service, on the basis that it is possible to locate or communicate with him.
For example, in proceedings against anonymous trespassers, the Court held that service is to be effected under English procedural rules by attaching copies of the documents to the main door or placing them in some other prominent place at the property in question.
That is not, however the case with unidentifiable defendants (i.e. the second category of defendant set out above):
"One does not, however, identify an unknown person simply by referring to something tha...
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2 months ago
18 minutes 52 seconds

Exploring Offshore Litigation
Hitting the right note – ultimate beneficial owner noteholders given standing in English Court
The English High Court recently handed down judgment in Caxton International Ltd v Essity Aktiebolag (Publ), in which Mr Justice Fancourt held that the Claimants not being parties to the subject notes was no bar to seeking declaratory relief that an event of default had occurred under such notes.
The case involves Caxton International Limited and others' claim for declaratory relief against Essity Aktiebolag and Essity Capital BV (collectively Essity), the Defendants, who are the issuers of three series of euro-denominated bearer notes. The notes are held through clearing systems as legal owners and custodians as "noteholders". The Claimants are account holders with the custodians and ultimate beneficiaries of the notes.
Upon Essity's disposal of the entire stake in one of its subsidiaries known as Vinda International, some of the custodians served acceleration notices on Essity on the basis that such disposal constituted "cessation of a substantial part" of Essity's business and that an event of default under the notes has occurred. Essity disputed the occurrence of any event of default, and contended that only the clearing systems are entitled to serve acceleration notices as legal owners of the notes.
The High Court held that the Claimants, despite not being contractual counterparties to the notes, have a sufficient and legitimate interest to seek declaratory relief due to their equitable proprietary interest in the notes.
The Court acknowledged that the Claimants are the real creditors, as recognised in insolvency situations, and went on to find that the Claimants have a good arguable case that their interests are sufficiently affected by Essity's contested legal rights which justify the declaratory relief.
Essity also relied on Secure Capital SA v Credit Suisse AG to argue that allowing ultimate beneficial owners to seek declarations would disrupt the "no look through" structured chain of relationships that exists for such securities in the capital markets for good reason.
However, the Court did not accept that the Claimants were subverting the structure, as there is no contractual term precluding them from seeking a determination of rights under the notes. The Court distinguished Secure Capital, in which the claim was to enforce payment directly, from the declaratory relief being sought in Caxton.
In respect of the utility of the declaratory relief, the Court took the view that the Claimants clearly have a legitimate interest in having the matters in dispute determined, including the validity of the acceleration notices already served. The declaratory relief sought could serve a useful purpose by clarifying the rights under the otes.
The Court further noted that joining the custodians could enhance the effect of the declarations sought and reduce the possibility of further disputes, but the absence of such joinder may be justified for the purpose of saving unnecessary costs.
This English Court ruling has significant implications for both note issuers and investors. Whilst the claim in Caxton is still pending determination, the English Court has recognised ultimate beneficial owners' rights to seek declaratory relief even if they lack direct contractual rights under such notes.
Whilst notes issuers may face increased litigation risks, an avenue is opened for ultimate beneficial owners to bypass clearing systems and custodians to take legal action against note issuers directly in safeguarding their economic interests.
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2 months ago
3 minutes 49 seconds

Exploring Offshore Litigation
From insolvency to innovation: The BVI leads the conversation
Over the past couple of weeks, key players in the financial services world converged on the shores of the British Virgin Islands for two globally significant conferences: INSOL BVI Seminar and Fintech on the Seas (FOTS). The BVI relished its opportunity to play host, showcasing the sophistication of its financial services sector and legal market to an elite global audience.
These events were a fantastic reminder of the relevance of this jurisdiction to the global legal industry. Delegates from all over the world, including the UK, Europe, the US, Asia, and the Caribbean, descended on the BVI, making it the heart of international discussion on pressing topics such as insolvency, fintech innovation, regulatory developments, and disputes.
INSOL BVI Seminar
Hosted on Peter Island, INSOL BVI delivered compelling discussions on insolvency and restructuring in an offshore context, with insights tailored to real-world challenges. Topics ranged from director liabilities in a globalised business world to redefining practices with innovative solutions. Attendees and speakers alike included some of the brightest legal and financial minds, creating an unparalleled forum for collaboration.
Fintech on the Seas
Fintech on the Seas solidified the BVI's position as a hub for fintech innovation. It demonstrated the deep knowledge of its professionals (and those from other jurisdictions that work in close collaboration with the BVI) in advising and assisting Fintech businesses and highlighted the flexibility and adaptability of both its regulatory framework and the approach of its courts.
For Harneys, it was a particularly active conference. Eight of our lawyers, representing BVI, Cayman, and Europe, attended and participated in multiple key panel discussions across both days. Their contributions highlighted Harneys' expertise in navigating complex legal landscapes in the fintech industry. Notable presentations included:
Ayana Hull shared insights on the BVI Advantage in the Global Virtual Assets Space and addressed AML & International Considerations for VASPs (Virtual Asset Service Providers).
James Kitching explored the Regulatory Implications of Token Issuance.
David Mathews provided a forward-looking perspective on Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs).
Christopher Pease offered practical advice on mitigating risks and how professional experts and the court system can step in to assist when needed. He was able to draw from his first-hand experience in liquidating a DAO through a court-appointed receivership process (a first of its kind).
Aki Corsoni-Husain added to the robust discussions with a Fireside Chat on global regulatory frameworks.
Adding a little levity to the intellectually charged discussions, resident Necker Island lemurs paid surprise visits to the panels, proving that innovation isn't the only thing thriving in the BVI.
Showcasing expertise and innovation
For the BVI, hosting such high-profile conferences reflects the territory's global significance in financial services and its ability to convene some of the brightest minds in law, technology, and business.
Pervading both conferences was the theme of innovation and adapting to the ever-changing challenges faced by our clients. As a jurisdiction, BVI has proven its resilience and ability to be at the forefront of change in global finance and legal services.
The conferences were a huge success. Harneys celebrates and is grateful for the efforts of all of the organisers and the engagement and keen participation of delegates.
For Harneys, contributing to these conferences reinforces our mission of delivering superior service and innovative legal solutions. We excel at using our expertise to guide clients through the complexities of global financial markets and new technologies.
Interested in how Harneys can help your business stay ahead of the innovation curve? Get in touch today.
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2 months ago
4 minutes 24 seconds

Exploring Offshore Litigation
Mitigate or litigate? Binance's bold Defence against BSV claims upheld on appeal
The appeal focused on "sub-class B" - around 75,000 individuals who held BSV on 11 April 2019 and continued to do so when proceedings began in July 2022. The claim sought damages quantified by reference to a supposed "foregone growth effect". This theory posited that the Respondents' alleged wrongdoing had prevented BSV from becoming a top-tier cryptocurrency like Bitcoin, in which scenario its value would have massively increased.
The Applicant claimed that sub-class B holders were entitled to damages due to the Respondents' preventing BSV from becoming a major cryptocurrency (and the associated increase in its value). Alternatively, the Applicant claimed that the Respondents' actions had caused sub-class B to lose the chance of BSV becoming a major cryptocurrency. The total quantum claim for sub-class B was a staggering £8.99 billion - over 350 times the original value of their holdings.
The Applicant's appeal concerned the first instance findings of the Competition Appeal Tribunal, which ruled that the Applicant's loss was subject to the "market mitigation rule". This rule states that a claimant seeking damages for lost or damaged goods should ordinarily mitigate its loss by buying or selling substitute goods, where there is an available market.
Where the rule applies, recoverable losses will generally be limited to the difference between the value of the original goods and the value of the substitute goods.
In this case, the Court of Appeal confirmed that the market mitigation rule applied.
Since BSV remained tradeable and comparable cryptocurrencies were available on the open market, sub-class B holders who knew of the delisting could have sold their coins and reinvested in substitute crypto assets, thereby crystallising their losses. Their failure to do so meant they could only claim the immediate loss of BSV's value caused by the Respondents' alleged wrongdoing - not speculative future gains.
The Court of Appeal also rejected the Applicant's 'loss of a chance' argument for similar reasons. The Court ruled that this principle was inapplicable on the facts. It was also disapplied by the market mitigation rule, which required that sub-class B ought to have crystallised, and thereby mitigated, their loss by selling their BSV holdings upon becoming aware of the Respondents' alleged breach (which they failed to do).
This judgment is helpful for all crypto investors. In confirming the applicability of principles of mitigation to quantum in the crypto context, the Court of Appeal has limited the scope for claims seeking exaggerated damages based on hypothetical market outcomes. The judgment confirms that traditional common law rules are entirely applicable to disputes involving digital assets and sets a precedent for how courts may treat speculative claims in the volatile world of cryptocurrencies.
Although Harneys does not advise on the laws of England & Wales, this judgment is likely to be of strong persuasive value in the courts of our jurisdictions when adjudicating crypto-related disputes.
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2 months ago
3 minutes 44 seconds

Exploring Offshore Litigation
Exploring Offshore Litigation is a captivating podcast series containing audio of written blog content that dives deep into the intriguing world of offshore litigation, including the BVI and Cayman. Each episode sails through complex legal waters, bringing you up-to-date analysis of recent high-stakes cases and expert commentary from the leading minds in this specialised field. Our episodes demystify legal jargon and break down complex cases to make them accessible to all. Harneys, an international law firm with entrepreneurial thinking, brings each episode to you.