Back to basics baby. We're doing a couple introductory episodes on Popper's philosophy of science, following Chapter 10 of Conjectures and Refutations. We start with Popper's theory of content: what makes a good scientific theory? Can we judge some theories as better than others before we even run any empirical tests? Should we be looking for theories with high probability?
Ben and Vaden also return to their roots in another way, and get into a nice little fight about how content relates to Bayesianism.
My aim in this lecture is to stress the significance of one particular aspect of science—its need to grow, or, if you like, its need to progress. I do not have in mind here the practical or social significance of this need. What I wish to discuss is rather its intellectual significance. I assert that continued growth is essential to the rational and empirical character of scientific knowledge; that if science ceases to grow it must lose that character. It is the way of its growth which makes science rational and empirical; the way, that is, in which scientists discriminate between available theories and choose the better one or (in the absence of a satisfactory theory) the way they give reasons for rejecting all the available theories, thereby suggesting some of the conditions with which a satisfactory theory should comply.
You will have noticed from this formulation that it is not the accumulation of observations which I have in mind when I speak of the growth of scientific knowledge, but the repeated overthrow of scien- tific theories and their replacement by better or more satisfactory ones. This, incidentally, is a procedure which might be found worthy of attention even by those who see the most important aspect of the growth of scientific knowledge in new experiments and in new observations.
- C&R p. 291
Thus it is my first thesis that we can know of a theory, even before it has been tested, that if it passes certain tests it will be better than some other theory.
My first thesis implies that we have a criterion of relative potential satisfactoriness, or of potential progressiveness, which can be applied to a theory even before we know whether or not it will turn out, by the passing of some crucial tests, to be satisfactory in fact.
This criterion of relative potential satisfactoriness (which I formu- lated some time ago,2 and which, incidentally, allows us to grade the- ories according to their degree of relative potential satisfactoriness) is extremely simple and intuitive. It characterizes as preferable the theory which tells us more; that is to say, the theory which contains the greater amount of empirical information or content; which is logically stronger; which has the greater explanatory and predictive power; and which can therefore be more severely tested by comparing predicted facts with observations. In short, we prefer an interesting, daring, and highly informative theory to a trivial one.
- C&R p.294
Let a be the statement ‘It will rain on Friday’; b the statement ‘It willbe fine on Saturday’; and ab the statement ‘It will rain on Friday and itwill be fine on Saturday’: it is then obvious that the informative contentof this last statement, the conjunction ab, will exceed that of its com-ponent a and also that of its component b. And it will also be obviousthat the probability of ab (or, what is the same, the probability that abwill be true) will be smaller than that of either of its components.
Writing Ct(a) for ‘the content of the statement a’, and Ct(ab) for ‘thecontent of the conjunction a and b’, we have
(1) Ct(a) <= Ct(ab) >= Ct(b).This contrasts with the corresponding law of the calculus of probability,
(2) p(a) >= p(ab) <= p(b),
where the inequality signs of (1) are inverted. Together these two laws, (1) and (2), state that with increasing content, probability decreases, and vice versa; or in other words, that content increases with increasing improbability. (This analysis is of course in full agreement with the general idea of the logical content of a statement as the class of all those statements which are logically entailed by it. We may also say that a statement a is logically stronger than a statement b if its content is greater than that of b—that is to say, if it entails more than b does.)
This trivial fact has the following inescapable consequences: if growth of knowledge means that we operate with theories of increasing content, it must also mean that we operate with theories of decreasing probability (in the sense of the calculus of probability). Thus if our aim is the advancement or growth of knowledge, then a high probability (in the sense of the calculus of probability) cannot possibly be our aim as well: these two aims are incompatible.
- C&R p.295
How much content does the theory "dish soap is the ultimate face cleanser" have? Send your order of infinity over to incrementspodcast@gmail.com
We're joined by Jonathan Rauch to discuss what it means to be a radical incrementalist, how to foment revolution on geological timescales, and whether Christianity can be a force for good in politics. Can Jon convince angry-Hitchens-atheist Vaden that Christianity has some benefits? Will both Vaden and Ben be at Sunday prayer?
Follow Jonathan on his website, at Brookings, at The Atlantic or on Bluesky.
Jonathan Rauch is the author of nine books, not eight!
Anyone in Canada have a basement suite Jonathan could rent for a while? Send your address over to incrementspodcast@gmail.com
Special Guest: Jonathan Rauch.
Professor of electrical engineering and computer science Ben Recht joins us to defend Bayesianism, AI doom, and assure us that the statisticians have everything under control.
Just kidding. Recht might be even more suspicious of these things than we are. What has statistics ever done for us, really? When was the last time YOU ran a clinical trial after all, huh? HUH? After Ben Chugg defends his life decision to do a PhD in statistics, we talk AI, cults, philosophy, Paul Meehl, and discuss Ben Recht's forthcoming book, The Irrational Decision.
Check out Ben's blog, website, and his story about machine learning.
The z-score for the Pfizer trial was 20, not 12!
What's Berkeley's next cult? Send your guess over to incrementspodcast@gmail.com
Special Guest: Ben Recht.
Always the uncool kids at the table, Ben and Vaden push back against the AGI hype domininating every second episode of every second podcast. We react to "We're not ready for superintelligence" by 80,000 Hours - a bleak portrayal of the pre and post AGI world. Can Ben keep Vaden's sass in check? Can the 80,000 hours team find enough cubes for AGI? Is Agent-5 listening to you RIGHT NOW?
We strongly recommend watching the video for this one, available both on youtube and spotify:
- https://www.youtube.com/@incrementspod
- https://open.spotify.com/show/1gKKSP5HKT4Nk3i0y4UseB
But how many cubes until we get to AGI though? Send a few of your cubes over to incrementspodcast@gmail.com
Episode header image from here.
Phlogiston? Elan Vital? Caloric? Mention of any of these at a party, and Neil DeGrasse Tyson will be sure to take you out back and kick you in your essences. So why do "essences" have no place in science? In this episode we explore that question (and dive into some of the history behind this debate) by reading Chapter 6 of Conjectures and Refutations: A Note On Berkeley As Precursor Of Mach And Einstein.
In one corner, we have the estimable Sir Isaac Newton and Roger Coates (and of course Andre the Giant, upon whose shoulders they are standing), and in the other, we have Bishop Berkeley and Ernst Mach, looking to throw down at the speed of sound. Berkeley can't get Newton and his forces out of his head (literally), and boy oh boy is the fight ever on.
Everybody who reads this list of twenty-one theses must be struck by their modernity. They are surprisingly similar, especially in the criticism of Newton, to the philosophy of physics which Ernst Mach taught for many years in the conviction that it was new and revolutionary; in which he was followed by, for example, Joseph Petzold; and which had an immense influence on modern physics, especially on the Theory of Relativity.
- Popper, C&R Chapter 6
(20) A general practical result—which I propose to call ‘Berkeley’s razor’—of this analysis of physics allows us a-priori to eliminate from physical science all essentialist explanations. If they have a mathematical and a predictive content they may be admitted qua mathematical hypotheses (while their essentialist interpretation is eliminated). If not, they may be ruled out altogether. This razor is sharper than Ockham’s: all entities are ruled out except those which are perceived.
- Popper, C&R Chapter 6
No attempt was made to show how or why the forces acted, but gravitation being taken as due to a mere "force", speculators thought themselves at liberty to imagine any number of forces, attractive or repulsive, or alternating, varying as the distance,[4] or the square, cube, or higher power of the distance, etc. At last, Ruđer Bošković[5] got rid of atoms altogether, by supposing them to be the mere centre of forces exerted by a position or point only, where nothing existed but the power of exerting a force.[6]
Mach's antipathy to theorizing and to the invocation of "metaphysical" and therefore unprovable notions led him to some extreme opinions. In The Conservation of Energy he remarks: "We say now that water consists of hydrogen and oxygen, but this hydrogen and oxygen are merely thoughts or names which, at the sight of water, we keep ready to describe phenomena which are not present but which will appear again whenever, as we say, we decompose water.
- David Lindley, Boltzmann's Atom
In Mach's world, there was to be no such thing as "explaining" in the way scientists had always understood it. Mach even went so far as to argue that the traditional notion of cause and effect-that kicking a rock makes it move, that heating a gas makes it expand —was presumptuous and therefore to be denied scientific status.
- David Lindley, Boltzmann's Atom
But it was not always so. Well into the latter half of the 19th century, most scientists saw their essential task as the measurement and codification of phenomena they could investigate directly: the passage of sound waves through air, the expansion of gas when heated, the conversion of heat to motive power in a steam engine. A scientific law was a quantitative relationship between one observable phenomenon and another.
- David Lindley, Boltzmann's Atom
Do you have any fluids you'd like us to ponder? Send a sample over to incrementspodcast@gmail.com
This week we take a break from our regularly scheduled programming to listen to Ben, Rich, and Cam loutishly pontificate on one of the oldest poems in history. That's right, three fiction noobs take on Homer. Ladies, have you ever wondered what your fella is doing when you're out for the evening? Look no further.
The podcast you're listening to is Do You Even Lit? which you can find on any podcast platform and on youtube. The hosts are Richard Meadows, Cam Peters, and some third guy.
Back to increments in a couple weeks! In the meantime:
Should we switch out Vaden for Rich and Cam? Tell us at incrementspodcast@gmail.com.
Special Guest: Richard Meadows.
Ben and Vaden test their French skills and have Hugo Mercier on the podcast to discuss who we trust and what we believe. Are humans gullible? Do we fall for propaganda and advertising campaigns? Do we follow expert consensus or forge ahead as independent thinkers? Can Vaden go for one episode without bringing up Trump?
Hugo Mercier is a research director at the CNRS (Institut Jean Nicod, Paris), where he work with the Evolution and Social Cognition team. Check out his two books: The Enigma of Reason and Not Born Yesterday .
How much system 2 thinking does it take to misunderstand system 1 vs system 2? Tell us at incrementspodcast@gmail.com
Special Guest: Hugo Mercier.
Please donate here: https://www.gofundme.com/f/help-dr-alaa-alnajjar-and-her-family-in-gaza
https://www.thesun.ie/news/15281868/sligo-doctor-ali-al-najjar-nieces-nephew-killed-gaza/
https://www.thejournal.ie/brother-woman-nine-kids-gaza-6717437-May2025/
https://amp.rte.ie/amp/1515399/
https://www.oceanfm.ie/northwest-today-show/fundraiser-launched-after-sligo-doctors-9-nieces-and-nephews-killed-in-gaza-attack-504443
https://www.oceanfm.ie/news/dail-hears-of-devastation-caused-to-sligo-doctors-family-in-gaza-503064
https://m.independent.ie/regionals/sligo/news/sligo-doctors-nine-nephews-and-nieces-killed-in-devastating-gaza-attack/a121298480.html
Back with part two of our reaction to What's the most rational way to know?, a discussion between Brett Hall and Peter Boghossian on the relationship between confidence and evidence. Listen to part 1 first, availble here: https://www.incrementspodcast.com/85
It seems weird to try to be funny in this blurb, given the introduction, so going to keep the description lean. Back with our usual lighthearted nonsense next episode!
Check out more from Brett Hall here and Peter Boghossian here.
Please donate to: https://www.gofundme.com/f/help-dr-alaa-alnajjar-and-her-family-in-gaza
We all knew that Vaden would release his inner Youtube debate bro at some point. Well he finally paid Ben enough to do it, and here we are: our first reaction video. Today we're commenting on the video What's the most rational way to know?, a discussion between Brett Hall and Peter Boghossian on the relationship between confidence and evidence. Are we overly confident in our ability to make reaction videos? Evidently.
Check out more from Brett Hall here and Peter Boghossian here.
Where were you last night, and why do you have condoms in your pocket? Tell us at incrementspodcast@gmail.com.
Some thoughts (arguments?) on Hugo Mercier's Not Born Yesterday, which advances the thesis that humans are not as gullible as is commonly thought. This is our second episode on Mercier's work, and we're as intrigued as ever. But this time we have different interpretations of his thesis, so it's a good thing the man himself is coming on soon to sort us out.
Did you know that "gullible" isn't in the dictionary? Tell us at incrementspodcast@gmail.com.
Round two on the anxious generation. Well, honestly, round three. But we had a false start with round two, which is why this episode is a little late in coming. If you want to hear the gory, data-heavy details of our second attempt, you can access the episode by becoming a patron (was there ever a better sell?).
Here is a story. In 2007, Apple released the iPhone, initiating the smartphone revolution that would quickly transform the world. In 2010, it added a front-facing camera, helping shift the social-media landscape toward images, especially selfies. Partly as a result, in the five years that followed, the nature of childhood and especially adolescence was fundamentally changed — a “great rewiring,” in the words of the social psychologist Jonathan Haidt — such that between 2010 and 2015 mental health and well-being plummeted and suffering and despair exploded, particularly among teenage girls.
For young women, rates of hospitalization for nonfatal self-harm in the United States, which had bottomed out in 2009, started to rise again, according to data reported to the C.D.C., taking a leap beginning in 2012 and another beginning in 2016, and producing, over about a decade, an alarming 48 percent increase in such emergency room visits among American girls ages 15 to 19 and a shocking 188 percent increase among girls ages 10 to14.
Here is another story. In 2011, as part of the rollout of the Affordable Care Act, the Department of Health and Human Services issued a new set of guidelines that recommended that teenage girls should be screened annually for depression by their primary care physicians and that same year required that insurance providers cover such screenings in full. In 2015, H.H.S. finally mandated a coding change, proposed by the World Health Organization almost two decades before, that required hospitals to record whether an injury was self-inflicted or accidental — and which seemingly overnight nearly doubled rates for self-harm across all demographic groups. Soon thereafter, the coding of suicidal ideation was also updated.
- David Wallace Wells, https://www.nytimes.com/2024/05/01/opinion/smartphones-social-media-mental-health-teens.html
Studies confirm that as adolescents moved their social lives online, the nature of bullying began to change. One systematic review of studies from 1998 to 2017 found a decrease in face-to-face bullying among boys but an increase among girls, especially among younger adolescent girls.[47] ... According to one major U.S. survey, these high rates of cyberbullying have persisted (though have not increased) between 2011 and 2019. Throughout the period, approximately one in 10 high school boys and one in five high school girls experienced cyberbullying each year.[49] In other words, the move online made bullying and harassment a larger part of daily life for girls.
\
- Haidt, The Anxious Generation p. 170
Anyone you want to cyberbully into body dismorphia? Tell us who to send photos of our hot bods to over at incrementspodcast@gmail.com.
Anxiety, dispair, loneliness, depression -- all we need is a social media recession! A popular thesis is that All The Bad Things things are on the rise among adolescents because of social media, a view popularized in Jon Haidt's 2024 book The Anxious Generation. Haidt is calling for an end of the "phone-based childhood" and hoping that schools banish all screens for the benefit of its students.
But is it true than social media is causing this mental health crisis? Is it true that there even is a mental health crisis? We do a deep dive into Haidt's book to discuss the evidence.
No screen time for a month. If you send an email to incrementspodcast@gmail.com, we're taking away your iPad.
Image credit: Is social media causing psychological harm to youth and young adults?.
As whores for criticism, we wanted to have Kasra on to discuss his essay The Deutschian Deadend. Kasra claims that Popper and Deutsch are fundamentally wrong in some important ways, and that many of their ideas will forever remain in the "footnotes of the history of philosophy". Does he change our mind or do we change his?
Follow Kasra on twitter and subscribe to his blog, Bits of Wonder.
By the nature of Deutsch and Popper’s ideas being abstract, this essay will also necessarily be abstract. To combat this, let me ground the whole essay in a concrete empirical bet: Popper’s ideas about epistemology, and David Deutsch’s extensions of them, will forever remain in the footnotes of the history of philosophy. Popper’s falsificationism, which was the main idea that he’s widely known for today, will continue to remain the only thing that he’s widely known for. The frustrating fact that Wittgenstein is widely regarded as a more influential philosopher than Popper will continue to remain true. Critical rationalism will never be widely recognized as the “one correct epistemology,” as the actual explanation (or even the precursor to an explanation) of knowledge, progress, and creativity. Instead it will be viewed, like many philosophical schools before it, as a useful and ambitious project that ultimately failed. In other words, critical rationalism is a kind of philosophical deadend: the Deutschian deadend.
- Kasra in the Deutschian DeadendThere are many things you can directly observe, and which are “manifestly true” to you: what you’re wearing at the moment, which room of your house you’re in, whether the sun has set yet, whether you are running out of breath, whether your parents are alive, whether you feel a piercing pain in your back, whether you feel warmth in your palms—and so on and so forth. These are not perfectly certain absolute truths about reality, and there’s always more to know about them—but it is silly to claim that we have absolutely no claim on their truth either. I also think there are even such “obvious truths” in the realm of science—like the claim that the earth is not flat, that your body is made of cells, and that everyday objects follow predictable laws of motion.
- Kasra in the Deutschian Deadend
Deutsch writes:
Some philosophical arguments, including the argument against solipsism, are far more compelling than any scientific argument. Indeed, every scientific argument assumes the falsity not only of solipsism, but also of other philosophical theories including any number of variants of solipsism that might contradict specific parts of the scientific argument.
There are two different mistakes happening here.
First, what Deutsch is doing is assuming a strict logical dependency between any one piece of our knowledge and every other piece of it. He says that our knowledge of science (say, of astrophysics) implicitly relies on other philosophical arguments about solipsism, epistemology, and metaphysics. But anyone who has thought about the difference between philosophy and science recognizes that in practice they can be studied and argued about independently. We can make progress on our understanding of celestial mechanics without making any crucial assumption about metaphysics. We can make progress studying neurons without solving the hard problem of consciousness or the question of free will.- Kasra in the Deutschian Deadend, quoting Deutsch on Solipsism
At that time I learnt from Popper that it was not scientifically disgraceful to have one's hypothesis falsified. That was the best news I had had for a long time. I was persuaded by Popper, in fact, to formulate my electrical hypotheses of excitatory and inhibitory synaptic transmission so precisely and rigorously that they invited falsification - and, in fact, that is what happened to them a few years later, very largely by my colleagues and myself, when in 1951 we started to do intra- cellular recording from motoneurones. Thanks to my tutelage by Popper, I was able to accept joyfully this death of the brain-child which I had nurtured for nearly two decades and was immediately able to contribute as much as I could to the chemical transmission story which was the Dale and Loewi brain-child.
- John C. Eccles on Popper, All Life is Problem Solving, p.12
In order to state the problem more clearly, I should like to reformulate it as follows.
We may distinguish here between three types of theory.
First, logical and mathematical theories.
Second, empirical and scientific theories.
Third, philosophical or metaphysical theories.-Popper on the "hierarchy of reliability", C&R p.266
Are you a solipsist? If so, send yourself an email over to incrementspodcast@gmail.com.
Special Guest: Kasra.
Immanuel Kant was popular at his death. The whole town emptied out to see him. His last words were "it is good". But was his philosophy any good? In order to find out, we dive into Chapter 7 of Conjectures and Refutations: Kant’s Critique and Cosmology, where Popper rescues Kant's reputation from the clutches of the dastardly German Idealists.
Enlightenment is man's emergence from his self-imposed immaturity. Immaturity is the inability to use one's understanding without guidance from another. This immaturity is self-imposed when its cause lies not in lack of understanding, but in lack of resolve and courage to use it without guidance from another. Sapere Aude! "Have courage to use your own understanding!" --that is the motto of enlightenment.
- An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment? (Translated by Ted Humphrey, Hackett Publishing, 1992)
(Alternate translation from Popper: Enlightenment is the emancipation of man from a state of self-imposed tutelage . . . of incapacity to use his own intelligence without external guidance. Such a state of tutelage I call ‘self-imposed’ if it is due, not to lack of intelligence, but to lack of courage or determination to use one’s own intelligence without the help of a leader. Sapere aude! Dare to use your own intelligence! This is the battle-cry of the Enlightenment.)
- C&R, Chap 6
What lesson did Kant draw from these bewildering antinomies? He concluded that our ideas of space and time are inapplicable to the universe as a whole. We can, of course, apply the ideas of space and time to ordinary physical things and physical events. But space and time themselves are neither things nor events: they cannot even be observed: they are more elusive. They are a kind of framework for things and events: something like a system of pigeon-holes, or a filing system, for observations. Space and time are not part of the real empir- ical world of things and events, but rather part of our mental outfit, our apparatus for grasping this world. Their proper use is as instruments of observation: in observing any event we locate it, as a rule, immediately and intuitively in an order of space and time. Thus space and time may be described as a frame of reference which is not based upon experience but intuitively used in experience, and properly applicable to experience. This is why we get into trouble if we misapply the ideas of space and time by using them in a field which transcends all possible experience—as we did in our two proofs about the universe as a whole.
...
To the view which I have just outlined Kant chose to give the ugly and doubly misleading name ‘Transcendental Idealism’. He soon regretted this choice, for it made people believe that he was an idealist in the sense of denying the reality of physical things: that he declared physical things to be mere ideas. Kant hastened to explain that he had only denied that space and time are empirical and real — empirical and real in the sense in which physical things and events are empirical and real. But in vain did he protest. His difficult style sealed his fate: he was to be revered as the father of German Idealism. I suggest that it is time to put this right.
- C&R, Chap 6Kant believed in the Enlightenment. He was its last great defender. I realize that this is not the usual view. While I see Kant as the defender of the Enlightenment, he is more often taken as the founder of the school which destroyed it—of the Romantic School of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. I contend that these two interpretations are incompatible.
Fichte, and later Hegel, tried to appropriate Kant as the founder of their school. But Kant lived long enough to reject the persistent advances of Fichte, who proclaimed himself Kant’s successor and heir. In A Public Declaration Concerning Fichte, which is too little known, Kant wrote: ‘May God protect us from our friends. . . . For there are fraudulent and perfidious so-called friends who are scheming for our ruin while speaking the language of good-will.’
- C&R, Chap 6As Kant puts it, Copernicus, finding that no progress was being made with the theory of the revolving heavens, broke the deadlock by turning the tables, as it were: he assumed that it is not the heavens which revolve while we the observers stand still, but that we the observers revolve while the heavens stand still. In a similar way, Kant says, the problem of scientific knowledge is to be solved — the problem how an exact science, such as Newtonian theory, is possible, and how it could ever have been found. We must give up the view that we are passive observers, waiting for nature to impress its regularity upon us. Instead we must adopt the view that in digesting our sense-data we actively impress the order and the laws of our intellect upon them. Our cosmos bears the imprint of our minds.
- C&R, Chap 6From Kant the cosmologist, the philosopher of knowledge and of science, I now turn to Kant the moralist. I do not know whether it has been noticed before that the fundamental idea of Kant’s ethics amounts to another Copernican Revolution, analogous in every respect to the one I have described. For Kant makes man the lawgiver of morality just as he makes him the lawgiver of nature. And in doing so he gives back to man his central place both in his moral and in his physical universe. Kant humanized ethics, as he had humanized science.
...
Kant’s Copernican Revolution in the field of ethics is contained in his doctrine of autonomy—the doctrine that we cannot accept the command of an authority, however exalted, as the ultimate basis of ethics. For whenever we are faced with a command by an authority, it is our responsibility to judge whether this command is moral or immoral. The authority may have power to enforce its commands, and we may be powerless to resist. But unless we are physically prevented from choosing the responsibility remains ours. It is our decision whether to obey a command, whether to accept authority.
- C&R, Chap 6Stepping back further to get a still more distant view of Kant’s historical role, we may compare him with Socrates. Both were accused of perverting the state religion, and of corrupting the minds of the young. Both denied the charge; and both stood up for freedom of thought. Freedom meant more to them than absence of constraint; it was for both a way of life.
...
To this Socratic idea of self-sufficiency, which forms part of our western heritage, Kant has given a new meaning in the fields of both knowledge and morals. And he has added to it further the idea of a community of free men—of all men. For he has shown that every man is free; not because he is born free, but because he is born with the burden of responsibility for free decision.- C&R, Chap 6
Follow the Kantian Imperative: Stop masturbating and/or/while getting your hair cut, and start sending emails over to incrementspodcast@gmail.com.
Hope everyone is having a great holiday! Today we're releasing a short lil' bonus episode from the patreon archives before we get back into the serious and professional business of podcasting in the new year. A few months ago, Vaden appeared on the forthcoming Treacherous Jezebels podcast, to discuss the life of Unity Valkyrie Freeman-Mitford, the most treacherous of jezebels. Her biography is... shall we say... quite something. Even Hitler had to get his rocks off every once and a while.
(Links to Treacherous Jezebels podcast will be added when their website is up!)
So did she bang Hitler... or didn't she? Email us the raw facts at incrementspodcast@gmail.com.
Where do you arrive if you follow Vaden's obsessions to their terminus? You arrive at Brian Boyd, the world expert on the two titanic thinkers of the 20th century: Karl Popper and Vladimir Nabokov.
Boyd wrote his PhD thesis on Nabokov's 1969 novel Ada, impressing Nabokov's wife Vera so much that he was invited to catalogue Nabokov's unpublished archives. This led to Boyd's two-volume biography of Nabokov, which Vera kept on her beside table. Boyd also developed an interest in Popper, and began research for his biography in 1996, which was then promptly delayed as he worked on his book, On The Origin of Stories, which we [dedicated episode #50]((https://www.incrementspodcast.com/50) to.
In this episode, we ask Professor Boyd to contrast and compare his two subjects, by addressing the question: What could Karl Popper have learned from Vladimir Nabokov?
Do you love words, or ideas? Email us one but not the other at incrementspodcast@gmail.com.
Special Guest: Brian Boyd.
Back on Liron's Doom Debates podcast! Will we actually get around to the subject of superintelligent AI this time? Is it time to worry about the end of the world? Will Ben and Vaden emotionally recover from the devastating youtube comments from the last episode?
Follow Liron on twitter (@liron) and check out the Doom Debates youtube channel and podcast.
Was Vaden's two week anti-debate bro reeducation camp successful? Tell us at incrementspodcast@gmail.com
Special Guest: Liron Shapira.
Liron Shapira, host of [Doom Debates], invited us on to discuss Popperian versus Bayesian epistemology and whether we're worried about AI doom. As one might expect knowing us, we only got about halfway through the first subject, so get yourselves ready (presumably with many drinks) for part II in a few weeks! The era of Ben and Vaden's rowdy youtube debates has begun. Vaden is jubilant, Ben is uncomfortable, and the world has never been more annoyed by Popperians.
Follow Liron on twitter (@liron) and check out the Doom Debates youtube channel and podcast.
What's your credence that the second debate is as fun as the first? Tell us at incrementspodcast@gmail.com
Special Guest: Liron Shapira.
When Very Bad Wizards meets Very Culty Popperians. We finally decided to have a real life professional philosopher on the pod to call us out on our nonsense, and are honored to have on Tamler Sommers, from the esteemed Very Bad Wizards podcast, to argue with us about the Problem of Induction. Did Popper solve it, or does his proposed solution, like all the other attempts, "fail decisively"?
(Warning: One of the two hosts maaay have revealed their Popperian dogmatism a bit throughout this episode. Whichever host that is - they shall remain unnamed - apologizes quietly and stubbornly under their breath.)
Check out Tamler's website, his podcast (Very Bad Wizards), or follow him on twitter (@tamler).
If you are a Very Bad Wizards listener, hello! We're exactly like Tamler and David, except younger. Come join the Cult of Popper over at incrementspodcast@gmail.com
Image credit: From this Aeon essay on Hume. Illustration by Petra Eriksson at Handsome Frank.
Special Guest: Tamler Sommers.
What do you do when one of your intellectual idols comes on the podcast? Bombard them with disagreements of course. We were thrilled to have David Deutsch on the podcast to discuss whether the concept of belief is a useful lens on human cognition, when probability and statistics should be deployed, and whether he disagrees with Karl Popper on abstractions, the truth, and nothing but the truth.
Follow David on Twitter (@DavidDeutschOxf) or find his website here.
What's the truth about your belief on the probability of useful statistics? Tell us over at incrementspodcast@gmail.com.
Special Guest: David Deutsch.
