In this conversation, Hunter interviews Jerome Drevon, a senior analyst at the International Crisis Group, about his book 'From Jihad to Politics,' which explores the transformation of Syrian jihadi organizations into political entities. Drevon discusses the complexities of the Syrian Civil War, the evolution of groups like HTS and Ahrar Al-Sham, and the importance of understanding these organizations within their social and political contexts. He emphasizes the significance of field research and the need for a nuanced approach to studying insurgent groups, highlighting the challenges they face in balancing radical ideologies with the demands of governance and political legitimacy.

His book is available for purchase (if you can, support the research this way!): https://a.co/d/eBBZaJz (Amazon) or 

Or publicly via the PDF: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/382491710_From_Jihad_to_Politics_How_Syrian_Jihadis_Embraced_Politics

Order Jerome’s new book “ Transformed by the People” : https://a.co/d/0xYkWih

Keywords: Syria, Jihad, Politics, HTS, Ahrar Al-Sham, Al-Qaeda, Institutionalization, Field Research, Jihadi Organizations, Middle East

Notes from the discussion:

Jerome shares his surprise at the speed of the HTS-led offensive that led to the collapse of the Assad regime. While he and his colleagues had observed significant transformations within HTS in Northwest Syria, the swiftness of their victory was unexpected even for the group itself. The international community had largely ignored the evolving situation in Syria, making the outcome all the more shocking.

Hunter asks why Jerome focused on Ahrar Al-Sham and Jabhat al-Nusra (which became HTS) out of the hundreds of groups in the Syrian conflict. Jerome explains that unlike ISIS, which he found less interesting due to its reliance on "violence for the sake of it," these two groups had to adapt their radical ideas to survive. Their evolution and willingness to learn from their environment presented a more complex and compelling case study.

A key concept from Jerome's book is institutionalization, which he breaks down into internal and external dimensions.

• Internal Institutionalization: This refers to how a group organizes itself beyond its initial leaders, creating structures for recruitment, decision-making, and providing basic services. This allows a group to survive the loss of key figures.

• External Institutionalization: This involves how a group coordinates with other armed factions, governs civilian populations, and interacts with foreign states.

Jerome argues that this process of institutionalization, rather than simple centralization, constrains a group and forces it to make concessions, a step ISIS was never willing to take.

Jerome prefers the term "politicization" over "moderation" to describe the transformation of groups like HTS. He argues that "moderate" is a subjective term, and these groups were still committed to violence. Instead, they became more political by recognizing that military action is a means to a political end, not the end itself. This involves making alliances, dealing with foreign states, and making concessions to the local population.

Jerome explains the "jihadi paradox": the very factors that make transnational jihadi groups successful (like their global networks and clear ideology) also prevent them from achieving ultimate political victory. Their transnational nature inevitably draws international opposition. Groups like the Taliban and HTS understood that to win, they had to distance themselves from transnational jihad and focus on becoming national governing bodies.

Hunter asks about Jerome's personal experience interviewing the now-interim president of Syria. Jerome describes al-Sharaa as a decisive commander and leader who commands respect, rather than a deep intellectual thinker. He notes that al-Sharaa was willing to learn and adapt, representing a younger generation poised to do things differently in Syria