Episode Description: “The PLA’s Doctrine of Deception: How China Might Strike Taiwan”

Surprise has always been a decisive force in warfare. For China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA), deception is not a supporting tactic—it is the very heart of its warfighting philosophy. Xi Jinping has exhorted his commanders to “excel at stratagem,” and modern PLA doctrine treats guile, misdirection, and surprise as the keys to defeating a technologically superior adversary.

In this episode of War Lab, we dive deep into the PLA’s doctrine of deception and its application to the most dangerous flashpoint in the world today: a potential invasion of Taiwan. Drawing from historical precedent, doctrinal manuals, and modern capabilities, we explore how China might attempt to paralyze Taipei’s defenses long before the first landing craft reaches shore.

From Sun Tzu’s timeless axiom that “all warfare is based on deception” to the PLA’s own case study of the 1955 Yijiangshan amphibious assault, we trace how deception has been institutionalized at every level of Chinese military thinking. We unpack the PLA’s “Information Deception Methodology,” which integrates concealment, confusion, and inducement to overwhelm adversary intelligence and decision-making. And we look at how modern tools—from decoy drones and electronic “ghost armies” to maritime militia disguised as civilian shipping—could be employed to disguise the real invasion force and fracture Taiwan’s defenses.

But deception is not just about hiding; it’s about shaping the adversary’s perceptions. The PLA’s goal is not a zero-warning attack, but to create ambiguity, hesitation, and doubt—conditions that can delay a decisive response until it is too late. We analyze how Beijing might engineer a crisis to distract or lull Taiwan, sow chaos through covert infiltration and psychological warfare, and conduct multi-pronged feints designed to overwhelm command and control.

Finally, we turn to what this means for the United States and Taiwan. Can modern ISR systems really make the battlefield “transparent,” or will deception once again prove decisive? What would it take for Taiwan to adopt a true “fight tonight” posture? And how can allies flip the script—using deception themselves to complicate PLA planning and blunt its warfighting edge?

This is not just an academic debate. The PLA’s doctrine of deception represents one of the greatest challenges to deterrence in the 21st century. Understanding it is the first step in countering it.

War Lab takes you inside the architecture of modern military power—where innovation, doctrine, and strategy collide.