Analysis of three paragraphs in section c. Right vs. Wrong, in Hegel's Encyclopedia.

¤ 497  Now so long as (compared against this show) the one  intrinsically right, still presumed identical with the several titles,  is affirmed, willed, and recognized, the only diversity lies in this,  that the special thing is subsumed under the one law or right by the  particular will of these several persons. This is naive, non−malicious  wrong. Such wrong in the several claimants is a simple negative  judgement, expressing the civil suit. To settle it there is required a  third judgement, which, as the judgement of the intrinsically right, is disinterested, and a power of giving the one right existence as against  that semblance. 

¤ 498  But (2) if the semblance of right as such is willed against  the right intrinsically by the particular will, which thus becomes  wicked, then the external recognition of right is separated from the  right's true value; and while the former only is respected, the latter  is violated. This gives the wrong of fraud − the infinite judgement as  identical (¤173) − where the nominal relation is retained, but the  sterling value is let slip. 

¤ 499  (3) Finally, the particular will sets itself in opposition  to the intrinsic right by negating that right itself as well as its  recognition or semblance. (Here there is a negatively infinite  judgement (¤ 173) in which there is denied the class as a whole, and  not merely the particular mode − in this case the apparent  recognition.) Thus the will is violently wicked, and commits a crime