In this season finale, we explore how encryption and obfuscation tools are adapting to advanced censorship. Topics include potential client-side backdoors, the centralization of encrypted services, and the role of grassroots tech communities. This concluding discussion frames key challenges and possibilities for future internet governance and user privacy.

MASQUE (sometimes spelled “mask”) expands on HTTPS-based tunneling to conceal additional traffic types, including IP-level tunnels. You’ll look at how MASQUE can make censorship more difficult by blending various protocols into HTTP/3 streams. There is a broader reflection here on protocol “camouflage” and how the arms race escalates as new protocols offer stronger obfuscation against state or ISP-level meddling.

TLS used to expose data like Server Name Indication during the handshake. Encrypted Client Hello (ECH) fixes that by encrypting handshake info, defeating SNI-based blocking. This episode covers how ECH works, its adoption push, and how censors might react. It also explores the privacy vs. visibility debate between users and network operators focused on security.

Shifting into the encryption era, you introduce DNS over HTTPS (DoH) and explain how it attempts to shield DNS queries from on-path observers. This episode investigates the controversies around DoH—whether centralization of DNS resolvers shifts power to big tech, and whether it genuinely thwarts censorship or simply moves the choke point to another layer (e.g., government regulation of public DoH endpoints).

This episode explores how DNS, traditionally in plaintext, exposes user intentions and becomes a target for censorship via spoofing, redirection, or injection. It covers classic DNS-based blocking tactics and examines how the fragmented, distributed nature of the DNS ecosystem influences censorship approaches.

Here, you map out the “where” of censorship: ISPs, internet exchange points (IXPs), backbone providers, and government-run or regulated network segments. The focus is on how each actor can enforce blocking or filtering, and what legal or political frameworks empower them. Real-world examples (e.g., national firewalls) highlight the many ways organizations leverage these choke points to monitor or restrict content.

This episode explores how unencrypted (plaintext) traffic historically enabled governments, ISPs, and entities to monitor and control internet communications. You'll learn foundational concepts—such as internet structure, traffic routing, and administrative interventions—to illustrate why plaintext channels (e.g., classic DNS) facilitate censorship and surveillance.

How do people in censored environments access information? We explore user perspectives, priorities, and barriers to using circumvention tools. Research from Xue et al. highlights challenges in trust, funding, and usability, shaping the future of internet freedom. Created with NotebookLM.

Some governments take censorship further by shutting down the internet entirely. We analyze case studies from Myanmar, Ethiopia, and Sudan, examining economic and social impacts, resistance strategies, and expert insights on the growing trend of shutdowns as a political tool. Created with NotebookLM.

We examine popular circumvention methods—VPNs, Tor, and encrypted DNS (DoH/DoT)—and how governments counter them. What makes these tools effective? What are their limitations? Insights from Feldstein reveal the ongoing battle between censors and those fighting for open internet access. Created with NotebookLM.

Censorship isn’t just about blocking—sometimes, it’s about disruption. This episode covers DDoS attacks, how states and non-state actors deploy them, and their impact on independent media. We discuss mitigation techniques, collateral effects, and whether DDoS remains a viable tool for online suppression. Created with NotebookLM.

We dive into Deep Packet Inspection (DPI), TCP resets, and packet filtering—tools used to inspect and block content. As HTTPS adoption grows, how does it challenge censorship? We examine how encrypted protocols make DPI less effective and discuss the arms race between censors and developers of secure communication tools. Created with NotebookLM. References Nabi, Zubair. “Censorship is Futile.” arXiv, 2 Nov. 2014, https://arxiv.org/pdf/1411.0225v1.pdf. Accessed 31 Jan. 2025. “Global Internet Censorship and Control: 2008–2022.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, https://carnegieendowment.org/files/Global_Internet_Censorship_and_Control_2008-2022.pdf. Accessed 31 Jan. 2025. “Internet Censorship and Control: Essay and Glossary.” Berkman Klein Center for Internet & Society, Dec. 2023, https://cyber.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/2023-12/Internet Censorship and Control Essay and Glossary_0.pdf. Accessed 31 Jan. 2025. Hall, Joseph Lorenzo, et al. “A Survey of Worldwide Censorship Techniques.” RFC 9505, Internet Research Task Force, Nov. 2023, https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9505. Accessed 31 Jan. 2025. “Research2017: Global Internet Censorship - Internet Monitor.” ResearchGate, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/376287996_Research2017_Global_Internet_Censorship_Internet_Monitor. Accessed 31 Jan. 2025. Brunke, Peter J. “PhD Dissertation.” ResearchGate, Dec. 2021, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/366375939_brunke_peter_j_202112_phd. Accessed 31 Jan. 2025. Feldstein, Steven. “Government Internet Shutdowns Are Changing. How Should Citizens and Democracies Respond?” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Mar. 2022, https://carnegie-production-assets.s3.amazonaws.com/static/files/Feldstein_Internet_shutdowns_final.pdf. Accessed 31 Jan. 2025. Xue, Diwen, et al. “Bridging Barriers: A Survey of Challenges and Priorities in the Censorship Circumvention Landscape.” USENIX Security Symposium, Aug. 2024, https://censorbib.nymity.ch/pdf/Xue2024b.pdf. Accessed 31 Jan. 2025. Clayton, Richard, Steven J. Murdoch, and Robert N. M. Watson. “Ignoring the Great Firewall of China.” University of Cambridge, Computer Laboratory, https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rnc1/ignoring.pdf. Accessed 31 Jan. 2025.

We explore early censorship techniques like IP blocking and DNS manipulation, alongside economic levers such as data taxes and ISP restrictions. How did these methods evolve, and how effective were early circumvention strategies? Historical case studies set the stage for more advanced filtering techniques in later episodes. Created with NotebookLM. References 1. Nabi, Zubair. “Censorship is Futile.” *arXiv*, 2 Nov. 2014, https://arxiv.org/pdf/1411.0225v1.pdf. Accessed 31 Jan. 2025. 2. “Global Internet Censorship and Control: 2008–2022.” *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, https://carnegieendowment.org/files/Global_Internet_Censorship_and_Control_2008-2022.pdf. Accessed 31 Jan. 2025. 3. “Internet Censorship and Control: Essay and Glossary.” *Berkman Klein Center for Internet & Society*, Dec. 2023, https://cyber.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/2023-12/Internet%20Censorship%20and%20Control%20Essay%20and%20Glossary_0.pdf. Accessed 31 Jan. 2025. 4. Hall, Joseph Lorenzo, et al. “A Survey of Worldwide Censorship Techniques.” *RFC 9505*, Internet Research Task Force, Nov. 2023, https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9505. Accessed 31 Jan. 2025. 5. “Research2017: Global Internet Censorship - Internet Monitor.” *ResearchGate*, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/376287996_Research2017_Global_Internet_Censorship_Internet_Monitor. Accessed 31 Jan. 2025. 6. Brunke, Peter J. “PhD Dissertation.” *ResearchGate*, Dec. 2021, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/366375939_brunke_peter_j_202112_phd. Accessed 31 Jan. 2025. 7. Feldstein, Steven. “Government Internet Shutdowns Are Changing. How Should Citizens and Democracies Respond?” *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, Mar. 2022, https://carnegie-production-assets.s3.amazonaws.com/static/files/Feldstein_Internet_shutdowns_final.pdf. Accessed 31 Jan. 2025. 8. Xue, Diwen, et al. “Bridging Barriers: A Survey of Challenges and Priorities in the Censorship Circumvention Landscape.” *USENIX Security Symposium*, Aug. 2024, https://censorbib.nymity.ch/pdf/Xue2024b.pdf. Accessed 31 Jan. 2025. 9. Clayton, Richard, Steven J. Murdoch, and Robert N. M. Watson. “Ignoring the Great Firewall of China.” *University of Cambridge, Computer Laboratory*, https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rnc1/ignoring.pdf. Accessed 31 Jan. 2025.

This episode introduces internet censorship, exploring its motivations—political, economic, and cultural. We discuss its impact on societies and individuals, the tools governments use, and a preview of future episodes on filtering, circumvention, and shutdowns. Created with NotebookLM. 1. Nabi, Zubair. “Censorship is Futile.” *arXiv*, 2 Nov. 2014, https://arxiv.org/pdf/1411.0225v1.pdf. Accessed 31 Jan. 2025. 2. “Global Internet Censorship and Control: 2008–2022.” *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, https://carnegieendowment.org/files/Global_Internet_Censorship_and_Control_2008-2022.pdf. Accessed 31 Jan. 2025. 3. “Internet Censorship and Control: Essay and Glossary.” *Berkman Klein Center for Internet & Society*, Dec. 2023, https://cyber.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/2023-12/Internet%20Censorship%20and%20Control%20Essay%20and%20Glossary_0.pdf. Accessed 31 Jan. 2025. 4. Hall, Joseph Lorenzo, et al. “A Survey of Worldwide Censorship Techniques.” *RFC 9505*, Internet Research Task Force, Nov. 2023, https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9505. Accessed 31 Jan. 2025. 5. “Research2017: Global Internet Censorship - Internet Monitor.” *ResearchGate*, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/376287996_Research2017_Global_Internet_Censorship_Internet_Monitor. Accessed 31 Jan. 2025. 6. Brunke, Peter J. “PhD Dissertation.” *ResearchGate*, Dec. 2021, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/366375939_brunke_peter_j_202112_phd. Accessed 31 Jan. 2025. 7. Feldstein, Steven. “Government Internet Shutdowns Are Changing. How Should Citizens and Democracies Respond?” *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, Mar. 2022, https://carnegie-production-assets.s3.amazonaws.com/static/files/Feldstein_Internet_shutdowns_final.pdf. Accessed 31 Jan. 2025. 8. Xue, Diwen, et al. “Bridging Barriers: A Survey of Challenges and Priorities in the Censorship Circumvention Landscape.” *USENIX Security Symposium*, Aug. 2024, https://censorbib.nymity.ch/pdf/Xue2024b.pdf. Accessed 31 Jan. 2025. 9. Clayton, Richard, Steven J. Murdoch, and Robert N. M. Watson. “Ignoring the Great Firewall of China.” *University of Cambridge, Computer Laboratory*, https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rnc1/ignoring.pdf. Accessed 31 Jan. 2025.