Professor Andrew Futter specialises in contemporary nuclear weapons issues, specifically emerging technologies and their impact on nuclear strategy, stability and arms control. His work is centred on raising international awareness of nuclear risks, and shaping the climate of ideas that ensures governments and policymakers can make the best decisions possible. 

In this interview we discussed Andrew's book, Hacking the Bomb: Cyber Threats and Nuclear Weapons, which covers how "the increasing sophistication of hacking and cyber weapons, information warfare capabilities, and other dynamics of the cyber age are challenging the management, safeguards, and warning systems for nuclear weapons." 1. One of the most counter-intuitive differences you point out between nuclear weapons and cyber operations is that whereas nuclear weapons need to be openly declared in order to exhibit their coercive power, cyber capabilities must be kept secret in order to maintain the enemies wariness of how they might be used. Instead of cyber warfare being seen as a separate field to nuclear warfare, to what extent could cyber operations be used a precursor to kinetic conflict in order to electronically degrade the enemy's nuclear weapons before a shot has been fired?

2. Why is the human being still the weakest link in nuclear cyber security?

3. You mention Peggy Morse, the Director of ICBM systems at Boeing, saying that the age of some nuclear command and control systems, such as 8-inch floppy discs, could actually protect the US nuclear deterrent from cyber threats. Do you think archaic computer systems could actually be being used by nuclear proliferators such as North Korea to prevent cyber infiltration by the US and others?

4. By using commercial Windows operating systems rather than more secure Linux based systems on its Vanguard class submarines, is the UK's nuclear deterrent at risk of cyber disablement?

5. How might the ever increasing sophistication of ballistic missile defences and cyber operations constitute a serious threat to assured retaliation or even be viewed as facilitating a nonnuclear first-strike capability, thereby ushering in a third nuclear age?