The book argues that "there are no accidents," but rather predictable outcomes of underlying systemic and societal factors [i, 3]. The common narrative of accidents often focuses on individual human error, obscuring larger contexts like power and vulnerability [i, 1, 7].
Powerful entities, such as automakers, have historically shifted blame for fatalities to individual drivers to protect their interests [i, 4, 27]. Corporate decisions driven by profit can create dangerous conditions leading to predictable accidents, exemplified by increased injuries at Georgia-Pacific after Koch Industries' takeover and the hazardous conditions at the Imperial Food Products factory fire [i, 4, 5, 7].
Crystal Eastman's early 20th-century work showed that frequent, less sensational workplace incidents caused a massive toll, challenging the focus on individual carelessness [i, 3, 16, 87]. Hugh DeHaven's research shifted focus to crashworthiness, highlighting the role of the built environment in mitigating harm [i, 3, 26, 87]. Large-scale disasters like Three Mile Island and Deepwater Horizon reveal systemic failures and cost-cutting measures, with official narratives often downplaying severity and broader consequences, including impacts on undiscovered species [i, 15, 17, 19, 22, 24].
The concept of risk is explored, showing how engineering standards can prioritize flow over safety based on flawed assumptions [i, 27]. The opioid crisis is presented as a consequence of pharmaceutical companies' actions and subsequent blaming of "abusers," while stigma significantly impacts societal responses to issues like drug overdose [i, 35, 103].
Economic disparities correlate with higher accident rates in poorer and marginalized communities due to limited resources and systemic neglect [i, 51, 119]. The book advocates for shifting from victim-blaming to controlling dangerous conditions through better design and regulations, citing examples like Portugal's decriminalization of drugs and Sweden's Vision Zero traffic safety program [i, 61, 62, 69, 70]. Failures in the design and regulation of the Boeing 737 Max demonstrate the deadly consequences of prioritizing profit over safety [i, 16].
Ultimately, the book calls for recognizing "accidents" as preventable consequences of societal structures and creating safer conditions [i, 61, 62]. The author's personal experience highlights the inadequacy of simple "accident" narratives and the need to seek complex truths for prevention [i, 10].