Season 6 continues with another presentation from our 2022 annual conference, Engaged Phenomenology II: Explorations of Embodiment, Emotions, and Spatiality. This episode features a presentation from Eugenia Stefanello, University of Padova.  Eugenia Stefanello 'Empathy, Narrative Medicine, and (Mis)Representation of Illness: A Phenomenological Perspective'  Abstract:   It is often argued that mutual understanding is crucial in clinical encounters. In particular, narrative medicine proponents strongly believe that through mutual understanding and doctors' narrative skills it is possible to increase both empathy in the doctor-patient relationship and affiliation within the community of healthcare professionals (Charon, 2017; DasGupta & Charon, 2004). However, although empathy appears to be one of the main aims of narrative medicine, it has not been extensively analyzed by its supporters. For this reason, I argue that narrative medicine should discuss on the one hand what the role of empathy is in narrative medicine's proposal and, on the other hand, what kind of empathy should be involved in the clinical encounter. In this regard, I show that if the type of empathy involved in narrative medicine is understood as synonymous with the doctors' ability to simulate the patients' perspectives as proposed by Simulation Theory (Goldman, 2006), narrative medicine and the clinical encounter can be negatively impacted (Gallagher, 2007). In addition, when empathy is reduced to a simulation-plus-projection mechanism, it can not only radicalize the other's alterity triggering possible harm towards others (Bubandt & Willerslev, 2015) but also disregard whether and how deeply people want or need to share their perspectives and ignore the situatedness of the empathic understanding exacerbating existing inequalities (Hollan, 2008, 2017). Finally, I suggest that narrative medicine should explore alternative accounts of empathy. Specifically, the phenomenological approach (Scheler, 1913; Stein, 1917) offers one that is multifaceted and layered in which empathy has a specific but partial role in understanding others (Throop & Zahavi, 2020). Accordingly, I will try to show that phenomenological empathy seems able to provide healthcare professionals guidance to improve their narrative skills and achieve the ultimate goal of affiliation, without having to face the objections raised against a simulationist concept of empathy (Vendrell Ferran, 2015; Zahavi, 2014).   References Bubandt, N., & Willerslev, R. (2015). The Dark Side of Empathy: Mimesis, Deception, and the Magic of Alterity. Comparative Studies in Society and History, 57(1), 5–34. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0010417514000589 Charon, R. (2017). The principles and practice of narrative medicine. Oxford University Press. DasGupta, S., & Charon, R. (2004). Personal Illness Narratives: Using Reflective Writing to Teach Empathy. Academic Medicine, 79(4), 351–356. https://doi.org/10.1097/00001888-200404000-00013 Gallagher, S. (2007). Simulation trouble. Social Neuroscience, 2(3–4), 353–365. https://doi.org/10.1080/17470910601183549 Goldman, A. I. (2006). Simulating minds: The philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience of mindreading. Oxford University Press. Hollan, D. (2008). Being There: On the Imaginative Aspects of Understanding Others and Being Understood. Ethos, 36(4), 475–489. Hollan, D. (2017). Empathy across cultures. In The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Empathy. Routledge. Scheler, M. (1913). The nature of sympathy (W. Stark, Trans.). Routledge and KPaul. Stein, E. (1917). On the Problem of Empathy (W. Stein, Trans.). Springer Netherlands. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-5546-7 Throop, C. J., & Zahavi, D. (2020). Dark and Bright Empathy: Phenomenological and Anthropological Reflections. Current Anthropology, 61(3), 283–303. https://doi.org/10.1086/708844 Vendrell Ferran, Í. (2015). Empathy, Emotional Sharing and Feelings in Stein's Early Work. Human