Proxy Season Bets, plus Oracle’s 4x CEOs and the rise of Executive Vice Chairs

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PROXY COUNTDOWN

Free Float Media, Inc.

60 episodes

3 weeks ago

The silent female retreat The not-so-secret power of the lead independent director An aggressive activist atmosphere is heating up A college professor in a bow tie gets voted out And on the Big Vote, Matt talks Surveys Trade Wire - BUY/SELL Top Stories: proxy countdown_trade wire_2025 - Google Sheets Tracking Noteworthy 8-Ks since September 24th: DIrector comings and goings: Men added: 22 Men subtracted: 7 Women added: 6 Women subtracted: 5 Down to 2F: Fannie Mae: Karin Kimbrough resigned Down to 1F: F&M BANK: Daphyne S. Thomas retired Rocket Companies, Inc. (RKT): Jennifer Gilbert resigned; appointing Mr. Jay Bray to serve as a Class II director and Mr. Tagar Olson to serve as a Class I director Pitney Bowes: Milena Alberti-Perez resigned (Julie Schoenfeld resigned in July) Stupidities/Oddities: IDEXX LABORATORIES INC /DE (IDXX) elected Karen Peacock Ms. Peacock will stand for election by stockholders as a Class I Director at the Company’s 2027 IonQ, Inc. (IONQ, IONQ-WT) appointed John W. Raymond General Raymond was appointed as a Class I director whose term will expire at the Company’s 2028 Annual Meeting of Stockholders Rocket Companies, Inc. (RKT) appointing Mr. Jay Bray to serve as a Class II director until 2028 Mr. Tagar Olson to serve as a Class I director until 2027 F&M BANK CORP: Daphyne S. Thomas: Upon reaching the mandatory retirement age, Ms. Thomas became an honorary director and will continue to function as such until she tenders her resignation to the board or until the board requests that she tender her resignation. Under Section 2.11 of the Bylaws, an honorary director may attend board meetings but is not entitled to vote. NEOs Disney: Sonia L. Coleman, the Company’s Senior Executive Vice President and Chief Human Resources Officer, changed title was to Senior Executive Vice President and Chief People Officer increased Ms. Coleman’s annual base salary to $1,000,000; increased her target annual bonus opportunity to 175% of her base salary; and increased her target long-term equity incentive annual award value to 375% of her base salary CEOs COMCAST CORP: Michael J. Cavanagh will be appointed Co-CEO along with current CEO and Chair Brian Roberts, the son of Comcast founder Ralph Roberts VERIZON COMMUNICATIONS: lead director Daniel H. Schulman succeeding Hans E. Vestberg Money Norfolk Southern: One-time cash retention to all NEOs Mark R. George—$4,000,000; Jason A. Zampi—$2,250,000; John F. Orr—$3,000,000; Claude E. Elkins—$2,000,000; and Anil Bhatt—$2,000,000 Pepsi CFO Golden Hello: $9M Strategy Inc: increase to the annual cap for the security program maintained for Michael J. Saylor, Executive Chairman/former CEO/co-founder, under which the Company covers certain security-related costs. Previously, the annual cap for this program was $1,400,000; effective in calendar year 2025, the cap will be increased to $2,000,000 Dell Technologies: one-time performance-based stock option award to COO Jeffrey Clarke valued at $132.4M CSX CORP: appointed Stephen Angel as CEO; $10.1M golden hello PROXY CAGE MATCH Activist investors launched a record number of new campaigns in Q3, with 61 new campaigns, up sharply from 36 a year earlier. Barclays’ new data show that activism is accelerating globally, with a 90% quarter-on-quarter increase in the U.S. Year-to-date figures indicate nearly 191 campaigns targeting 178 companies, with activists securing 98 board seats and driving approximately 25 CEO departures thus far Japanese game company GungHo Online Entertainment, has rejected a proposal from activist investors to dismiss its longtime CEO Kazuki Morishita The proposal was put forward by Strategic Capital, a Tokyo-based investment fund which controls over 11% of GungHo’s voting rights. During an extraordinary shareholders’ meeting held at its request on September 24, the activist pushed for: 1) the requirements for ousting an executive to be relaxed 2) for Morishita to be fired from his position as CEO. While the first proposal was accepted, the attempt to remove Morishita failed, not gaining enough votes from majority shareholders. Irenic Capital Management, which owns about 2% of Workiva, wants board and governance changes: Specifically, the hedge fund is urging the company to collapse its dual-class share structure, make all board members stand for election every year and add two newcomers, including Irenic executive Krishna Korupolu, to the board. The hedge fund also expressed considerable concern about the company's governance, noting that five of its seven directors have served on the board since 2014. Acadia Healthcare has appointed Todd Young as CFO, amid growing pressure from activist investors Khrom Capital and Engine Capital — which together own more than 8% of the company VOTE RESULTS TABLE Freedom Holding Corp. (FRHC) 0 SHP classified; Philippe Vogeleer 99.2% FEDEX CORP (FDX) 1 SHP: independent board chairman 43% yes 97% yes; Smith 10% NO 37% NO pay PAUL S. WALSH (CHAIR) 94% Silvia Davila 97% Susan Patricia Griffith 98% Amy B. Lane 99.5% Susan C. Schwab 96% GENERAL MILLS INC (GIS) 2 SHP Regenerative Agriculture Practices Within Supply Chain 27% YES Separate the Board Chair and CEO Roles 36% YES avg 97% YES RPM INTERNATIONAL (RPM) 0 SHP 99.7% YES Craig Morford; 9/12 up for election as company in process of declassification CARPENTER TECHNOLOGY CORP (CRS) 0 SHP Classified at John Wiley & Sons: 54% said NO to Governance Committee Chair Brian Hemphill The Board, upon recommendation of the Governance Committee, determined not to accept Mr. Hemphill’s resignation: “The Board concluded that the voting outcome reflected proxy advisory firm recommendations unrelated to Mr. Hemphill's individual performance or contributions. The Board determined that Mr. Hemphill's continued service is in the best interests of the Company and its shareholders” THE BIG VOTE PICKS DAMION Upcoming Meetings September 29- AGM Date Company SHPs # Notes 10/13 MillerKnoll Inc 0 Classified: 3 dirs 10/14 Procter & Gamble 1 As You Sow: Plastic Packaging 23% 10/16 Medtronic 0 Irish 10/16 CACI International 0 no Say on Pay; 3 directors Matt SURVEY SEASON Executives PwC Board Effectiveness Survey - August 2025 All NEOs, ~500 of them Biggest representation in tech/media (23%) Mostly mid (35%) and large (26%) companies Directors PwC Annual Corporate Directors Survey - October 2025 More than 600 directors surveyed Mostly mid cap (33%) and large cap (37%) Mostly men (65%) - and no question about race/ethnicity Mostly longer tenured (6+ years, 56%) Asset Owners Morningstar’s Voice of the Asset Owner Survey 2025 - October 2025 500 asset owners, 19tn in assets Mostly EU and APAC, 20% US Mostly 1-100bn in assets SURVEYS SAY… How important is voting out a director? Executives: 93% of executives say at least one director should be replaced, 78% say 2 or more Directors: 55% think AT LEAST ONE should be replaced, and 7% of directors - nearly 1 in 10 - think MORE THAN TWO directors Investors: 35% said they voted - IN EITHER DIRECTION - at all To put that in perspective, investor voter turnout is roughly equivalent to voter turnout in Syria (37%) Are boards any good? Executives: 35% of executives rate their boards as “excellent” or “good” IT executives think their boards are the WORST - only 21% think they’re effective at all, and 40% think they’re straight up “Poor” Directors: 68% of board Boards think they have an effective assessment process Investors: only 35% of investors said board composition was material AT ALL, much less worrying about how effective those boards were Are we culling directors that suck? Executives: 50% of executives feel confident a board will remove an underperformer Directors: 34% of directors think the chair/lead director is “very effective” in dealing with underperforming directors - the lowest of the options Investors: Only 35% even VOTE, and the average vote for a director is 96% in favor - 0.2% of directors annually are voted out Why aren’t we cutting directors exactly?? Executives: 57% said “Board leadership is unwilling to have difficult conversations with underperforming directors”, while 48% say “Individual director assessments are not performed” This checks out - only 27% of directors said as part of the assessment process, they did individual assessments ACTION ITEM: USE DATA TO DO INDIVIDUAL ASSESSMENTS Directors: The main reason why they haven’t been replaced is “personal relationships with board members” Investors: Only 35% even VOTE, but 52% do vote on shareholder resolutions - maybe if there was a shareholder resolution that said “do a report on individual director assessments, focusing on old, long tenured, underperforming directors”, they might actually approve a report on it since they won’t vote against a human? What makes a sucky director? Executives: advanced age, overboarding, long tenure, and unprepared for meetings When asked what a coaching a board chair should give underperforming directors: 36% say “not actively participating in discussions”, and 33% say dominating discussions Directors: “does not meaningfully contribute to discussions” and “long tenure” Investors: only 14% of asset owners find it “very useful” to do stewardship, which includes voting proxies, and 16% said they “don’t know” if it’s useful - the only time we see votes against consistently is for attendance and overboarding (like SUPER overboarding) What’s the most important issue? Executives: Executives are asking boards to spend more time… on ESG? 50%, the highest overall ask. What keeps them up at night is talent management (18%) Directors: 34% said they plan on adding “industry expertise” - which suggests 1 in 3 boardrooms might have none? Investors: Business ethics remains number 1, and is the TOP RANKED material issue of every issue they asked - 68% of asset owners agreed What do boards need? Executives: 37% said more education Directors: 45% said more education Investors: Not asked because they don’t care Other fun survey tidbits… Only 15% of executives think the board has sufficient gender/racial/ethnic diversity, while… 25% of directors thought they could improve the board by seeking “more diverse viewpoints” Boards think - at a 94% plus rate - their interactions with management were very or somewhat effective, including “developing relationship with management outside of the boardroom” So what do you do with this, investors? Executives WANT YOU TO VOTE OUT DIRECTORS Directors ALSO WANT YOU TO VOTE THEM OUT ACTION: VOTE OUT DIRECTORS - find underperformers, long-tenured or over-aged directors and swap them - only directors care about “collegiality”, executives don’t care because they need diverse viewpoints ACTION: Stop obsessing over shareholder proposals - they don’t matter nearly as much as you think they do investors Directors themselves seem like they don’t have enough expertise on the industry where they’re a director, and investors are worried directors are in it for themselves (ethics) while executives need them to think about exogenous risk (ESG) ACTION: It’s time to marry skills of directors to companies, looking for the exogenous long term risks facing an industry - use data to find them! ACTION: Don’t ask about AI skills on the board, they have to manage ALL exogenous risks over the long term, AI among them - when you myopically focus on just one, you miss the next wave of risk

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Proxy Season Bets, plus Oracle’s 4x CEOs and the rise of Executive Vice Chairs

PROXY COUNTDOWN

54 minutes 49 seconds

1 month ago

Proxy Season Bets, plus Oracle’s 4x CEOs and the rise of Executive Vice Chairs

2025-2026 PROXY SEASON COUNTDOWN: BETTING LINES Jay Hoag as canary in the “investors REALLY don’t care about their directors” coal mine - what’s Hoag’s votes FOR this year? Pursuant to the Company’s director resignation policy, the Nominating and Governance Committee (the “Nominating and Governance Committee”) of the Board considered Mr. Hoag’s offer of resignation and whether to recommend that the Board accept or reject the offer. Mr. Hoag did not participate in the Committee or the Board’s determination regarding his resignation. The Nominating and Governance Committee considered a variety of factors relative to the best interests of the Company and its stockholders, as more fully described below. The Nominating and Governance Committee recommended that the Board reject Mr. Hoag’s resignation offer. On June 22, 2025, the Board rejected Mr. Hoag’s resignation. The Board, consistent with the Nominating and Governance Committee’s recommendation, determined that Mr. Hoag’s continued service as a member of the Board is in the best interests of the Company and its stockholders. Mr. Hoag will continue to serve on the Nominating and Governance Committee and as lead independent director of the Board until the Company’s 2026 Annual Meeting of Stockholders or until his earlier resignation or removal. Attendance Record. We believe that Mr. Hoag did not receive a majority of votes cast in his election to the Board because he attended less than 75% of the meetings of his total board and committee meetings in 2024. Upon the recommendation of the Nominating and Governance Committee to reject Mr. Hoag’s offer of resignation, the Board determined that his absences in 2024 did not indicate a lack of commitment to his duties, noting that Mr. Hoag possesses an otherwise exemplary attendance record. Mr. Hoag’s attendance rate was 97% in the five years prior to 2024. The Nominating and Governance Committee as well as the Board noted that despite his absence from certain meetings during 2024, Mr. Hoag remained engaged with the Company and Board activities by attending meetings with senior management, engaging in pre-Board meeting memos, and helping to set agenda topics for meetings. In addition, Mr. Hoag has committed to returning to his historic pattern of meeting attendance and continuing to be fully committed to the Board. Line: 89% (-110 OVER / +105 UNDER; implied odds 52.4% over, 47.6% under) Will a director be voted out in an uncontested election this year for a reason OUTSIDE of attendance at a big US company? The average percentage of directors getting less than 50% of the vote is 0.2% - generally it happens due to activism OR attendance. Will it happen for some other reason? LINE: -20000 NO / +50000 YES (implied odds: 99.5% chance of NO, 0.2% chance of YES; $100 wins either $0.0002 or $50,000) Highest/lowest votes FOR a director in the US? Highest: 99.94% (-115 OVER / +110 UNDER) Lowest: 38.0% (+120 OVER / -115 UNDER) How many directors will be added inside 30 days after the AGM this year? 54 US companies added 56 directors inside 30 days after the AGM in 2025 - that’s 56 times the shareholder democracy was subverted to create incumbents without elections. The majority of the time it’s done through board expansion or done on classified boards - which makes it much worse, as directors can serve as many as 3 years before their FIRST election. Was it a banner year? LINE: 61 adds (-105 OVER / +102 UNDER) The average percentage of women on boards will be? Most recent data shows a 22% drop in new diverse candidates on boards, and Damion pulled a stunning number of “Down to 2” as a common refrain for boards looking to diversify away from women. The current average number of women on large cap US boards is 30% - how far does the average move after 2025-6? LINE: 28% (+200 OVER / -185 UNDER) - was 30% for US companies in 2024-5 Disney’s Mel Lagomasino vote total Lagomasino was the target of Nelson Peltz’s “vote out” campaign - and ISS sided with Peltz at the time 2023: 92% YES 2024: 63% YES 2025: 98% YES 2026?: 92% (OVER -200 / UNDER +175) Will any shareholders remember that ISS suggested WITHHOLD on Brookdale Senior Living director Lee Wielansky? ISS Recommends “Withhold” votes on long tenured Brookdale Senior Living directors Lee Wielansky, Chair of the Investment Committee, and Victoria Freed, Chair of the Nominating and Governance Committee: “Given the tenure and positions of Wielansky and Freed, they are arguably the most culpable among incumbent directors for the current state of affairs.” 2024: Wielansky (99.6% YES) and Freed (98.8% YES) 2025: Wielansky (61.5% YES) and Freed (63.0% YES) 2026?: Wielansky 98% (+110 OVER / -105 UNDER) Freed 97% (-105 OVER / +105 UNDER) Musk’s pay package What’s the final vote for Musk’s NEW pay package - not the one they robbed employees to pay him to make up for his compromised initial pay package - the EXTRA trillion they want to give him to keep him motivated, because $1.7tn isn’t enough to keep someone motivated, he wants $2.7tn… and frankly, who gets out of bed for less than $700bn anymore? 2018: 73% (look how well that turned out for America!) 2025?: 84% (-190 UNDER / +200 OVER) Damion line: 73% Over / under and highest number of shareholder proposals? In 2025, Alphabet clocked in with highest number of shareholder proposals at 13, followed by Meta at 9, Amazon at 8, and Walmart and Berkshire tied at 7. Who do you bet? Alphabet: 8 (+110 OVER / -115 UNDER), +350 for most SHPs (last year: 13, 1st) Meta: 5 (-115 OVER / +125 UNDER); +450 for most (last year: 9, 2nd) Amazon: 9 (+120 OVER / -150 UNDER); +300 for most (last year: 8, 3rd) Walmart: 4 (-110 OVER / +105 UNDER); +600 for most Apple: 6 (-110 OVER / +105 UNDER); +700 for most Disney: 9 (-110 OVER / +105 UNDER); +325 for most JPMorgan: 7 (-110 OVER / +105 UNDER); +400 for most Exxon: 1 (+150 OVER / -200 UNDER); +2000 for most Starbucks: 3 (-110 OVER / +105 UNDER); +900 for most Chevron: 4 (-110 OVER / +105 UNDER); +1200 for most Pfizer: 1 (-110 OVER / +105 UNDER); +1500 for most Winningest proponents Last year, the average vote getting by proponent was as follows: Activists: 23% Anti woke: 2.2% AOs / Pensions: 11.9% Woke: 10% Governance: 29% Religious: 10.3% Who you got for averages this year? Activists: 29% (-110 OVER / +105 UNDER); Anti woke: 3% (-110 OVER / +105 UNDER); AOs / Pensions: 9% (-110 OVER / +105 UNDER); Woke: 7% (-110 OVER / +105 UNDER); Governance: 40% (-110 OVER / +105 UNDER); Religious: 10% (-110 OVER / +105 UNDER); John Cheveddan total shareholder proposals 2025: 27 2026?: 32 (+175 OVER / -150 UNDER) Number of non governance shareholder proposals that will WIN (defined as >50% votes in favor)? 2025: 0 2026?: 1 (+4500 OVER / -3300 UNDER; implied odds 2.2% OVER, 97% UNDER)

PROXY COUNTDOWN